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Abstract 
 
The famous French psychoanalyst, Françoise Dolto (1908–1988), proposes a 
remarkable narrative of life between conception and weaning. Thoroughly original while 
loyally Freudian, Dolto discovers that precocious audition in a fluid blur of subject and 
object impacts psychical structuration, as «phonèmes» inform nascent symbolization. 
Dolto’s oeuvre derives from the assumption that life is sourced in the unconscious, thus she 
delivers a powerful attestation of the primary processes. Following Freud, this study 
elaborates Dolto’s particularly salient theory-by-testimony of the transference as an ‘inter-
relational libidinal dialectic’—the wild circulation of unconscious affects. Dolto is the 
foremost theorist of the archaic stage of psychical development, wherein originates the 
transference as securitizing continuity with our idiosyncratic libidinal histories. And Dolto’s 
unusual body of work, equal parts personal and professional, permits an exceptional 
demonstration of the passive movement of the autobiographical in the theoretical, as her 
own archaic echoes reverberate in homonymic repetitions and weighty silences. Finding 
such traces—a notion I source in Derrida—suggests that the transport of dream-work 
through words produces in writing (thus enabling in reading) what I advance as the 
transference in texts.  Dolto’s exploration of our unspeakable ‘time before thought’ is 
supported by a half-century of clinical practice, and engaging Dolto’s complex material, I 
venture into six overlapping fields of words as «objets médiateurs»: filiation, transmission, 
listening, reading, speaking and writing. Dolto proffers convincing evidence that primitive 
audition destines language to elude grammars, rooting it instead in «filiation symbolique»: a 
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paradoxical ontology of melancholy and play, as dreams offer consolations for our difficult 
coming to reality, and we only advance on confirmations of archaic security—witnessing. 
Thus bridging a compelling French corpus with English audiences, this dissertation unsettles 
biography, linguistics, literacy and pedagogy, as the investment of enigmatic phonemes with 
indelible significance troubles the word with a phantastic prehistory. 
 
Keywords: continuity, dream-work, Freud, homonym, passive pulses, phoneme, 
psychoanalysis, trace, unconscious. 
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For Bertha Pappenheim, the first patient of the ‘talking cure,’  
and for all the youngest patients of psychoanalysis, in enduring gratitude for their passage in 
the literature, I offer this small scholarly work as “an attempt to follow an idea consistently, 
out of curiosity, to see where it will lead” (Freud, 1920, 24). For highly original play is 
bound to the origins of psychoanalysis by virtue of the particular task it undertakes: “to lift 
the veil of amnesia which hides the earliest years of childhood” (Freud, 1933a, 28). 
 
 
And for Françoise Dolto (née Marette), my inestimable subject-object, 
in profound appreciation for her astonishing generosity in leaving behind a bounty of 
intimate materials, whereby I hope readers can experience the transference in texts: evidence 
of the unconscious in human creativity as “autobiographical—not what is called the 
‘autobiographical genre’ but rather the autobiographicity that greatly overflows the ‘genre’ 
of autobiography...in an existential experience that is singular, and if not ineffable at least 
untranslatable or on the verge of untranslatability” (Derrida, 2001a, 41). 
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While the reader may experience what seems like an avalanche of references, I 
believe I have done my best to simply be as thorough as possible, being fully cognizant of 
my responsibility in bringing Françoise Dolto’s project to new audiences, in English. If I 
have managed to convey something of her phenomenal work and thought, she deserves full 
credit. Any interpretive failings, errors, omissions or weaknesses are mine alone.  
On the use of the name “Dolto” in this work 
Except where noted as C. (Catherine) Dolto, daughter, formerly Dolto-Tilitch, who is 
currently a pediatrician, midwife, writer and haptotherapist, as well as Dolto’s legatee 
(Wikipédia, 2014f); or B. (Boris) Dolto, deceased husband, formerly a physician and a 
forerunner of physiotherapy in France (Wikipédia, 2014c), all occurrences of the name 
‘Dolto’ in this work refer to Françoise Dolto, whose name prior to marriage was Marette.  
On the translations in this work 
I am a native speaker of French, originally from the city of Quebec, in Quebec, 
Canada. All translations herein (of Dolto, Derrida & others) are my own free translations. In 
the interest of concision, Dolto’s precise, original wording in French is provided alongside 
translations only where it is deemed to impact directly on the main thesis of this dissertation, 
as in notably idiomatic or homonymic passages. On the other hand, where a French 
expression is a cognate of English (as in, «une expression tragique»), the translations are 
omitted instead. 
A final note on translation 
In German, Freud’s wortgebilden educate, form and construct, being neither mere 
‘word-things’ (objects) nor simply ‘word-presentations’ (visual). In turn, the expression, 
‘dream-interpretation,’ silences the trau (trust) embedded in Freud’s traumdeutung. And of 
his trieb—urge, sprout, desire, instinct and work—we translate only ‘drive,’ or in French, 
«pulsions.»  Thus do both the word and the subject begin with the problem of translation.   
Kathleen Saint-Onge   (Toronto, 2016) 
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Chapter One: Introduction ~ Witness & Filiation 
Abstract: In this chapter, I describe Dolto’s opening to the archaic origins of the 
transference, and I source the filiation of her ideas in Freud’s drive theory. Beginning with 
her childhood pledge to be a doctor of education, I outline her medical and analytic training, 
as well as her social context among noteworthy peers in France, where psychoanalysis 
began with the need for translating words. I relate Dolto’s crucial desire to be a witness of 
the unconscious, and I introduce the reader to the enigmatic echoes of her corpus. I 
contextualize my work as a psychobiography, defining my method, and I present Derrida’s 
notion of ‘trace’ as a means for thinking about the transference in Dolto’s texts.  
 
Trieb,” the drive, also designates in German the sprout, in the sense of what grows…but also 
in the sense of the development of what is born, the shoot, the bud, the child…This pulsion, 
or this pulse, is a force, but a force whose meaning remains absolute, hence unspecified 
(Jacques Derrida, 2003/2010, 158). 
 
Introduction 
This psychobiographic study of Françoise Dolto is a work of the archive in all ways. 
I rely on artifacts from her childhood and treasures from the analytic archive, like her 
dissertation of 1939—its fragile pages leaving a trail of dust, as if self-effacing while 
disseminating. With Dolto, I examine the human archive—the infant—primarily aided by 
Freud’s archive, his ‘dream book.’ Thus I engage “primal scenes of reading” (Mishra Tarc, 
2015, 66)—the infant’s, Dolto’s, Freud’s and my own. For my work is rooted in early 
childhood ruptures that left me questioning the psychical work of biligualism (Saint-Onge, 
2013),
1 
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craving language memoirs and «joual» [slang]. And Dolto’s project is also 
archival—narrating history before thought and “the infinitely other origin of language” 
(Derrida, 1967c, 224). She questions the boundaries of self, as pronouns slip from first to 
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third, engaging material not thinkable as ‘I,’ nor even thinkable. Thus, Dolto provokes the 
reader’s ‘othering,’ as we are invited back to a messy ‘time’ where words begin, into an as-if 
discursive ‘space.’ Enlisting the primary processes prevailing—drives and dream-work—I 
eschew linear chronology in favour of word-association as ‘method.’ So doing, I structure 
my chapters as six fields informed by language—filiation, transmission, listening, reading, 
speaking and writing—as content suggests its structure. Young-Bruehl explains:“When you 
write a full-length biography, turning-point images slowly emerge to you and you use them 
to frame the book”(1998b, 24). Through these fields, the reader will encounter Dolto’s 
phenomenal productivity and likely never think about the infant, or the word, the same way. 
For Dolto’s subject is precocious indeed, and his unconscious vitality inscribes, “dreams as 
records of what is unthinkable about history” (Farley, 2011, 24). I do not, however, tender a 
history of child psychoanalysis in France, nor do I focus on Dolto’s influence on her peers.  
Rather, I seek only the transference of affective investments from Dolto’s history to her 
thought. Transference is “that method by which we satisfy our instincts” (Freud, 1912/1990, 
28), and it is of crucial value since, “psychic processes are essentially unconscious; 
becoming conscious, or being conscious, is not a necessary characteristic of psychic life” 
(Freud, 1907/1962, 124). 
Psychobiography as a genre began with Freud’s study of DaVinci in 1910, and 
thousands have been published since then (Runyan, 1988, 299; Wikipedia, 2016). As 
Runyan explains, “psychobiography is spread across a substantial number of existing 
disciplines” (1988, 298), as “the use of any explicit or formal psychological theory in 
biography” (1984, 201). Freud’s DaVinci makes its first appearance as a work-in-progress in 
the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society of 1 December 1909 (1909/1967, 338-
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346). Yet 18 months prior, the Minutes reveal Freud’s attention is already alert:“someday 
one should investigate how infantile impressions influence great achievements” (1908/1962, 
361). And six months further back, Freud announces his interest in the “relation between the 
artistic creation and the poet’s life” (1907/1962, 265-266). The idea spreads to Abraham, a 
Member, who studies first Giovanni Segantini, in the relation of the unconscious to “artistic 
creativeness” (1911/1955a, 211), and the capacity for sublimation (Ibid, 245); then 
Amonthep, showing, among other things, the after-effects of an attachment to a wet-nurse 
(1912/1955, 268f). Hitschmann, another Member, states in 1911 his desire to study “works 
from an author’s youth…and the element that his writings have in common” (in Nunberg & 
Federn, 1974, 232), and writes his “psychoanalytic biographies” in 1912-1948 (Hitschmann, 
1957). His notion of the genre usefully invokes theory as creativity, asking “Why does a 
man solve precisely this problem and in precisely this way?” (Ibid, 65). Two close 
disciplines should not be confused with the genre, however. The first is Lifton’s 
“psychohistory” (2011, 344), about shared historical themes, intended to depart from the 
“psychoanalytic model of instinctual drives” (1974a, 31; 1983, 36; 2011, 365 & 373). The 
second is Edel’s “literary biography” (1959; 1987), focused on how an author’s fantasies 
enter stories, but refusing the unconscious, the drives, and psychoanalysts who “blazon their 
incompetence on ground where they do not belong” (1959, 93). Somewhat more congenial 
is Elms, who views DaVinci as the model (1988, 19), but is oddly harnessed to quantitative 
methods invoking hypotheses, validity and databases (2007, 111-112); further, Elms has an 
avowed “passion for pathography” (1994,9), in opposition to Freud’s intention. Closer to 
Freud is Fernandez, who begins with DaVinci’s “dream of the vulture” (1972, 17; 1975, 32), 
studies the “childhood of the artist” (1972, 39), and focuses on the “interaction between man 
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and the oeuvre in unconscious motivations”(1972, 38-39; also 1975, 12). In fact, his 
psychobiography of Cesare Pavese provides priceless references to a word appearing in 
associations in several novels (1967, 371-375)—and of the literary return of a wet-nurse 
(1967, 123, 158 & 305). But paradoxically, he rejects the «Freud archaïque» (1975, 281) and 
considers the «théorie de la sublimation…une imposture» (1975, 281-283). Roudinesco 
remarks on the anomaly, admitting Fernandez is a major proponent—yet one “inspired by 
the esthetic of psychopathology” (1975a, 30) that “distances itself from the Freudian 
initiative” (Ibid, 29). Conversely, Roudinesco lauds Bonaparte’s study of Poe as true to 
Freud’s intent, by concentrating on the unconscious, repressed childhood memory, and 
repetition in an oeuvre (Ibid, 46); Freud actually prefaces that study for his “friend and 
pupil” (1933d, 254). Following Freud, Gay roots his work in DaVinci (1988, 268), and 
declares his goal is “to integrate psychoanalysis with history…not psychohistory” (1984, 8). 
Thus he states Freud“impelled me to ask these questions, and left his mark on my answers” 
(1984, 10), while rejecting psychobiographies that “discount those instinctive drives” (1984, 
227). Young-Bruehl, who also considers DaVinci the “touchstone of the genre” (1998b, 48), 
and whom I later engage, encourages “psychoanalytically trained biographers” (1998a, 237) 
to search “childhood materials, tracing developmental lines and considering cultural  
contexts” (Ibid, 240; 1998b, 9). Harris (1998) has similar recommendations. 
Roudinesco believes the contribution of psychoanalysis to biography is in 
“recogniz[ing] what is doubtlessly the most revolutionary aspect of the Freudian discovery: 
the «lien» of the unconscious and language” (1975b, 85). Thus, the unconscious arrives in 
narrative as a provocation to revolt—a concept Kristeva takes up in 1996 (2000) that will 
matter to my thinking. The promise of rupture is announced in Freud’s most wildly popular 
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texts: his ‘dream book’ (1900) and studies of jokes and ordinary errors (1901-1905)—
‘Freudian slips.’ This publishing event is quickly followed by Saussure’s (1907-1911) 
structuration of language (as repair?). The same two-step seems to happen 60 years later. 
For in 1962, the Minutes appear in English (first)—the archive of Freud’s Association. Also 
in 1962, SE III (1893-1899) is published—the archive of Freud’s thought. In it, he declares 
his debts to Charcot, whom he is translating, and to the Salpêtrière (1893c, 5&13)—and 
most provocatively, introduces “deferred action” (1895, 456): unconscious repetitions in, of, 
as reality. This notion of «après-coup» disturbs the meaning of ‘the present’ and dislocates 
rationality from its hierarchy, as simply, “our ordinary thought, unconscious, with 
occasional intrusions into consciousness” (1895c, 373). Levinas takes Freud’s offer by 
starting a radical narration in the wide space that opens in the fabric of historicity, with «La 
trace de l’autre» (1963). Thereupon (as response?), Starobinski (1964) releases the first 
translation of 99 secret journals from 1906-1909—the archive of Saussure’s thought—
wherein the master of linguistics reveals “anagrams” in Latin poetry—a “repetition of 
syllables” (in Starobinski, 1971, 30-31) and “prevalent homophony” (Ibid, 129 & 134), as a 
“game on phonemes” (Ibid, 125). Starobinski minimizes, “Why not expect a combinatory 
art” (1971, 154 & 159) of «mot-thème» (e.g. Ibid, 17, 23)? Yet, as-if play insists, the reader 
hears Lacan’s (1971) homonymic «mathème» (Wikipédia, 2016). Others receive Saussure’s 
anagrams as “words beneath the words” (Scheidhauer, 2010, 123); and a “possibly 
unconscious production of a latent text within a manifest text” (Bachner, 2003, 4). While 
Kristeva derives from them her «paragrammatisme» (Forest, 1995, 253-255), as 
“displacements and condensations from phonemes” (Kristeva, 1974, 219) that prompt a need 
to “re-examine the functioning of language” (Ibid, 239). Yet I offer that the curious counter-
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play between Freud and Saussure makes publishing both a force and a scene of its own in 
history, as inscription precedes discourse (and action)—being not merely a writing of what 
happened, but ‘that’ [«ca»] which happens. Of note, the same period inaugurates the «Tel 
Quel» [as-is] group, literary and philosophical theorists with whom Derrida worked (Marx-
Scouras, 1991). Roudinesco maintains Derrida’s «trace» fuelled the movement, as it “gave 
the notion of writing a serious philosophical caution of which it was previously deprived” 
(1975b, 79); while Kristeva credits his related notion of “arch-writing” (1974, 129), as «la 
grammatologie derridienne» became the «référence essentielle» for the group (Forest, 1995, 
259). In fact, Derrida was prolific in 1967, launching three major works (1967a, 1967b, 
1967c) that elaborate ‘trace,’ as the unknowable transiting human writing (ergo, history). 
And he engages Freud specifically on writing (1967c, 293-340), invoking “dreams following 
old facilitations” (Ibid, 307 & 311; in Freud, 1895, 340). As Derrida notes, the “unconscious 
text is already woven of pure traces” (1967c, 314), making the encounter with reality a 
“rupture that will thereafter but resonate «à travers» language” (1967c, 169).  
How this resonance happens, I submit, is what Dolto narrates. The precocious 
relation between the unconscious and the «phonème» formally enters her corpus in 1957 
(SS, 210), along a trail from infancy to her dissertation, where Dolto deems analysis “a 
problem of language” (MA, 7)—seeking what is “behind words” (MA, 13), and the “passive 
storing of words” (MA, 28). Dolto first worked under Édouard Pichon, who (with 
Damourette) wrote an epic study of French grammar (Leroy & Muni Toke, 2007; 
Roudinesco, 1982). Ergo when Pichon joined the movement, he and Laforgue steered its 
vocabulary (Roudinesco, 1982, 315 & 386). Ironically, Laforgue,“the first French disciple” 
(Ibid, 290), had “imperfect French” (Ibid, 291). So “greeted in France under the auspices of 
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an obscure germanic thought” (Ibid, 397), tribulations multiplied: Freud and Laforgue 
disagreed on “scotomization” (Ibid, 315 & 391-392), Freud disliked the «Ça» for the 
unconscious (Ibid, 376-385), and so on, as translation became “the sea serpent of the history 
of the movement” (Ibid, 348). Thus I start my study of Dolto in this paradox of translation as 
continuity and rupture—with an apt new definition of psychobiography I find elsewhere, out 
of (apparent) context, in the writing on education by Deborah Britzman, as I try “to invite 
the writer’s own character to emerge from the work, and thus create a means to grasp the 
transference and call upon it” (2015, 9). 
A being in language 
Françoise Dolto (1908-1988), France’s ‘other’ most famous psychoanalyst and an 
icon of the 20
th
 century, has a unique corpus of vital interest to psychoanalysis, narrative 
studies, linguistics and education. Equal parts autobiographical and professional, and 
continually rereleased, her texts interweave brilliant insights and intricate clinical portraits 
with humorous anecdotes and self-deprecating remarks that her opinion «n’a aucun intérêt» 
[is moot] (CE, 369). Even in a casual encounter, one is struck by the unusual word play and 
frankness in Dolto’s project. But in a slow reading, one begins to hear an uncanny echo 
between her childhood history and her theoretical notions about childhood, which alternately 
escape and attract her attention. Dolto’s key belief is that, “at the same time as we live our 
relation to the other, logic, referring us to the meaning of words, we also live on another 
register a relation to which we do not pay attention, from the domain of the unconscious”  
(1985a, 283). Conveyance from this unconscious register, which I will understand as ‘the 
transference,’ arrives in Dolto’s texts as an unstoppable countersignature—a trace. And 
following this trace takes us to the most unexpected destination imaginable: the archaic 
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stage of psychical development, a dreamscape wherein resides the infant from conception to 
weaning—essentially, nine months on either side of birth—only reluctantly departing 
towards reality. Through the transference in Dolto’s texts, we also learn something quite 
unexpected: not only is her corpus a spectacular example of trace, but it also offers an 
astounding theorization of transference itself. And it is this enigmatic blur of subject and 
object, heralding primary narcissism, that will help explicate how Dolto can be the subject 
and the object of her own theory—thus, how I will end up ‘explaining Dolto with Dolto.’ 
Dolto once said she could live as well not knowing where she was going (ATP, 26). 
But in the effort towards meaning-making with her difficult material, I propose an original 
movement that returns Dolto to Freud, who inaugurated her century and psychoanalysis with 
his watershed theorization on dreams, as I submit that her work (in an astonishing 
reciprocity) is its exquisite articulation. I also believe Dolto is the foremost theorist of the 
oral passive stage, and that in exploring the archaic origins of transference with her, we will 
find (as much as it is ‘findable’), “proof that what we are dealing with are impressions from 
childhood [that] must therefore be established by external evidence, and there is seldom an 
opportunity for doing this” (Freud, 1900a, 189). I am awakened to this method in 
psychobiography, enlisting trace, by Freud’s singular text of less than 100 pages on 
Leonardo DaVinci (1910b), largely relegated to the margins of his corpus. The publisher of 
a popular 1984 re-edition ironically warns “Freud never repeated the exercise” 
(frontispiece), and the book “seems to have been greeted since its publication with an 
unusual amount of disapproval” (Ibid). This is our first hint that we have come upon 
something that disturbs and disrupts: the unconscious cannot be far. For biography is 
normally a densely annotated timeline, but Freud writes something deceptively simple that 
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almost passes unnoticed, then becomes trivialized. Yet Freud’s is the first demonstration of 
the path of instinctual activity toward thought (1910b, 136). The key to understanding future 
achievements, he explains, is in childhood phantasies (Ibid). I believe what Freud critically 
opens here is the trace: the irrepressible transitting of unconscious material in our works that 
makes us all what Jacques Derrida called “autobiographical animals” (1997/2008)—
complex, anachronistic living beings that cannot help but leave, seek and find the 
transference in texts. Dolto’s texts offer the transference as wild correspondence to an 
unknown addressee: a movement of traces. For the unconscious, the “essence of the living” 
(Derrida, 1997/2008, 50), is capable lifelong “of affecting itself with traces of a living self 
and thus, of autobiographing itself…to trace itself or retrace a path of itself…to call to 
itself” (Ibid). Derrida interprets the trace as “writing in voice” (1983, 81); a web of silent 
script (1978, 207); what proclaims as much as recalls (1967b, 97); and the road to open an 
itinerary (1995b, 149; also 1995b, 112; 1999/2004, 17), with no «destination assurée» (1982, 
77), as text holds what is “traced and effaced” (1973, 154 & 156; also 1967b, 69; 1978, 226; 
1987b, 17; 2001b, 393). Thus the trace is testimony to dream-work: access to an ever-absent 
referent originating in private audition long ago and far away—a ruin and a «rue» in—
whereby we enlist our eyes to search for what our ears, alone, have lost. 
Dolto’s constructions—often punctuated by her expression, «tout se passe comme 
si» [everything happens as if]—will unsettle our comfortable repression from the start. She 
believes the child just born has already been living a long life of shared desires (CE, 350; 
JD, 273; PJE 71; SP1, 76). She also insists that the fetus is a being in language (CE, 43; 
1977/1984, 208), and capable of ethical thought (SF, 342 & 345). Furthermore, she believes 
that through his un-obscured access to the unconscious, the infant is potentially stronger 
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than the adult (EM, 221), for reality extinguishes the richness of childhood (EM, 223). Freud 
anticipates the resistance Dolto’s positions provoke: “they arise from the fact that we are 
here touching on the generation of anxiety and on the problem of repression” (1900a, 237). 
Hers is indeed a landscape of radical uncertainty where, as she often repeats, «on ne sait pas 
ce qu’on fait» [we don’t know what we’re doing] (e.g., CE, 329). Then, with few tributes to 
anyone but Freud, Dolto advances a novel project whose strength derives from her valuing 
what is childish and phantasmatic in herself (EN, 90, 120 & 124; Nobécourt, 2008a; 
Ribowski, 2004; WIN, 22), and her conviction that «l’enfant sait» [the child knows] (SP3, 
9). Every child begins life in a story (PJE, 23; SP3, 19), Dolto contends. Thus, it is in the 
opening to her own story, so generously shared, that I begin to explore the oeuvre of a 
human being who said of her work, simply: «Je suis venue pour cela, pour vous témoigner 
de l’inconscient» [I have come for this, to witness (for/before you) the unconscious] (CE, 
328). And in keeping this promise, I believe, she will most assuredly succeed. 
Vineuse & Vava 
Precisely as Freud is writing DaVinci, Dolto has a brush with death (EN, 62), thrown 
into suffering when her Irish nurse is dismissed. The memory is repressed until 1937, by 
which time Dolto has been in psychoanalytic sessions with René Laforgue for almost three 
years. She was well after the first year, she recalls, but insisted on another two because she 
wished to help others without thinking of herself (ATP, 119-122; DW 162-3; EN, 96). The 
question begs as to the feeling that something was being withheld. Yet three years in, a word 
arrives in repetitions of faint recollections of fragrant red hair and clinking glasses: Vineuse 
(AI, 144; Nobécourt, 2008a). Laforgue suggests she ask her mother if rue Vineuse means 
anything. Her mother reluctantly confesses: «la rue Vineuse, c’est une histoire» (Nobécourt, 
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2008a). And a story it surely was, one that will slowly decompose in the most remarkable 
way throughout our study. For now, our awareness begins only with «la nurse,» a young 
nanny aged about 18, from a respectable family of judges, who found Paris in the spring of 
1909 just too hard to resist, taking her young charge to parties at a nearby hotel, parking the 
baby stroller just outside the door. The mother is angry the incident is remembered at all, 
adding to her resentment of psychoanalysis. But Dolto remains thankful to Freud, and to 
Laforgue, for all her years, for the chance to begin again after finally reaching the sorrow 
that had structured her life upon a «fondation boiteuse» [shaky foundation] (PF, 105). In 
fact, “it is precisely these most important of all impressions that are not remembered in later 
years” (Freud, 1913, 183). And yet, as Freud will theorize so decisively, and Dolto will 
illustrate so beautifully, these impressions are not exactly forgotten either. 
Consciously, Dolto will be indebted lifelong to her analysis for how it helped her 
understand the troubles of children better than if she had only been a doctor (Nadal, 39f). 
Yet her brother, Philippe, suffered because she shared his analyst: it was «très maladroit» of 
Laforgue, she states (EN, 95; Roudinesco, 1982, 355)—«peut-être que Philippe a été 
malheureux que je vienne aussi» [italics mine; perhaps Philippe was unhappy that I came 
too] (ATP, 121). Yet listening carefully, we cannot miss the word play by this Freudian. 
Indeed, Dolto’s life and work are a continuous invocation of the accidental, parapraxes as 
inevitabilities, the “indiscretions of the unconscious” (Britzman, 2003, 36). Such irruptions 
in the conscious fabric of human texts represent an overturning—a rising from underneath 
and in-between our words—by which the unconscious interrupts any comfortable linearity. 
So with psychobiography, we turn away from intellectual biography, where ideas scaffold 
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others in the progress of reason. For libidinal history is nothing of the sort, and we are 
concerned with intellect only insofar as its achievements are traceable to the unconscious. 
Freud explains, in relation to DaVinci, that nature has a way of forcing its way into 
experience (1910b, 137), causing repetitions of childhood patterns. So Freud advises the 
biographer to look for the signature of the primary processes (Ibid, 119), especially where 
there is overdetermination (Ibid, 93). Freud then follows his method logically: if our earliest 
dream life affects our futures, later achievements should disclose traces of these phantasies 
and the work of the unconscious. By way of a demonstration, Freud then traces the phantasy 
DaVinci experienced in the cradle, a visit by a vulture (Ibid, 82), to his theoretical work on 
flight. Through the influence of his unconscious, Freud explains, DaVinci was “destined 
from the first to investigate the flight of birds” (Ibid, 92), being “bound up in a special and 
personal way with the problem of flight” (Ibid, 126). Freud notes the unconscious 
conveyance in technique, too, for after his passion for the Mona Lisa, DaVinci “transferred 
its traits…to all the faces that he painted or drew afterwards” (1910b, 110). Freud describes 
the transference as, “a universal phenomenon of the human mind” that, “dominates the 
whole of each person’s relations to his human environment” (1925[1924], 42), by which 
unconscious phantasies are externalized (1914c, 150-151). Yet while DaVinci refers to his 
childhood only once (Freud, 1910b, 82), Dolto is the only analyst other than Freud to have 
deliberately left a rich personal record. Through Freud’s correspondence and his 
Autobiographical Study (1925[1924])—and critically, through the exposition of so much of 
his life and character in his study of dreams—psychoanalysis is itself accidental upon 
autobiography. And what these two courageously witness is that life is entirely sourced in 
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the unconscious, being the origin of who we become and remain—though even now, we 
find few as willing as they were to admit enigma, the unconscious, into the human story.  
Perhaps little Françoise was destined to be so frank from the start, born into 
biography we might say, as her name, «franc sois» [honest be], is literally the injunction to 
«parlai vrai,» speak truth, and we will find the ethics of speaking and listening to be the core 
of her project. As another case in point, her childhood nickname was «Vava» [go-go] (e.g., 
AI, 74; EN, 24; MF, 19-20; VC1, 34-35, 160-161 & 327). Known for her boundless energy 
and needing little sleep, Dolto reflects late in life that perhaps she can’t stop herself because 
Vava lost her surname, «Marette» [to stop me-myself] (VC2, 453). She is only half-joking. 
For soon, we will discover the share of play in her thinking, this capacity for engaging 
phantasy and dream-work, to be the greater part of genius, as word-things upon her path 
become openings onto histories folded with significance. Young Françoise put her 
sleeplessness to good use, having liberal access to her father’s library. By the age of 16, she 
had read psychoanalysis through Régis and Hesnard (1916) (AI, 116; ATP, 104) when two 
works by Freud were soon translated: On Dreams (1901), by Hélène Legros (1925); and The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), by Ignace Meyerson (1926) (Douville, 2009, 117 & 123). 
Dolto may also have read Freud in German, her mother’s tongue—giving her even earlier 
access to his works—as a letter in 1931 suggests Françoise tutor Philippe in it (VC1, 331).  
Françoise was educated largely at home, as her mother actively prevented school 
attendance (AI, 132; D&R, 16; EN, 92). It seems she was needed at home to keep the 
mother company, following the tragic death of the only other girl among seven children, 
beautiful Jacqueline, much preferred, who died in 1920 at age 18. This death would be the 
second to devastate the family, following that of a maternal uncle, Pierre, a young soldier 
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killed in 1916. In fact, the history of this bourgeois family quickly becomes far more 
nuanced than their material comforts suggest, exposing young Françoise to deep struggles: 
“She spent her youth in a climate of grief and guilt; a serious neurosis was the result” 
(psycho-analytikerinnen, 2013). Amid the jokes and the off-handed remarks of this candid 
woman, then, we find the question of death was already troubling her openly since the age 
of four: «La question…faut pas oublier…après la mort» […I mustn’t forget…after death] 
(EN, 12).  
In 1924, after years of arguments, Françoise enrolled at Lycée Molière to get a 
«BAC» in philsophy, after which she trained with the Red Cross in 1929 and became a nurse  
at age 25 (AI, 28-29; EN, 82; VC1, 231). Then, against her mother’s adamant belief it would 
make her unmarriageable, Françoise won the right to go to medical school (AI, 118-119; 
EN, 77)—ironically, so she could accompany Philippe (AI, 122). Dolto half-jokes again: “I 
would have said I was settling in a bordello and it wouldn’t have been worse” (DW, 157; 
Nobécourt, 2008a). Her mother was particularly disgusted at her plan to study 
psychoanalysis, insisting Freud was a «villain monsieur» [wicked man] (AI, 125; EN, 99). 
No wonder that when Dolto completed her dissertation exam, 11 July 1939, she registered as 
a physician only two hours later. She was in a hurry to work (AI, 35; VC2, 16f). I offer the 
thesis itself as worthy of note, as the first with ‘psychoanalysis’ in its title among French 
filiations (Birksted-Breen, Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, xixi), from which Dolto would found 
the field of  “the subjectivity of the child” in France (Ibid, 24f). Yet her mother put greasy 
laundry on her copy (AI, 125; EN, 99). Such was the home environment of this early reader 
of psychoanalysis whom Roudinesco (fully aware of Lacan’s reknown) deems to have been 
the “most popular person of the French psychoanalytic community” (1986, 169). 
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Un médecin d’éducation 
Of course, we can never know how much of her interest in psychoanalysis was 
nurtured by the curious concordances around her year of birth, 1908, which marked the first 
psychoanalytic congress (Gay, 1988, 184); the first dissemination of Freud in journals (Ibid, 
157); and the formation of both the Vienna and Berlin psychoanalytic societies (Ibid, 174 & 
181). By any measure, Françoise Marette was born at an auspicious time for psychoanalysis. 
And by the age of eight, she was already expressing a clear desire to be a ‘doctor of 
education.’ People would ask her, what is that career anyhow? And she would reply 
seriously, “I have no idea. But it must exist” (AI, 112; D&R, 17; EN, 68-69; 1985a, 231-
232). Simply, she explains, she had begun to notice that when household staff had 
disagreements, the younger children would be chided, then vomit. She knew the (new) Irish 
nanny had been drinking and had words with the cook, but the doctor would be called, 
Philippe or André would be put on a diet, watched for eight days because of “indigestion”—
but he wasn’t ill. Only there had been a scene between the cook and «l’Irlandaise» (AI, 112). 
And our nanny—that young «nurse Irlandaise»—echoes even here, as-if ever-present. 
Lifelong, Dolto would value her years as a nurse, as it allowed her to see «l’envers 
du décor de la medecine» [obverse of the medical scene] (Nobécourt, 2008a), a difficult 
world where she was, in 1929, the only intern for 1200 patients (ATP, 127). Dolto grew her 
interest in being a pediatrician (EN, 84), and in doing psychoanalytic consultations around 
surgery (EN, 97-98). In a warm interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco in 1986, when Dolto is 
nearly eighty, it is clear she valued having had a practice that evolved out of the everyday 
life of a hospital (D&R, 14-15). For example, she felt displeased in 1946 with the first centre 
for psychoanalysis in Paris, at Claude-Bernard, refusing to join because some children could 
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have used a doctor as well (Ibid, 30).  On the other hand, after hearing from Jenny Aubry 
about the realities of being a hospital physician, Dolto says, «j’ai fui la hierarchie » [I fled 
the hierarchy] (Ibid). This simple self-reflection symbolizes well her refusals of codification. 
In this high regard for the ordinary work of hospitals is rooted much of Dolto’s 
unmitigated respect for Freud. On the first page of her dissertation, she credits him with 
being a «homme de laboratoire» who prioritized examples (MA, 1) and who was always 
willing to rework his theories (VC2, 672). And throughout her working life, she will regard 
the clinic as an opportunity that «illustre la théorie inventée par Freud» (D&R, 33). The high 
respect given to Freud is convincing, as she credits him with the genius of inspiration (JD, 
67), the «héroique» beginning (DW, 22), and a “fantastically supportive schema” (TL, 36).  
She also honours Freud as the first to give the unconscious a prominent role in psychical life 
(MA, 14). Repeatedly, Dolto emphasizes that Freud is her only reference, with the caveat 
that she has used Freud to think about the period before «l’age Oedipien» (AI, 217; D&R, 
32; DW, 27, 31-32 & 39; Nobécourt, 2008b; VC2, 796-797). And Dolto wholeheartedly 
believes her own purpose is to dedicate herself to the research Freud inaugurated, to «la 
vérité qui parle depuis Freud, par sa souffrance et celle des autres» [the truth that speaks, 
since Freud, through his suffering and that of others] (VC2, 655). 
The psychoanalytic project that comes to 19
th 
century France as a response to 
personal suffering will be strangely marked by the public suffering that frames its eruption. 
One is prompted to notice, not for the last time, the performative in the divisiveness that fills 
the field of first adherents: “one is tempted to see in the psychoanalytic movement of the 
time of Freud the history of the psychogeography of Freud’s thought, and the transference 
that makes it fertile and sustains it in the infinite movement of borrowings” (Douville, 2009, 
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v). So it is that psychoanalysis in France, born «entre deux guerres» [between two wars] will 
be irrevocably coloured by its peculiar time and space (Bourgeron, 1993, 14). In her own 
appraisal of the situation, Dolto reveals she despised polemics (ATP, 19; LF, 300; VC2, 225 
& 333) and was never deeply aware of the controversy in England (Ibid, 31). Thus, she was 
happy when psychoanalytic institutions dissolved in France, believing they impeded 
freedom of thought (Ibid, 24; ATP, 133); she walked away from the Société de psychanalyse 
de Paris (SPP) in 1953 (D&R, 23)—though Philippe, also an analyst, stayed; she quit the 
Société française de psychanalyse (SFP) in 1963 (Roudinesco, 1986, 365-367), impatient 
with power struggles; she was frustrated by political machinations at L’École Freudienne de 
Paris (EFP), just prior to its closure in 1980 (VC2, 669-672); yet she was unfazed by her 
inadmissibility to the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) in 1953 (Roudinesco, 
1986, 329, 356, 365 & 657; Turkle, 1995). As for the war, Dolto still met André Berge, 
Juliette Favez and Marc Schlumberger every two weeks, rotating homes, defying bombings 
and black-outs: «le travail d’analyse continuait» [work continued] (AI, 169). So it was that 
Dolto became a crucial member of the second generation of analysts in France (Birksted-
Breen, Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, xx). And thus situated, she hobnobbed with the elite of 
her time, stunning even Roudinesco, also of the bourgeoisie (1986/1988). Yet what will 
matter to Dolto is never status but solidarity with those “convinced of the dynamic of the 
unconscious” (AI, 218; VC2, 796-797). Hers is a trust, then, in a particular human narrative. 
Inner circle 
Planted on the soil of war, the «noyau» [kernel] of French psychoanalysis was Marie 
Bonaparte, René Laforgue and Eugénie Sokolnicka (Douville, 2009, 116)—the first two 
deep in Dolto’s inner circle. Regarding the Princess, whom Freud rightly valued so highly 
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(Bertin, 1982, 300; E.Freud, 1970, 158; Gay, 1988, 586) I find the suggestion on the name 
impossible to refuse: «bonne à part,» ‘good on the side,’ or ‘the good one with a share.’ 
Dolto’s correspondence includes a thank you note from the Princess for expressions of 
sympathy following Freud’s passing (VC2, 22). There is also an uncanny resonance, as the 
heroine of an unfinished novel by the Princess is «Vaga» (Bourgeron, 1993), who runs away 
to the Midi—a work paused when she decides to translate DaVinci the same year, 1925 
(Bertin, 1982, 295). Bonaparte is sympathetic towards Dolto, writing a very particular 
message in a gift of her published notebooks: «Pour Françoise Marette, psychanalyste et 
femme, ces échos des drame d’une petite fille. En toute sympathie» […psychoanalyst and 
woman, these echoes of the drama of a little girl…] (AI, 125). For her part, Dolto is 
sympathetic towards Bonaparte, commenting on her difficult life with a sadistic father and 
grandmother (SF, 313). Like Dolto, Bonaparte, familiarly known as «Mimi» (Bertin, 1982, 
53), will have a beloved nanny she calls «zinzin» [dingdong] (Bertin, 1982, 189)—a word 
that performs its onomatopoeia in Dolto’s own work. In fact, the Princess is a neighbour, at 
rue Adophe Yvon (Douville, 2009, 177), a five-minute walk away. Dolto will be invited to 
her home on 12
 
(or 13) July 1939, hours after her thesis, for she had just been accepted as a 
member of the SPP (the first of two required cases had been submitted earlier, in 1937-
1938) (LF, 292-293). Attendees that day included Ernest Jones and Melanie Klein (Ibid). 
The other of the French «noyau», René Laforgue, will not only be Dolto’s analyst 
but Bonaparte’s too; and by 1925, Laforgue is dining regularly with the Princess (Bertin, 
1982, 277; Bourgeron, 1993, 12). When Dolto defends Laforgue against charges of anti-
semitism, Bonaparte supports Dolto and Laforgue unequivocally (Roudinesco, 1986, 175). 
Dolto credits Laforgue for being the first to practice psychoanalysis in France, at «la Pitié» 
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in 1914 (D&R, 17); and the first meeting of French analysts was at his home in 1926 
(Bourgeron, 1993, 13). Roudinesco reflects rather unkindly on his “vulgar manners” and 
“modest origins” (1982, 353), believing his dissidence cost Dolto support by association 
(D&R, 20; 1999, 186), as Freud questioned the reception given to Sokolnicka, his 
representative in France and Laforgue’s analyst (Bertin, 1982, 264; Douville, 2009, 109; 
Roudinesco, 1982, 288; 294). Dolto sought Laforgue on the advice of her friend, Marc 
Schlumberger (EN, 92; Roudinesco, 1986, 169; VC1, 349f). Her analysis began on 17 
February 1934 and ended in March 1937 (VC1, 402; VC2, 13f). Dolto appreciated that he 
valued intuition (SP3, 8; 1932/1963, 106); did not try to normalize her (EN, 119; PF, 70); 
and allowed silent sessions, including her first three, where she only cried (ATP, 118; EN, 
104). In turn, Laforgue felt her gift for analysis, lowering his rate (ATP, 118; EN, 104) and 
obtaining a bursary for her from Bonaparte (Yannick, 1999, 27). Dolto vacationed in the 
Midi (MF, 95; PF, 61) with Laforgue and his other analysands, «le Club des Piqués» [the 
stung] (VC2, 526-527). Thus, the Marettes were among the first families in France touched 
by the potential for a revolt of one’s narrative inherent in analysis: her mother hoped (after 
six months) she would stop (MF, 81) and her father disliked the new personality (VC1, 532). 
Of her generation, however, Dolto’s record with Lacan is the richest.2 Dolto 
unabashedly admits she barely read Lacan (D&R), never adhered to his theories 
(Geissmann, 1998, 293), and did not know «petit objet a» (DW, 70). Further, she notes she 
was formed long before Lacan came on the scene (DW, 65). Aubry agrees: “Françoise does 
not need «mathèmes» to hear the unconscious of the child” (Aubry & Cifali, 1986/1988, 48). 
In sum, Dolto believes Lacan errs in two keys ways: in thinking everything could be put into 
words, while there are “additional supports that are rhythmed and coloured and have no 
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words, pulsions that are non-verbalized and non-verbalizable” (LF, 282); and in trying to 
master pulsions intellectually (LF, 307). Still, they shared warm conversations and 
correspondence for decades, Aubry noting his fascination for Dolto’s notions: “Lacan drank 
her words” (Aubry & Cifali, 1986/1988, 45). I leave aside any implications for his work. 
We also owe a special regard to Sophie Morgenstern, who arrives in Dolto’s texts on 
the nebulous edge of repression—«mais j’oublie de dire le maître principal…c’est Madame 
Morgenstern» [but I’m forgetting to say my principal teacher] (DW, 23; Nobécourt, 2008b). 
Indeed, a survey of Morgenstern’s oeuvre reveals her significant contributions to Dolto’s. 
Morgenstern began her own practice in 1924, when she arrived in France (Morgenstern, 
2003a, 9), and she volunteered with Heuyer for more than a decade (AI, 217; Geissmann, 
1998, 149; VC2, 797). She was the first in France to employ psychoanalysis with children 
(Douville, 2009, 129; DW, 23; Nobécourt, 2008b; VC2, 797), and she recommended Dolto 
to Pichon (VC2, 786). She was analysed by Sokolnicka (Roudinesco, 1982, 344), but Dolto 
(at nearly 80) will recall—in a touching slip?—that Morgenstern said she was analysed by 
Freud himself (Geissmann, 1998, 140; VC2, 786). In fact, Morgenstern’s was a radical 
practice centred entirely on listening, a witnessing, “without any ethic of normalisation,” by 
which children reentered communication with other children and especially with 
themselves: “demutisation by graphic expression” (AI, 217; VC2, 797). It was “very 
precious,” an example in the medical tradition, Dolto says (AI, 217; VC2, 797). 
Morgenstern’s suicide in 1940 surely wounded Dolto deeply, as the reference to trying to 
help, and being unable to, comes up often: “I had gone to see her to bring her out of Paris in 
June 1940, but she did not want to come” (ATP, 137; D&R, 18; Geissmann, 1998, 150; 
VC2, 786). It was Morgenstern who taught Dolto to make children talk in trust, she 
21 
 
reminisces (D&R, 12; Morgenstern, 2003a, 12). And with Morgenstern’s guidance, Dolto 
listened to babies on hospital night shifts, returning regularly (D&R, 11), producing one of 
the most powerful observations of her entire corpus: “the child waits for you even if you 
never speak to him” (DW, 24; Nobécourt, 2008b). Dolto wistfully adds that Morgenstern 
was a «douce et généreuse femme» [soft and generous woman] (D&R, 18; VC2, 786). 
From Aubry to Winnicott 
Dolto’s connections beyond this point are a veritable ‘who’s who’ of psychoanalysis 
in France. We first meet Jenny Aubry (E.Roudinesco’s mother), a neuropsychiatrist who 
herself engages psychoanalysis in 1948 (Roudinesco, 1986, 222), and whom Dolto much 
admires for bringing analysts into the hospital for consultations (D&R, 27 & 29; VO, 233), 
as well as for diagnosing the illness of hospitalism as provoked by psychical trouble (VO, 
233-234). Hospitalism, Dolto explains, happened when «l’Assistance publique» removed 
children from their parents, in aggravated separations that “if it did not kill them, made them 
autists” (Ibid). These children, Aubry found, were predictably prone to acute vomiting and 
‘green diarrhea’ whenever their hospital caregivers argued—what Dolto explains as the 
consequence of “the auditory trial they had heard” (Ibid). Dolto reports that Aubry told the 
nurses, “Go ahead and argue, but know that the children are with you” (Ibid). Indeed, the 
record is abundant with the mutual respect and genuine appreciation between these two 
women, both medical pioneers, whose lifespans almost overlap (Roudinesco, 1982, 418).  
From here, Dolto’s extensive social connections are dizzying, embedding her in 
social relations right across the landscape of psychoanalysis in her time and place—through 
myriad conferences, meetings, clinics, dinners, walks and letters—in a paradoxical 
counterpoint to a highly innovative practice in which she will eschew referencing these very 
22 
 
same peers. There is Alice Balint’s sister, who paints a portrait of Dolto (VC2, 511f). 
Raymond De Saussure (son of Ferdinand, the linguist and analysand of Freud’s) (Birksted-
Breen, Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, xx), congratulates her on her thesis (VC2, 17), and on her 
marriage and work (VC2, 153); he also solicits her help in finding employment for two 
colleagues (VC2, 153 & 369). Dolto visits Julia Favez-Boutonnier’s vacation home in 1961, 
a place named, «Le Noyer» (MF, 138). She credits Sándor Ferenczi with teaching her 
much—the most after Winnicott (DW, 23)—for he was «un homme ouvert» [an open man], 
not too stuck on theory (SF, 309). I add that, like Dolto, Ferenczi believed in learning from 
patients, including children (Ferenczi, 1931/1980, 14-15 & 21). Ángel Garma and Heinz 
Hartmann are mentioned once, as providing supervision (control) for her training as an 
analyst, likely in 1938 only (EN, 104). Georges Heuyer gave her a tough time at her 
dissertation examination, as he thought IQ could not be improved with analysis, while she 
argued the opposite (D&R, 19); with Heuyer, she says she learned what not to do, for he was 
a harsh man who wrote insults in children’s files and sent the ill to detention centres (ATP, 
123). There are wedding greetings (VC2, 93) from Daniel Lagache, whom she could not 
differentiate from Lacan for years because they were inseparable, like “siamese twins” 
(D&R, 19-20), or “two zombies” (LF, 292). Of Serge Lebovici, she says much the same as 
René Diatkine—another set of twins, perhaps—but the comments are unusually negative for 
Dolto, who finds good to say about most people: “Lebovici was my enemy at the SPP” 
(VC2, 668), who criticized her intuition (JP, 35) and, along with Diatkine, mocked and 
insulted her (LF, 300; Roudinesco, 1986, 257). “I didn’t care,” she adds, “I just kept going 
along my way,” adding ironically that while she never wanted to live with five brothers 
either, it helped her deal with the SPP (LF, 300-301). From John Leuba, then SPP secretary, 
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there are congratulations to «ma p’tite Mimi» in 1938, recognizing her membership (AI, 36). 
Rudolph Loewenstein names his daughter Marie-Françoise in her honour (VC2, 25); along 
with René Spitz (below), he took over supervision of her early cases from Garma and 
Hartmann (EN, 104). And there is a lovely dinner invitation in March 1960 from Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (VC2, 313). In regards Sacha Nacht, there is more rare hate, as she accuses 
him of a “totalitarian gangster spirit,” paternalistic and coercive (LF, 294; VC2, 227-229). In 
correspondence, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis requests articles for publications (VC2, 351 & 622); 
and in 1978, his letter fondly recalls how “she let him walk with her to Trousseau” years ago 
(VC2, 622).  There are many letters back and forth with Elisabeth Roudinesco, in thanks for 
gifts of their respective books (VC2, 585, 737, 818, 837, 886), and a note of sympathy when 
Aubry dies (VC2, 839); we also learn Dolto was Elisabeth’s childhood analyst 
(psychoanalytikerinnen, 2013). René Spitz is supportive throughout her career, advising her 
on her doctorate (VC2, 511-513); even after emigrating, he writes regularly and sends her 
“delicious” American baby food (LF, 293), while only months before Dolto’s death, Spitz’s 
daughter still corresponds (LF, 294). As for Donald Winnicott, “this is work as I would 
work if I were a man” (DW, 27). But Dolto bemoans the bandwagon of “doing the 
squiggle,” and how the transitional object is a family obsession (DW, 27 & 30). In a 
comment fully intended as a compliment, she adds, “Winnicott is not theory” (DW, 27). In 
fact, there is perhaps nowhere more than in relation to Winnicott that the reader new to 
Dolto will experience uncomfortable familiarity—as if he has already said what she says, or 
vice-versa—in a professional relation, sight unseen, that becomes a metaphor of what might 
be called ‘the problem of the English Channel.’For not only is Dolto little known in English, 
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but it is as-if that body of water imposes a silence between kindred thinkers that, in turn, 
symbolizes in a most uncanny way the loss of that first beloved, English-speaking nanny.
3
 
Charcot & Co. 
I stop to double back, however, for it seems I have forgotten four without whom 
Dolto’s story cannot be told. The first is Jean-Martin Charcot, whose work was so 
instrumental to psychoanalysis. All who are passionate about mental health can only be 
thankful for the revolution he inaugurated, in Paris, beginning with humane observations 
that the removal of organs was not helpful (Charcot, 1887/1971, 127); repetition is a 
symptom (Ibid, 200); and family environments are decisive in hysteria (Ibid, 165 & 202). 
Charcot’s death in 1936 appears in correspondence from Dolto’s mother  (VC1, 542). But 
true to her lifelong rejection of mimetism, Dolto has little use for national illusions: some 
female hysterics put it on for Charcot, Dolto explains, because they loved him, but Freud 
noticed and called him out on it (SF, 326). From here, a little way around, I come upon 
Pierre Janet, Charcot’s student, who pays homage to his master as the one who taught the 
study of hysteria «en savant» [intelligently] (1892/2013,78). But unlike Charcot, as 
charismatic in writing as in person, Janet is a hard read, his sentences constrained by his 
belief that the human spirit does not accept contradiction (Ibid, 16). So I leave him to 
Roudinesco, who pens him as the «philosophe d’un royaume déchiré, aggressif, arrogant» 
[philosopher of a shredded kingdom…] (1982, 245).  
From this point, the path around Charcot diverges. One branch follows Janet towards 
Édouard Pichon, his son-in-law (Bertin, 1982, 301; VC2, 26f). As Dolto’s dissertation 
supervisor, he congratulates her (D&R, 19); and she reports favorably about his being her 
teacher (VC2, 228); on visiting him at Fontainebleau (VC2, 26); and on the chance to work 
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at Bretonneau from 1936 (D&R, 12-14; Roudinesco, 1986, 169). But a dark undertone seeps 
through, beginning with the revelation, in a footnote, that Dolto had not sent him a copy of 
her thesis, in which his preface is absent (VC,26f). True, too, Pichon clashed with Laforgue 
and Bonaparte, especially regarding the fledgling «Revue française de psychanalyse» (RFP) 
(Bourgeron, 1993, 13). And when he died in 1940, Dolto relocated to Trousseau (D&R, 25), 
as if his death allowed escape. Roudinesco does not mince words, calling him “Jekyll and 
Hyde” (1982,297), a psychotic, deranged, unyielding fanatic (Ibid, 299). On his acute 
paralysis from rhumatism and delusions, Roudinesco diagnoses the “evolution of 
incurability” (Ibid, 298). Sifting, I also discover Pichon once dedicated an article, “Death, 
anxiety and negation,” to Dolto (Roudinesco, 1982, 382). And I muse that his name for her, 
«la petite Marette» (Roudinesco, 1986, 168 & 277)—homonymically, “the little one stops 
me”—manifests in his symptoms, as a most curious contagion on suggestion seems to return  
us to Charcot’s hysterics. But in her early (contentious?) relation with Pichon, Dolto’s 
project seems destined from the start to be a work both in, and provoking, language.  
Here, a final branch follows Angelo Hesnard, self-appointed interpreter of Freud 
who, as Roudinesco states, knew Janet’s hypotheses didn’t concord with Freud’s but tried to 
link them anyhow (1982, 262). Hesnard’s texts are a passive-aggressive monument to Freud 
right from the dedication, as he vows, “with his unjust criticisms to offer homage in pure 
admiration” (1926, n.p.). Two decades later, his mood has calcified, as he calls the 
unconscious a “postulate” (1946, 120) and attributes to Freud “cold and superhuman 
lucidity” (Ibid, 131). Hesnard’s sword strikes even Janet, “student of our great Charcot” 
(1946, 19)—thus, by implication, Charcot—for “few facts” and a “monotony of rules and 
 hypotheses” (Ibid, 131). So I gladly abandon his reality in favour of a dream. 
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Unconscious energy 
 
Freud opened his practice in Vienna in 1886, about a year after a trip to Paris to 
study with Charcot (Freud, 1886; Roudinesco, 1982, 60), financed by a grant he dreamed 
about (E. Freud, 1961, 166). He wrote to his fiancé, Martha, on 19 October 1885, that his 
dream came true on his first visit to the Salpêtrière (Ibid, 182).
4
  From this dream, Freud 
“devoted the first half of his life’s work to clinical phenomena which come into evidence 
more or less against the will of the ego” (E. Freud et al, 1978, 30). Freud’s interest in the 
unconscious (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 197) is first mentioned in an unpublished 
draft in 1892 (Breuer & Freud, 1892, 45f). And Freud’s oeuvre on dreams (1900) reveals the 
unconscious is responsible for “primary processes [that] are present in the mental apparatus 
from the first” (1900a, 603) as the “true psychical reality” (Ibid, 613), continuously active, 
day or night (Ibid). Thus, “what is suppressed continues to exist…and remains capable of 
psychical functioning” (Ibid, 608). The nature of that functioning is described as an “amount 
of psychic energy” (Ibid, 103) displaceable in “releases of pleasure and unpleasure [that] 
automatically regulate the course of cathectic processes” (Ibid, 574). In fact, even in 1895, 
Freud observed that “affective process approximates to the uninhibited primary process” 
(1895, 357), so “where there is affect there is a primary process” (Ibid, 358); thus, we speak 
of quanta of affect (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 12, 325 & 448-450). And it is here, 
deep in Freud’s drive theory—his libido theory (1917b, 137 & 139)—that we root Dolto’s 
project: “Freud described the libidinal evolution of the human being whose pulsions of 
desire, active and passive, are organized during infancy in an unconscious structure,” she 
explains (SS, 26). And thus informed, she refers to libido as unconscious «énergie 
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modificatrice» (SS, 243; also LF, 9 & 11; SP1, 161), and to Freud’s as a “theory of the 
unconscious dynamic of desire” (LF, 60). In effect, Dolto’s use of «désir» should be read as 
synonymous with “libido,” consistent with her close reading of Freud. She elucidates:  
If needs must be satisfied in reality by consumption, there is something other in the 
human being, which Freud named libido, and that is desire. Desire which, at its 
origin, is always unconscious…and demands, too, the appeasement of its tension in 
an accomplishment, in a consumption for the sake of pleasure (JD, 269).   
 
The unconscious introduces enigma into our thoughts because in “unconscious mental 
activity, processes operate which are of quite another kind from those perceived in 
consciousness” (Freud, 1913, 171), being “more comprehensive and more important than 
the familiar activity that is linked with consciousness” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 
197). We learn about the characteristics of these unconscious processes from studying 
dreams, the foundation of psychoanalysis (1912b, 265; 1913, 169-170). Dream-work, as 
Freud shows, enables us to witness psychical processes of a “more primary nature” (1900a, 
177) that make use of symbolism (1900b, 352), and especially, of condensation and 
displacement (1900a, 177; 1909b, 36; also Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 197).  And 
through a meticulous study of countless examples of dream-work, Freud discovers that “all 
dreams have meaning” (1913, 170), precisely because dream language…forms part of a 
highly archaic system of expression” (Ibid, 176). 
We find Dolto to be entirely up to the task of playing with enigma. She believes, for 
example, that while it is a problem to deny reality, it is a problem to be too much in reality 
(SP1, 29), for “reality and phantasy are a contract we all need to assume” (SP1, 30). She 
stresses repeatedly that we cannot understand the “unconscious component” (DW, 30), 
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because while everything comes from the «Ça» (VO, 34 & 52), the «Ça» never obeys reason 
(JD, 326-328). Then again, Dolto says, that is exactly what is so interesting about the 
human, that he is never «définitif» (SF, 345). Dolto welcomes enigma, enjoys it even: 
«l’inconscient ne finit jamais de nous apprendre là où surtout il nous surprend» [the 
unconscious never stops teaching us there where it most surprises us] (SP2, 55). And since 
the unconscious is constituted of questions and answers (SP2, 62), she believes, the best 
interpretations in analysis are not statements but questions (DW, 54; SP2, 65)—or help 
clarifying the questions the unconscious asks (SP2, 66; VO, 56 & 66). Here is work on the 
terms of the primary processes, where we need to «travailler sans raisonner» as Freud said 
(1886/1974, 307). And working on these terms, we have the opportunity to encounter the 
transference. The transference first enters Freud’s texts in 1888, interestingly in French, as 
«transfert» (1888, 48). Freud develops the notion through the next decade (1893e, 302 & 
302f), leading to his treatise on dreams, where the transference is a displacement of an 
infantile scene onto the present (1900b, 546 & 567). There is also the transference of dream 
thoughts to dream content (Freud, 1901a, 667) that makes it both the centre and obstacle of 
clinical practice. In fact, the transference in dreams and in analytic cures, we will discover, 
is “indistinguishable” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 494), for both are means of 
displacement in service of the primary processes that are susceptible to being witnessed in 
analysis (Freud, 1900a, 184)—to being palpable as experience. 
Résonateur 
 
The displacement of unconscious energy in dreams and in the transference is 
evidence, Freud says, that “stress is laid upon making the cathecting energy mobile and 
capable of discharge” (1900b, 597), so of a “need of transference on the part of repressed 
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ideas” (Ibid, 563-564; 1905, 116). In meeting this need, the transference privileges the 
auditory (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 418), so the analyst becomes, as Dolto says, a 
«résonateur» (SS, 77). And by enabling the discharge of quanta of unconscious energy, the 
transference offers relief: «Il y a toujours des fantasmes, même quand il y a aucune 
expression mimique ou gestuelle…Ce sont les fantasmes, exprimés ou non, qui 
accompagnent la relation transferentielle, qui guérissent le malade» [there are always 
phantasms, even when there is neither facial nor gestural expression…It is these phantasms, 
expressed or not, accompanying the transferential relation, that heal the sick] (Nadal, 130f). 
This very substantive contribution is buried in a letter to Diatkine, whom she hated, in the 
footnotes of a third party referencing an unpublished text in her archives. Our path of 
learning, it seems, is just as enigmatic as its content. Right from the start, Dolto recognizes 
the transference as the means of hearing the unspeakable, explaining in her dissertation that 
the transference reveals «réactions affectives,» and healing requires «le truchement» 
[intermediary, bypass] of the transference (MA, 148) for «libération libidinale» (MA, 202).  
And right to the end, in a letter marked ‘confidential,’ five months before her death, she 
explains that the transference enables the liberation of repressed libido by the re-living of an 
event in the history of a subject, and of «répétitions stérilisantes de processus archaïques» 
maladapted at the time and never spoken, that left «traces de traumatismes» (VC2, 853). 
Freud creates a dynamic opening for the transference in “the personal influence of 
the physician in a haphazard fashion which has not yet been explained” (1913, 165). Dolto is 
equally content with ‘not knowing,’ believing theory is only useful in helping you explain 
the transference to yourself, as all kinds of things happen in the transference which actually 
cure (DW, 420; SP3, 21), though we don’t know what, exactly (EN, 124; SP2, 78; SP3, 14). 
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Ironically, the transference “creates and abreacts troubles” (DV, 162), evidence of the 
ontological priority of serving the vital requirement of displacing cathexis (DV, 8; JD, 288; 
SF, 314; SS, 256). Dolto credits Freud with discovering the transference, and she too 
believes it to be perpetually present in human relations (DV, 8), adding that it offers a source 
of pleasure in its symbolic function of securing affect and remembrance (DV, 158-160; JD, 
286). And she takes on the skeptics preemptively: “Do not think transference acts by 
suggestion,” she states in 1939, with a remarkable force of authority, as “suggestion 
necessitates bringing something new to the subject,” but the analyst usually brings 
“absolutely nothing new” (MA, 148). Rather, it is the old that returns in the transference, a 
re-experiencing of something missed of the past (DV, 8 & 189; LF, 185), a transference of 
archaic relations (SS, 78 & 270). And as the transference brings much-needed liberation, we 
remain unconsciously in a state of «narcissisme alerté» (CD, 193), destined to seek to 
engage the “operational fact of the transference” (SS, 79; also CD, 201) as an unconscious 
dialectic (LF, 107; SS, 42, 244 & 269), an emotional resonance (SS, 79), «infraverbale» 
expression (CD, 195)—«échanges primitifs humains» (LF, 103) that are “archaic witnesses   
of a system of affective relays” (LF, 90)—in sum, unconscious associations. 
Dolto’s acceptance of enigma, her humility before the transference, and her 
conviction of the correctness of Freud’s drive theory will define her practice. On this view, 
the “symptom is a condensation” (SP3, 17)—a proof, or witness, holding unconscious 
memory (CE, 40; DW, 46), by which the body, in health or in sickness, is language (CD, 
200; DV, 48; IIC, 363, 365, 367; PS, 79; QS, 52; SS, 253; TL). Thus, when troubles are 
spoken, it liberates the symptom, returning the “peace of the body” (DW, 45; DV, 46 & 48; 
TL, 130). Like Freud (1914c, 150), Dolto believes treatment begins with repetitions (SP2, 
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183; SP3, 69; SP3, 189), as alienation is “overdetermined” (CD, 183). Unlike 
psychotherapy, she adds, analysis never aims to fix a symptom (DW, 45; TL, 23). Rather, 
the analyst should feel sympathy (EM, 316; MA, 60) and be open to whatever phantasms 
arrive (D&R, 28). Even a baby is sensitive to such consideration, she adds (EM, 176-177)—
asking, “What if we took seriously the suffering of the child?” (MA, 153), instead of 
deriding libidinal suffering (DW, 81). For Dolto, it is belittling (dismissing, muting) 
suffering, not its mere presence, that causes psychical disorganization. And from her first 
publication, a natural grasp of Freudian theory is already hers (what detractors call her 
‘intuition’): we are dealing with an «économie affective» (MA, 12), and we seek the «raison 
éeconomique» for non-insertion (MA, 161). Hers is, effectively, an unabashed embrace of 
the emotional world. 
Floating narcissism 
And here, in this perplexing moment both precise and porous, is where I situate the 
problematic of organizing the inimitable material offered by the Dolto corpus. Mis-
understanding first strikes as a symptom caused by the flush of details in personal stories 
that spin out from underneath key theories—set against the fact that Dolto seldom draws 
explicit connections between her history and her work. Casual remarks about being ‘a bit of 
an analyst,’ or her ‘archaic love’ for the lost nanny, are about as close as we will get. And 
yet, the reader cannot but notice uncanny associations, and how Dolto’s ideas seem over-
determined on (by) the unconscious landscape of her infancy. Further, once one ‘picks up 
the trail,’ so to speak, of the archaic heritage in Dolto’s formulations, one encounters the 
complexity of her thinking in ways that translate difficulty into clarity. It is as if one had 
unearthed a fragrance upriver that gave its scent to all downstream. And in countless 
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unsettling moments, that peculiar sensation that is the transference—the arrival from 
somewhere, but where?—becomes Dolto’s inadvertent telling of a moving story carried 
fully beneath the conscious stories that she tells. Thus, her rare gift of biographical details is 
appreciated for the generous gesture that it truly is: ample testimony to the unconscious as a 
living force on the scene long before consciousness, operating continuously from earliest 
infancy as a dynamic pressure subtending and countersigning all our adult efforts. Hence, 
the biographical offers proof of (and desire for) the theoretical, and vice-versa. For there is 
no fixed partition between the explicit and implicit in Dolto, and no dramatic severing 
between phantasy and reality either. Enigmatically, everything and nothing is contradiction. 
And as the transference becomes our most potent tool for organizing her complicated texts, 
research becomes a matter of waiting (wading) through much reading—taking her words as 
our mediating objects—for the arrival of the unconscious effect of highly compressed stories 
that eventually become discernible by the sheer force of repetition. Our learning about 
primitive audition is, then, an experience of it, as Dolto’s project exquisitely performs its 
content. In turn, our thematization becomes possible only thanks to word-things that become 
palpable through the sheer quanta of associations, eventually structuring research notes like 
a dictionary, in a wild proliferation of dream-work from writer to reader. With Dolto, then, 
learning is not just of transference but in transference, as subject and object blur entirely, and 
thought is co-opted by the primitive processes from which it originated in the first place.  
What makes possible this radical learning is Dolto’s willingness to share truthful 
personal stories about the young child she once was. Thus, just like the powerful dream of a 
bird to which Freud traced the origins of DaVinci’s passion for flight, a psychobiographic 
study of Dolto reveals that knowing the thinker as an infant, pre-thought, helps us learn 
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something critical and new about his or her genius—and about the unconscious. Yet surely 
nothing unsettles education more than the notion that effective learning requires the student 
to know the teacher as a dreamer. From here, upon Dolto’s precious stories, our ship sails. 
And where it goes next will astound, being an entirely non-locatable place somewhere 
“between silence and the rumour of language” (Derrida, 1986b, 64). Our navigational co-
ordinates will be suitably contradictory. For the geography of primary narcissism is 
watery—a «narcissism flottant» [floating narcissism] (VO, 162) in the «indifférenciation de 
la masse liquide» (VO, 34; also AI, 120; SP1, 59), with stages that need to be «liquidé» 
(DW, 34, MA, 258, SP1, 39, SP3, 92).  And yet, here is also a warm hearth: a «foyer de 
réconfort» (CE, 205), a «foyer inconscient» (SS, 15). And desire itself is born, and reborn, 
of ashes (SS, 234 & 256), as Dolto’s thought blends seamlessly with childhood memories of 
war-era food lines outside the «fourneau» [oven; i.e., soup kitchen] (EN, 54); and (on the 
same page), collecting coal at the docks with her mother (Ibid). Decades apart—yet 
somehow, affectively simultaneously—we will find comments about how psychoanalysis 
needs to reach the archaic, to «aller au charbon» [go to the coals] (D&R, 31); and that 
without Laforgue, she would have always seen in the nanny fragment «que du feu» [only 
fire] (EN, 119). Talking with Bernard Pivot, Dolto even says she admires «le charbonnier» 
[coalcutter], for whom she is merely «son élève» [his student] (Ribowski, 2004).  
An organizing silence 
Closing this chapter, it seems apt to cite the only direct quote from Freud in Dolto’s 
inaugural work, most noteworthy because in the future, she will provide so few references:  
Impulses which strive for pleasure are not all taken up into the final organization of 
the sexual function. A number of them are set aside as unserviceable, by repression 
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or some other means; a few of them are diverted from their aim in the remarkable 
manner I have mentioned and used to strengthen other impulses; yet others persist in 
minor roles, and serve for the performance of introductory acts, for the production of 
fore-pleasure” (Freud, 1933c, 98; cited in MA, 25). 
 
Reading Dolto through Freud, because she did, makes experienceable the work of the 
primary processes: play with words as condensations; overdetermination through the 
accumulation of examples; and that other kind of conveyance from somewhere else that is 
the transference. Privileging return, I end this discussion of filiation where I began, in the 
story of one child. Here is Marcel, a 10-year old at Bretonneau in 1938 for school delays and 
balding (MA, 218-227). Dolto notices she needs to wait 20-30 seconds for his answers: “I 
take his rhythm.” Taking the dissertation to press after a year, she comments that Marcel is 
on the road to a recovery he may never reach. But at least he no longer thinks work is «pas 
la peine» [not worth it; also no(t) suffering/pain]. In her italicising is a subtle hint of the 
word play that will inform her life’s work. And in later editions, we will learn Marcel visited 
Dolto some 30 years later, in 1967, while passing through France, to introduce his 10-year 
old son (Dolto, 1939/2013, 194; P&P, 237). Marcel is the only one of the initial cases she 
saw again (P&P, 239), and his story lingers. Because walking with Dolto, we begin to feel 
we are in the company of someone with remarkable knowledge—but we can never be sure 
of how, or when, she came upon it. Just as Britzman writes of Freud, Dolto “felt the 
transference in the very activity of theory” (2003, 136). And thinking with Dolto, it becomes 
patent that language exceeds our intention, as the unconscious infuses unpredictability into 
our narratives—insight as a surprise, a sudden arrival—in stratifications of experience, like 
dreams layered upon each other (Freud, 1900a, 219f), compelling a reality that is never 
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unitary. Dolto believes philosophy is sourced in the unconscious (JD, 268), and in an 
uncanny echo, my own derives from an apparent stranger to Dolto who walked precisely the 
same block of rue Saint-Jacques for four decades: Jacques Derrida. Derrida posits the 
present as being perpetually deferred (1972/1987, 29), continuously compounded with non-
presence and non-perception (1973, 4), as unconscious archives (1995a, 64) inevitably 
provoke «déhiscence» and «divisibilité» (1996, 61), informing an enigmatic otherness in the 
very nature we call human. Such is Dolto’s conception of the unconscious as an undeniable 
dynamic, yet one that eludes and slips from our hands. Thus, the unconscious makes akin 
the problematic of psychobiography and psychoanalysis: how to tell the untellable story. 
And while my study of Dolto is not deliberately philosophical, perhaps it is accidentally so. 
For as Derrida describes, I begin “writing in the passion of the non-knowing” (1987b, 59), 
simply believing we are “structured by the phantasmic” (2001a, 89): constructed of, in and 
by dream-work; this “primary souvenir” (1967a,73) elaborates a “me of the living present as 
originally a trace” (Ibid, 95), wherein «la phonè» (Ibid,89) is intimately constructive. Thus, 
as Derrida notes, there is an “indelibility of certain traces in the unconscious” (1967c, 339f) 
perpetuating “a “purely idiomatic residue [that] is irreducible” (1967c, 310), as an enigmatic 
“signature brought forth produces events in the given language…illegible events” (1998, 
66)—an encounter with “all that is inhabited rather than produced by writing” (1967b, 230). 
And as I work, a curious question insists: Is not writing prior to the phoneme? For the word, 
we will learn, arrives on the archaic scene of proprioception, as the child is being written 
upon by experience while dreaming, engaging the primal psychical structuration that will 
form the root of her thoughts. Thus, with Derrida, we might say that “arch-writing is at work 
at the origin of sense” (1967a, 95), and consider “writing as more interior to speech” (1967b, 
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68), as “writing that takes place before and in speech” (1967b, 444)—a “lithography before 
words” (1967c, 307), or “primary writing” (Ibid, 310). These are the deep provocations, I 
believe, of the transference in texts, as we try to bring into discourse “some structures in the 
relationship with the Other which do not reduce to intentionality” (Levinas, 1982, 61). For 
Dolto’s corpus reveals an intimate weave of what is remembered and forgotten as an 
unconscious resonance testifies to a register, beneath and between words, with an absent 
other. Dolto believes suffering inheres in the human condition (JD, 57; JP, 41; SS, 234; TL, 
46). And if we cannot yet sense that transference offers securitization, we soon will, because 
Dolto believes it is a «silence organisateur» (SP1, 163), a potential for inter-human 
exchanges upon which our wish to live depends—passivity as an ironic potential for 
activity. She asks, “Who dreams? Is it ‘me’? Is it ‘I’? We are dealing with “an unknown that 
remains unknown” (Ibid, 13). And of the transference, «Qui, donc, parle à qui, et à quoi, de 
qui?» [Who, then, speaks to whom, and to what, from/about whom?] (SS, 256). Here is 
“knowledge of the enigmatic self, [as] Freud maintained” (Britzman, 2011, 27). With Dolto, 
then, we meet a subject both speaking and silent, amid witnesses filling a contemporary 
scene, tethered to secret, lost relics from a «passé antérieur.» And in that organizing silence 
wherein we will try to listen, Dolto will tell not only the story of one woman, but the story of 
man: that every autobiography begins in an idiosyncratic, unconscious, auditory prehistory 
as an indelible self-other with an enigmatic witness—as the subject of a biography. 
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Chapter Two: Family & Transmission 
Abstract: In this chapter, I examine the transference of Dolto’s infantile libidinal history in 
her thinking about the child. I reveal Dolto’s construction of the infant as being continuously 
engaged in an unconscious symbolic function critical to his subjectivization. I show how 
Dolto privileges language, in theory and in the clinic, and how her evidence for words as 
mediating objects for the transference overturns linguistics. I elucidate regression to the 
archaic and passive transmission in libidinal development. And I demonstrate how wartime, 
family deaths and lost loves—most crucially, the departure of a beloved nanny—left traces 
that echo enigmatically in her corpus. 
 
One may say of the impossible that it marks the limit of a possible or a power, more 
precisely, of an “I can” or a “we can.” Such passivity remains at work in the work.  
(Jacques Derrida, 2002b, XXXiii). 
 
In a wonderful interview in 1987, Bernard Pivot asks Françoise Dolto if one can 
speak of the existential anxiety of the baby—«sûrement,» she replies (Ribowski, 2004). For 
Dolto’s infant is anything but the ‘digestive tube’ of medicine. Nor is it mere rhetoric when 
Dolto tells Elizabeth Roudinesco that babies “invented everything” (1986/1988, 18) in her 
practice, as only they bring “something really new” (Ibid, 13). Dolto provokes a mute 
question: how can anyone learn from babies? And in its wake, the transference arrives. For 
what teaching could the infans ever convey if not via an unconscious conduit? In a lovely 
post-humous film project, Claude Halmos describes Dolto as “an ethnologist in the world of 
children” (Meirieu & Kübler, 2001). And what Dolto discovers in her explorations disturbs 
biography profoundly: the infant unconsciously “intuits his history” (CE, 242; VC2, 770), 
constructing his psyche on the truth he hears, ergo the need to «parlai vrai» [speak truth; 
homonym, «par les vrais» ‘by the true ones’] (ES,68; NE,202, 204 & 208; PJE,21; TL, 82 & 
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124). Herein is the paradox that the archaic sources all that is new—as well as a fine tension 
bound to every word. For what we will slowly learn is that untruth disturbs structuration by 
provoking anxiety, inciting regression; whereas truth, even if difficult, enables progression. 
Dolto theorizes that relational dependence is fundamental to humanisation, for if a child 
hears others speak of his suffering “it is taken from him” (DV, 37; Nobécourt & Simonetta, 
1978). Thus, speaking to a baby changes the diagnostic (EM, 217; Le Péron, 2008; TL, 16), 
especially speaking near the origin of trouble (JD, 129). But how can a baby tell what is 
true?:  
I don’t know what he [baby] says to me, but I know that he says, that he 
communicates with me unceasingly. And I know, I try to understand him, and he 
knows that I don’t understand him exactly. But that is the work between us. With 
you [interviewer], it’s the same…what I’m conscious of saying is a small part next to 
what I say unconsciously without knowing, and that these people [listeners] will hear 
with their unconscious, and that everyone in the world is like that…and the greatest 
desire of every human is to communicate his psyche with another human psyche 
(with Pivot, in Ribowski, 2004). 
 
The transference is simply a fact of life for Dolto. And tracing her powerful conviction will 
require a rapid decent into her personal history, wherein we will encounter a tremendous 
psychical force palpable throughout her project, and we will source her theory in her 
infancy. Dolto believes that an analyst cannot bring a patient to a place in psycho-affective 
development which he has not attained himself (MA, 166; also, VO, 213), and that an 
analyst is someone capable of going backwards in his story (Nobécourt, 2008b), as “real 
psychoanalysis always revives archaic pulses” (CD, 149). Further, she says, the closer one 
has been to psychosis, the better the analyst (DQ, 99). Her provocative words admit a 
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difficult truth: Dolto works “from her own experience” as Roudinesco says (1986, 518)—or, 
in the words of Michèle Montrelay, “as a «revenant»…who came back fighting against 
death in an archaic state…where she reconstituted herself” (DeMezamat, 2008b).  
Dolto begins each case with a detailed anamnesis, believing therapy is much longer 
without it (LF, 180-183; SP2, 60-62). Critically, she seeks names in a patient’s history (AI, 
224-226). It is curious, she notes, how “de-rhythming” and developmental delays occur in 
orphanages because so many adults have the same name (EV,62) (i.e., ‘nurse,’ ‘doctor’). 
The same happens in families, she adds, thus children believe the wrong grandmother is 
married to the grandfather (EV, 67). In fact, the First World War, which framed Dolto’s 
childhood, inclined families towards using names as guarantors of the posterity of the dead 
(Cabanes & Piketty, 2007, 7). And Dolto’s own record includes a maternal grandmother and 
great-grandmother both called «DanMé»; a homonymic  father (Henry) and paternal 
grandfather (Henri); and a family preference for names such that correspondence refers to 
dinner with “the Pierres,” or “the Andrés” (MF, 127-128)—and long after Jacqueline has 
died, the reader hears that “Jacqueline is still here” (MF, 146 & 145f). Freud himself felt his 
own children’s names made them «revenants» (1900b, 487). But so pronounced was this 
propensity in Dolto’s family that when her father went to register his baby boy (a 
replacement child for Jacqueline), with direct instructions from his wife to name him 
anything but ‘Jacques,’ that is exactly what he named him (AI, 85). 
Family neurosis 
Dolto’s parents had standing in the bourgeoisie (AI, 86; Roudinesco, 1986), but all 
was not as it seemed. Her mother hit her and pulled her hair, in a maniac state provoked by 
her very presence (AI, 130; DW, 157-161; EN, 99 & 103; VC1, 290). She had had an 
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inhumane mother, Dolto notes calmly (AI, 130), and a father who told her she was stupid, 
ugly and mean (ATP, 17-18). Then, when Jacqueline died, her mother lost her passion for 
life (EN, 61), calling her children serpents and vipers (ATP, 78), and railing publicly about 
why her pretty daughter died while the disabled don’t (DW, 132). Dolto says she was 
already “somewhat of an analyst” listening to this mother (Nobécourt, 2008a). But it was not 
until analysis with Laforgue that she could talk back, telling her mother she was too hard 
(AI, 130; ATP, 244;  MF, 74; Nobécourt, 2008a). Dolto thus depicts a mother who suffered 
much and passed on suffering as a legacy. As for her father, he is remembered as good, but 
simply too silent (AI, 122; EN, 91; PF, 113; Ribowski, 2004). 
WWI made mourning a reality for children, where it left over a million orphans in 
France and a “codification” of bereavement (Cabanes & Piketty, 2007, 2). A touching letter 
to God by little Françoise in 1915 asks for protection for her beloved uncle, Pierre (MF, 45-
46; VC1, 45-46). And the family record is rich with war efforts, including her mother and 
«Mlle» (governess) tending soldiers (EN, 31; VC1, 28-30 & 256), in a world of “women 
disguised as nurses” (EN, 29). Young Françoise herself tirelessly knitted «cache-nez» 
[mufflers; homonymically, ‘hiding-birth’] (AI, 74; EN, 29), wetting and stretching them 
between chairs just to free a little play time (AI, 75). Of her early childhood, Dolto 
remembers WWI determining everything; and when it ended, she wondered how one could 
live as war was «l’expérience de la vie sociale» (AI, 66 & 74). She even had a quick 
response when she was caught daydreaming: “I’m thinking of the poor soldiers in «les 
tranches»” [trenches; also, ‘psychoanalytic sessions’] (Ibid). In fact, the «Guerre de 14» (AI, 
118) could not but strike our young girl in peculiar ways: women with wails sounding more 
like laughter, who came to her home about a «fils disparu» [lost son]—“but he clearly 
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wasn’t at our house,” she remembers thinking (AI, 74; ATP, 27-28; CE, 15; EN, 33). The 
literality of words is patent in so many of her poignant recollections. Further, few widows 
had jobs (AI, 69), thus many fell to “pathological mourning” (DW, 118), driving her own 
push for an education (AI, 118). For in a «famille comme il faut» [right kind] a widow 
simply never remarried (AI, 73; EN, 52-53; Ribowski, 2004). And by the age of eight, a 
widow is exactly what she believed she was. 
«Oncle Pierre,» the «oncle oedipien» she adored—twice-decorated recipient of the  
Military Cross and Captain of the 62
nd
 Batallion of «Chasseurs Alpins»—died on 10 July 
1916, in Alsace, during his third tour of duty (AI, 69, 73 & 78; EN, 16 & 35; MF, 142f; 
VC1, 29, 60f & 209-210). He was her godfather (MF, 141f & 142f), but far more than that, 
she believed he was her fiancé. The story cannot be properly understood without considering 
the powerful support in reality for her belief: his letters from the trenches address her as «ma 
fiancée Vava» (VC1, 35), promise to marry her after the war (VC1, 44 & 57), and profess he 
dreams he is with her (VC1, 55). In turn, his sister (Dolto’s mother) sends Françoise his 
Legion of Honour photo, telling her seven-year old that to deserve the marriage, she must 
“never cry again” (MF, 23 & 51). And his mother (Dolto’s maternal grandmother) sends her 
two post-humous gifts: a diamond, as “she would have been his fiancé” (AI, 69); and a 
rosary for her communion, following the instructions he left (AI, 73; VC1, 99). But the night 
before that fateful day, Françoise learns that Jacqueline is dying of cancer, as her mother 
pleads that since “nothing is purer than a child before communion,” Françoise should pray 
for her sister’s survival (ATP, 20; EN, 50; Ribowski, 2004). Thus the deaths of Jacqueline 
and Pierre are co-immortalized, as-if in a union—«comme union»—in a haunting 
homonymic tension wherein suffering and the promise not to cry, silence, intertwine. A 
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letter to Mlle in 1928 still echoes mourning: “No one will know, perhaps not even myself, 
though I suspect it, the formidable influence upon me of the sadness of the death of Oncle 
Pierre” (VC1, 214-215).  
Dolto believes she would never have become a psychoanalyst without the drama of 
Jacqueline’s death in 1920 (AI, 82), yet her psychical pain is patent far earlier in her 
admission to experiencing transient schizophrenia around age four (EN, 10, 14, 82 & 93). 
And one can only suppose that Laforgue (interestingly, from Alsace), conceived his theory 
of family neurosis (D&R, 21) with at least some reference to Françoise and Philippe. Indeed, 
it is a home where much catches our attention on the scene of orality. For example, by 
bourgeois standards, children have no right to speak at the table (ATP, 30; EN, 42), and 
seven-year old Françoise is punished for perceived rudeness towards a valet with a month of 
eating from a chamber pot (EN, 46-47). There are privations of dessert for dirtying her dress 
(MF, 20; VC1, 41); and a prohibition on eating anywhere but at the mother’s or maternal 
grandmother’s tables until she is 24 (Ribowski, 2004). In turn, hers is an ‘oral’ (aural) 
curiosity, turning on words: for example, the funny way conversations jump subjects (EN, 
42), and the absurdity of idioms that suggest shrimp ask to be cooked (ATP, 24). «Je ne 
comprenais pas les mots» [I didn’t understand (the) words] (ATP, 27), she states. So her 
persistent questions got her reassigned to Mlle (aka Élisabeth Weilandt), as the other 
«nurses» could not stand her (EN, 65). And musing on how adults were like a different 
species (EN, 67), she wished, “When I’m big, I’ll try to remember what it’s like when 
you’re small” (Ibid). In fact, Mlle was two nannies removed, following a Miss Brice, from 
little Françoise’s very first English-speaking nanny, whose name is forgotten, in a home 
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where nannies are cut from family photos anyhow, as if they were never even there in the 
first place (e.g., AI, 144).  
Médiation langagière 
And in this presence-absence, we come upon the Irish girl whose story, unlike her 
name, is broadcast widely across Dolto’s project (e.g., AI, 144; CE, 272; DW, 40-41; EN, 64 
& 117-118; Ribowski, 2004). The vibrant 18- to 20-year-old enjoyed “coke and orgies” (AI, 
144) at a local hotel by borrowing the mother’s clothing and jewels, for which she was fired. 
Dolto explains her feelings for her as an archaic love (EN, 118-119), relating how she 
stunned her family by first babbling in English at 18 months, after a long silence (CE, 272-
273). Dolto recalls the nanny dressing her fully in blue one day, dying even her shoes, 
calling her a beautiful “blue angel” (EN, 64; Dolto & This, 1980/2002; Ribowski, 2004). 
And Dolto describes to Laforgue, “auburn hair that smelled very good…long tables, 
served…like the Romans, with very tall people dressed like Russian generals” and an 
elevator man “dressed like a Brandebourg” (AI, 144; Ribowski, 1987/2004). And it is right 
here, on words, that we experience a dramatic dive into dream-work. For the Brandebourg 
style (Wikipédia, 2014d) is a strong match to Pierre’s uniform (AI, 79; EN, 35; PF, 35), and 
to a so-called “Greycoat” soldier (Wikipedia, 2014k) of the (then recent) American Civil 
War. In one direction, this daydream takes us to the proximity of Greycoat Hospital 
School—doctor of education?—a prestigious English institute for girls (Wikipedia, 2014f). 
And in another, we somehow arrive at Billy Williams (Wikipedia, 2014b), whose huge hit in 
1909 was “The Old Grey Coat,” and whose role in that ancient scene is inadvertently 
recalled by a street name right around Françoise’s home—«rue Singer.» And right around 
the song, in 1905, a risqué German novel, Professor Unrat [garbage] centred its plot on a 
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wild cabaret, “The Blue Angel” (Wikipedia, 2014c). Thus, the nanny’s soundscape, though 
long silenced, becomes hearable again as archaic echoes weaving upon time and place, held 
in trust in the unconscious of the infant who loved her so. I offer that this is an example of a 
‘trace’—and that this is ‘exactly’ where, and how, it begins. It is as if a word itself were a 
memorial preventing our ever forgetting what we could never, in infancy, ‘remember’—and 
whereupon a few precious syllables drenched in archaic affects will inform and countersign 
the far, far later landscape onto which thoughts (ergo, theories) will emerge. 
Dolto believes the removal of a loved nanny is “an act of violence”; and that the loss 
of «médiation langagière,» in being more traumatic than the loss of a parent (CE, 241; EM, 
202-204), causes «maladies langagières» [language illnesses] (EV, 61; IIC, 85). Adding to 
the lost nanny, I note that Dolto’s suffering was fed by potent guilt: not making enough 
scarves (EN, 30); not praying well enough (PF, 52); hurting those she loved (ATP, 28; EN, 
94); asking too many questions (EN, 47); crying (MF, 21 & 42); making her mother anxious 
(VO, 199); even, having fun when her mother was bored (VC1, 305). Dolto describes her 
debilitating culpability as “narcissistic dereliction” (Nobécourt, 2008a; also DW, 163; EN, 
84 & 93). And she reveals that her rescue from childhood guilt came via an angel, BAG 
(EN, 20-21), an acronym for «Bon Ange Guardien» [good guardian angel]—but strangely, 
English slang for theft. Visiting her nightly, so that she had to negotiate fair space on her bed 
with his big wings, BAG absolved her by explaining her mischief helped adults «gagner leur 
ciel» [win heaven] (Ibid)—in effect, that her way of being good was being bad. “It was a 
very, very big consolation” (Ibid). And the affect that transits her telling is overwhelming. 
Dolto theorizes that the guilt originating in the “first preverbal sensations of the 
difficulty of living” (JD, 57) produces a narcissistic wound that blocks later investments of 
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erogenous zones (SP2, 52). Thus, the «névrose familiale» is a structure, she says, whereby 
the child is prevented from healing because he is needed to assume guilt (MA, 261; D&R, 
21). And the greatest source of the infant’s guilt is that of hurting the mother (VO, 199); 
though, ironically, she also states, “you cannot live without hurting your mother” (DQ, 116). 
In effect, guilt and suffering enter into our earliest relations of dependency, wherein «nous 
sommes punis donc sous sommes coupables» [we are punished hence we are guilty] (CE, 
322). Thus, guilt enfolds narcissism (CD, 239), while the child will be alright “as long as he 
is not guilty” (EV, 78).  Dolto will also develop the idea that losing a libidinal investment 
suddenly, before it has been displaced, causes an enclave «à bas bruits» [low-noise] (SS, 
143; also EM, 280; MA, 29; QS, 9; SS, 143)—an “infirmation at the oral stage” (SF, 140) 
that provokes disinterest in the exterior world (MA, 29) and vulnerability to frustration that 
can return the “oral autistic type” (Ibid). Further, Dolto believes that a predominance of 
unresolved oral fixations leads to smoking, among other sequelae (MA, 29; SP1, 155), while 
a wet-nurse can aggravate or correct the lacks in the «structure libidinale des parents» (CD, 
242f; CE, 29; DV 65; MA, 27; TL, 142). In fact, Dolto smokes in a film (Nobécourt & 
Simonetta, 1978) and two photos (VC2, 391 & 400), having apparently been a heavy smoker 
(AlloCiné, n.d.; Marie, 2008). Yet her mother nursed all her infants for a full year (EN, 62 & 
98), preventing the loss of the actual breast. Here, then, erupts the odd, illogical thought that 
the suffering of Dolto’s weaning has nothing to do with her mother—rather, that her rupture 
of oral-stage love is lived entirely inside a (hi)story. “An impossible desire arrives with 
weaning” (SF, 250), she states poignantly, a “suffering of abandon” (SP1, 213). Thus, with 
the nanny, Dolto’s ‘castration’ can be glimpsed as a symbolic loss informing a potent 
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contradiction (a telltale signature of dream-work?) where the one suffering oral castration 
too early or too quickly has, paradoxically, no oral castration.  
Listening slowly 
 
Thus grounded, Dolto privileges listening. Roudinesco describes it perfectly as a 
psychoanalytic method centred on hearing the unconscious (1986, 170), and Aubry, her 
mother, calls Dolto «géniale» in listening for the unconscious (Aubry & Cifali, 1986/1988, 
44). “I listen naïvely,” Dolto simply says, listening for the other, (DW, 27), unconscious 
language (CD, 196), a human presence (DV, 293)—because learning is in listening (DW, 
24), and the analyst must put himself in parentheses (DW, 163), refraining from impeding 
what the analysand says (DW, 30; NE, 207). Thus, Dolto will «écouter tranquillement» 
[listen slowly, quietly] (EM, 50), believing the analyst’s “non-reactivity” is what 
“reactualizes” what is unknown or forgotten in history (VC2, 799). In other words, the 
listener is foremost a witness (TL, 16). So she stresses, like Freud, looking at patients the 
least possible (JD, 69; Nobécourt, 2008a), as she works to decode unconscious fixations 
keeping the past alive, allowing patients to recover libidinal energy that had been unusable 
(VC2, 800). The elucidation of what is not said “transforms a person’s destiny,” she 
believes, and the energy put back in play is «irreversible» (VC2, 859). As she sees it, Freud 
opens a «dialectique du don» [bequest] (LF, 186) that returns liberty to humans who have 
been deprived of it (DW, 86). In sum, “reliving the enclave changes you” (SP 131). She 
sums up her belief as work, and vice-versa, in this way: 
This faith of mine is that everyone has chosen to be born and that if he survives, then 
that is already something. So is something unhealthy already, or is there something 
still healthy and he has a right to the auto-defense of his libido? «Ça» [that, the 
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unconscious] is what I look for. And if he has the right to the auto-defense of his 
libido, and he suffers from not re-finding this auto-defense of his libido, I try to help 
him to express his anxiety (anguish), because then he can re-find his primary 
narcissism with a body that can experience joy sufficiently for life to be sufficiently 
good, and he can be happy—well, he can be sufficiently happy to continue to support 
the ordeal of living (Nobécourt, 2008b). 
 
Dolto spontaneously lets theory spring from the clinic (Aubry & Cifali, 1986/1988, 
44; Roudinesco, 1986, 170 & 519), as she admits trouble in formulating her work (D&R, 23; 
VC2, 452-453). She believes theory is moot without examples (CE, 343; VC2, 684), and 
that her work is more of a witnessing put into words (DW, 31), a conversation rather than a 
schema (DW, 42; SP2, 93): «je bafouille des choses qui sont pour moi des repères» [I 
stammer some things that are landmarks for me] (DW, 87). Yet we need to stop for a pause, 
to hear the spectacular homonymic echoes of «repères»—at once, ‘re-father, lose again, 
repair.’ Dolto tells us theory is not something to dwell on (DW, 41), so we follow her out 
from this place, this «repère,» but we will return. For now, we just accept the invitation to 
personify the word, this word-thing, with the sense of witness that permeates her thinking 
about the transference. Where the unconscious is concerned, she says, we are only 
witnesses—an idea infusing her entire project (e.g., CD, 194 & 199; Dolto & Dolto-Tolitch, 
1989, 135; SP3, 14 & 162; SS, 154; TL, 49; VC2, 228). On the one hand, being a witness 
seems simple: listening and giving trust is a lot, she says, and you need to say «courage» 
(CE, 61), to try even when all seems impossible (VC2, 292). But beneath the surface, 
Dolto’s ‘witness’ is far more enigmatic, tethered to her belief that the analysand has a 
lucidity simply needing to be awakened (DW, 61; VC2, 678; 1985/1989b, 134), and that 
witnessing «ennoblit son existence qui a résisté aux difficultées» (CE, 40) [ennobles his 
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existence that resisted difficulties]. It is as if the witness honours what survives, and so 
doing, reawakens a dormant capacity for self-defense originating in what is perennially 
well, the unconscious, origin of the passive «pulsions» conserving life.   
Dolto’s ‘witness’ is a conduit to her notion of words as ‘mediating objects’ for the 
transference. For in her original approach, the word is the best ‘transitional object’ for the 
transference (DQ, 195-196; SP1, 136; SP3, 133; TL, 109). And what is at stake for Dolto re 
the word, the witness, and the transference is inseparable, theoretically or otherwise, and 
summed up well during a television interview she granted in the last year of her life. Asked 
to imagine if the walls in her office could tell a story, Dolto replies, after a silence:  
If we had put a magnetic band… it would recount nothing at all, it would recount the 
words, but it would not say what had passed that was intense, lived by the person 
who spoke, behind the words that served as mediators between the unconscious of 
the patient and the unconscious of the psychoanalyst, and that, because of this 
mediation, allowed affects to be re-lived and definitively enter a past that no longer 
draws interest (AI, 220; Ribowski, 2004). 
  
And in this belief about the word, we again find support for Dolto with Freud, who theorized 
that “intermediate ideas are looked for between two psychical dream-stimuli” (1900a, 235;  
see also Ibid, 228), to “transfer energy” by establishing connections (1900b, 596). Freud 
says this happens “with remarkable frequency…in speech” (Ibid) because the word has 
“predestined ambiguity” (Ibid, 340). In fact, central to Freudian theory is the notion that 
language is a privileged setting for transference (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 497).  
From 1939, then, Dolto steers the future of analysis in France; and the very first issue of the 
«Revue Française de la Psychanalyse,» in 1949 (Ribas, 2006, 95; VC2, 176f), features her 
invention of the «poupée-fleur» [flower doll] as a «procédé de transfert» for oral-stage 
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affects. Yet the acknowledgement due her remains «inédit» [unspoken], in talk of how the 
“classical study of the relationship between the thing-presentation and word-presentation in 
Freudian meta-psychology continues to underpin the thinking of French psychoanalysis” 
(Birksted-Breen, Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, 37), rooted in “very early Freud” (Ibid, 29) that 
“does not stray far from the focus on the drives” (Ibid, 31 & 27).  
Relative autism 
Grounding her understanding of primary narcissism in an enigma, Dolto believes the 
infant experiences suffering as a threat (JD, 21; SF, 78; VC2, 14 & 702), a narcissistic trial 
or wound (SF, 73-74; SP2, 45; SP3, 71; VO, 188). And in an original turn on what might 
seem self-evident, Dolto insists on the risk of “relational trouble” (SF, 73): a “language of  
refusal” or of not being heard (DW, 104; VC2, 641); a «phénomène de résonance» (SP3, 
81); a «histoire vrai» [true story] that, in turn, renders the child «pas vrai» [untrue] (CD, 
29)—essentially, a “depersonalization” provoked (enigmatically indeed) by “affect stripped 
of valor” (CD, 215). Thus, trauma is not always (or only) a real event for Dolto, but rather 
any break in structuring relations that is “pregenitally inverting” (LF, 137). So Dolto 
considers that her work consists of re-finding, recovering, children “by telling them the 
origin of the rupture” (CE, 528-529). A powerful idea emerges here whereby infancy and 
analysis share their roots: the talking cure works because suffering originates in the faulty 
insertion of a valorous young subject into the human story.  
We meet Josette, age three and a half, very early in the dissertation (MA, 3-4). 
Josette is experiencing enuresis, nightmares, anorexia and a loss of play. Over three visits in 
a single month, Dolto speaks to the mother (with Josette) about how troubles commenced 
when parents made secret plans to move her out of their bedroom; and she explains to 
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Josette (with mother) about wanting to stay a baby. Dolto recommends speaking about the 
room changes directly and valorizing progression. So at home, the father talks to Josette 
about going to school soon and being proud of her. Then, on a single page, the heart of a 
powerful theory is put on the table so unpretentiously that it may be missed altogether, 
returning only after years, as if it were an après-coup of reading, following our own ‘storing’ 
(storying?) of words. What is overheard creates anxiety, Dolto says, causing «symptômes du 
négativisme»—a revolt against progress, sleep, food and games that prompts regression to a 
prior stage in «évolution libidinale» (MA, 153). Progression requires incremental 
unpleasure, she explains, a «sacrifice que t’impose la réalité» (Ibid)—but “pleasure can 
never be renounced without an exchange for another pleasure” (Ibid; italics mine). So what 
enables progression? It is «promesses de plaisirs inconnus» [promises of unknown 
pleasures] (Ibid)—words becoming the site-means, the mediators, of unconscious affects 
that determine whether or not we can invest in reality. Not only is an ontogeny of the 
transference patent here, but also the «rôle du transfert est visible,» Dolto adds, as the child 
herself insists on returning to tell her doctor she is well (Ibid). Thus, little Josette’s intimate 
deconstruction truly does “«bouleverse» (overthrow, disturb, overturn) the landscape in (on) 
which the science of language has peacefully installed itself” (Derrida, 1967b,  44).  For the  
word is foremost a consolation for an unnameable absence from time immemorial. 
In fact, Dolto’s career as an analyst began with Sophie Morgenstern, whose practice 
focused on «démutisation»: pulling children out of autistic, regressive states. Morgenstern 
observed that unresolved traumas lead to a predisposition to return to anterior libidinal 
stages (2003a, 75 & 78); death and departure are identical for a child (2003c, 131); and what 
is psychogenic about troubles is also what is most hopeful (2003b, 39). Acknowledging 
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Morgenstern to the end of her own life (VC2, 797), Dolto herself recalls that children 
became autistic during the evacuation of Paris in WWII (SP3, 78), and she believes “an 
autist is not something you are, but something you become” (SP2, 71). Autism is amenable 
to psychoanalytic treatment, Dolto insists, and she refuses the «fatalité» of autism (1985c, 
527-528), insisting it is both «relatif» (SS, 221) and «réversible» (1957/1997a, 23). We find 
similar thoughts 40 years later in the work of Frances Tustin, who views autism as a 
regression to destructuration (1981, 169 & 186) that is reversible (1981, 173 & 188)—but 
without any reference to Dolto.
5
 The autist suffers from a break in relationality, Dolto 
insists: language did not “arrive on time,” so the child felt unheard, left with unsymbolized 
desires and unspoken suffering (ADT, 170; DQ, 36; DV, 117; DW, 87 & 111; ES, 183-185; 
EV, 54; JD, 269; SP1,139-140; TL, 96; 1985a, 527). The result is affective starvation (JD, 
23), whereby children enter autism passively, no longer asking for anything (CD, 184; NE, 
191); and by slow renunciation (CD, 70; SS, 37), they regress to anonymity and phantasy 
relations with sensations, in a private battle against solitude (JD, 23; PS, 21 & 64; SP1, 148 
& 151-152; SP2, 70). Dolto even offers a remedy: explain the origin of the rupture to the 
autist while he is half-asleep (1985a, 529). And in a watershed work in 1957, Dolto explains 
that the autist simply needs “to go far enough back to find the other similar enough to 
himself to be in security with him” (SS, 24). In fact, Dolto is narrating an unconscious 
witnessing—a relationality that enigmatically inheres in our infantile autism, our apparent 
silence. After all, she says, right at the inception of her project, “the unconscious is not an 
obscure, mute receptacle of useless psychical representations” (MA, 15). For Dolto, 
therefore, autism is «proof of the symbolic function in humans» (1985a, 534), and fertile for 
“new psychoanalytic cures” (VC2, 606). Yet thinking with Dolto, we somehow cannot 
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shake the feeling that organization and disorganization work something like an elevator. We 
may have gone a distance along the road of theory, but it seems the nanny is still right here.  
Sonar heritage 
Further, in the apparent negativism of destructuration is, paradoxically, a positive 
opportunity for recovery—one Dolto believes makes regression a necessity (DW, 110; EM, 
140-144; MA, 224-225; SP3, 90; SS, 16, 42, 165 & 265; VO, 225)—because of the crucial 
capacity of oral passivity (including sleep) for “re-narcissisation by deculpabilization” (LO3, 
154; SP2, 19; SP3, 175; VO, 42; 50 & 190-191). In Dolto’s original view, regression is a 
right to live «larvairement» [larvally] (JD, 126; also SP3, 156) that enables healing because 
primary narcissism is an “automaterning” (SP3, 26-29, VO, 162): a self-assumption of repair 
as we “take ourselves as a relay object in the absence of another” (DQ, 196; SF, 220). Dolto 
even prescribes that patients be allowed to just live out a stage normally surpassed (JD, 149; 
MA, 17; Roudinesco, 1986, 497).
6
 This valuation of regression to oral passivity (MA, 30) 
circulates throughout Dolto's project, from Josette’s ordinary trouble with growing up, to the 
most profoundly troubling cases, which Dolto undertakes with unwavering optimism: 
There is residual libidinal health conserved intact in psychotics behind the regressive 
tableau of their symptoms…The reactivation, in psychotics, of a state that remains 
sane but very archaic was therefore possible and could be followed by a 
restructuration of the relation to themselves and to the world (SS, 23)…Regression is 
or can be a positive process…every event that provokes a subjective disorganization 
returns the subject to the search for libidinal investments that were previously 
acquired and that, through his story, were imaginarily conserved as a place-time of 
existential security (SS, 25). 
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And what is the nature of this restorative oral passive environment? It is defined by 
«aimance absorptive» [absorbing love] (MA, 27), where “having” is indistinguishable from 
“being” (MA, 28). The first form of the oral stage is passive (MA, 28) and auto-erotic (MA, 
27 & 53), being an unconscious existence (JP, 41; MA, 15, 30 & 30f), and the archaic stage 
of desire (JD, 296-297; LF, 255; MA, 30). As language is present in fetal life «au moins 
auditivement» [at least auditorily] (JD, 270), the infant organizes a «code d’appel» [code of 
calls] (JD, 273) immediately, Dolto insists, because the symbolic function is “foundational 
of the human being” (JD, 270 & 296), and the desire for communication precedes the need 
for assistance (JD, 273). Further, as phonemes encountered in fetal life leave «en mémoire 
l’héritage sonore» (JD, 286), links in language are crucial to elaborating the separation (SS, 
244) of “aerial life” (QS, 9-10; VC2, 728). In effect, the child “passively stores words and 
sounds…to which he reacts according to their associations, agreeable or disagreeable” (MA, 
28; also CE, 17; JD, 286). Crucially, in the liquid dreamscape of the oral passive stage, there 
is no “splitting” (DQ, 123), and the infant has no notion of a world differentiated from 
himself (MA, 27). Thus, he is vulnerable to “ethical devaluation” (JD, 287; LF, 103) from 
the environment, “drinking anxiety with his milk” (EM, 111); or, if put to bed with a bottle, 
“swallowing the ceiling with his milk” (LF, 126). His only recourse is a “passive defense” 
(LO1, 90; LO2, 50): returning, in effect, to a prior state of goodness and safety. “Precocious 
libidinal stages” are a proven fact, Dolto declares (SF, 69), as “the libidinal sub-basement of  
relations of dependence…that stays in later libidinal organizations” (LF, 103). 
Dolto’s practice is centred on regression from the start, and the material on it 
dominates her project quantitatively. In 1939, Marcel, age 10, is diagnosed with «régression 
libidinale» (MA, 223); and in 1943, Marie-Louise B., age 28, is diagnosed with a 
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«régression la plus archaïque» (SS, 89). Living is an encounter with «tension régressivante» 
(SS, 17), as the death of loved ones causes “momentary regression” (JD, 226); as does 
removing the mother or trying to (JD, 163); and narcissistic trials (SS, 24 & 144). Humans 
react by withdrawing, “hiding” their desire (SS, 20)—provocatively, she says, as an 
“anorexic jouissance of slowing down” (SP2, 240), an “archaic symbolic satisfaction” (SS, 
42). In turn, sleep is restorative as a “daily regression” (EM, 139), and a defense against the 
loss of relational protection (SP2, 19; VO, 190-191). We recall Freud’s mention of “attacks 
of sleep” (1896/1954b, 180), and “the instinct to sleep” (1940[1939], 166). Implicit in 
Dolto’s view of regression is a crucial “continuity” of the subject (CE, 29; EM, 61) wherein 
narcissism remains essential to future well-being (JD, 123), and the “narcissistic economy” 
(LF, 92) is supplied by a ceaseless «force désirante» (DV, 9). Dolto opens her dissertation 
with full credit to Freud for her belief that instinct and its physiological substratum 
characterizes all that is life (MA, 24), as she explains how pulses are subject to cyclical 
repetition (Ibid; also DW, 31); developmental shifts in the «zone érogène élective» (Ibid, 11 
& 24); phases of excitation (Ibid, 24-25); and “mute rest cycles” (Ibid; also VO, 50), 
effectively a cathecting of silence. All affect is linked to narcissism (JD, 256) and 
“constructed in passive pulses only” (SF, 210). Thus, Dolto’s notion of primary narcissism 
is as a perpetually reachable subterranean river, supplying what grows, deeply reminiscent 
of Freud’s descriptions of “reservoirs” of narcissistic libido (1905, 218; 1917e, 252).  
Dolto’s narration of archaic prehistory cannot help but astound, as she relates how 
biological processes result in a «symbolique narcissistique,» thus “constituting language” 
(SS, 74)—and language is described with the same tropes as pulses: “language is made to 
bounce” (ES, 107). Freud himself declared narcissism a limit-concept (1914/2001a, 85); and 
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instinct, the frontier of biology and psychology (1913, 182). For as early as oral eroticism is 
(Freud, 1905/1953c, 176, 205 & 233-234), its libido has already passed through an archaic 
scene. Ruth Mack Brunswick speaks (after Dolto) of passive modes enduring when active 
modes begin (1940, 298 & 306-7); Melanie Klein describes a passive “oral suckling stage” 
(1929/1998, 204 & 209); Karl Abraham identifies passivity within the oral phases of the 
libido (1924, 450); Otto Rank muses on the “pre-Oedipal” (1924/1993, 216); August Stärcke 
describes what is infantile as “archaic” (1921a, 197); and Sándor Ferenczi posits fetal 
mental life (1913/1950, 219), and passive object love (1931/1980, 16). But wherever we 
search, we will find no one exploring the archaic with Dolto’s dedication: “As for precocity, 
I really have no idea anymore where it is…It really seems to be right from the first day of 
life” (Coronel & De Mezamat, 1997b). The social and moral implications are astounding. 
Régression à l’archaïque 
Dolto credits Freud’s concept of regression with allowing her to hypothesize 
«régression à l’archaïque» (SS, 115-116; SS, 142 & 265). As she explains it, when life 
pulses are blocked from symbolic expression, the system complies for a while by inhibiting 
them (SF, 250); but if pulses accumulate too much, regression to a more infantile mode of 
expression is made necessary to release tension (JD, 30; LF, 113). Thus, in the absence of a 
means of symbolic expression (i.e., the pre-verbal child), for whom there is “untranslatable 
anguish” (JP, 38), regression becomes a trap that is seldom spontaneously reversible (JP, 38 
& 41; SS, 11, 26, 75, 114, 118 & 128). We pause to hear the strong echoes of Dolto’s 
thought: regression is a solution for a quantitative excess of affect, but it can be pathological 
in the absence of symbolic mediation. For recovery requires «régression …et un appel au-
delà» [a call beyond; italics mine] (VO, 225). The role of this ‘call’ in the «processus de 
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régression et de leur résolution» (SS, 15-16) cannot be overstated, and we will hear of it 
later in Dolto’s notion of a “third” to enable transference at the oral passive stage (JP, 39). 
But thus equipped with the capacity to mediate re-emergence, Dolto values regression as a 
“healthy folding” (SS, 24-25 & 144); a “dynamic involution” (LF, 97); a fall into passivity 
(DQ, 261); a fall back to restart (VO, 233); and a refuge or passive defense (EM, 140; LO1, 
90; SP2, 154-155; VO, 233; 1965, 16). Freud himself describes regression as an involution 
or withdrawal of libido (1909b, 45; 1912a, 102; 1914b, 74-75 & 82); and as a refuge or 
flight from stimulus (1895, 296; 1900b, 547-548; 1914b, 101; 1917e, 251) made possible 
because of the indestructibility of unconscious paths (1900b, 553f; 1905c, 206; 1914b), and 
the role of unconscious complexes in attracting the liberation of affects towards the interior 
of the body (1900a, 174; 1900b, 467; 1912a, 103). But with Dolto, talk on regression 
somehow conveys familiarity, as if speaking of an ordinary given. And so she says, as if it 
were not only the most obvious thing but also the most comforting: “Negation is not 
absence. In negation, «Ça» [the unconscious] is there” (SP1, 123). Puzzlingly, recent 
historians claim a focus on regression characterizes French psychoanalysis (Birksted-Breen, 
Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, 41; also 15, 33 & 37), yet without crediting Dolto. 
Dolto’s view of regression, like Freud’s, marks not just a return to an earlier 
distribution of psychical energy, but also to primitive methods of psychical expression 
(Freud, 1900b, 542-543 & 548; 1905c, 240; 1909b, 49; 1917c, 342 & 417; 1917e, 250). 
Thus, the symbolic function secures «désirs accordés» [granted wishes] (JD, 279). And in 
this register of dream-work, we really begin to appreciate that Dolto’s «désir»—in French, 
meaning both ‘desire’ and ‘wish’—is unconscious. It is unarguably Freud’s greatest 
discovery that wishes are the motive for dreams (1895, 340; 1900a, 119, 121-122 & 133; 
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1900b, 553 & 589), guarding sleep (1900a, 233-234; 1900b, 570; 1917c, 417; 
1940[1939],171), as the hallucination of satisfaction ends excitation (1900b, 565-566; 
1905c, 213; 1914b, 80); and that the wish for satisfaction is present from the beginning of 
life (1900b, 603), emanating from an interior «source organique» (1900a, 22-23, 64 & 280; 
1900b, 525 & 603; 1915a, 123), seeking the free discharge of excitation to limit tension 
(1895, 297-298; 1900b, 599; 1917c, 356). Freud finds that not only affect (1900a, 8 & 487; 
1900b, 467), but also somatic stimuli influence dreams (1900a, 235; 1913, 169), as do fear, 
rage, mental pain, and sexual delight (1905c, 287)—even “quietly thinking…volition and 
attention” (1905c, 288). So how could the mother’s own influences not affect symbolic 
mediation in the fetal environment? Of note, Ferenczi also describes regression as wish-
fulfillment, a “hallucinatory re-occupation of the satisfying situation” (1913/1950, 218 & 
220-221; Dupont 1985, 83). But with Dolto, the biographical infuses each word, leading to 
the breathless expression of regression as ensuing from a “lack of love for silent sufferings 
and the teratological folding of the precociously banned” (EM, 283). A “tone of mourning 
colours the French understanding,” claim our historians (Birksted-Breen, Flanders & 
Gibeault, 2010, 37)—yet again, without recognizing Dolto. 
Archaic identification 
But just as narcissism is a limit-concept, it seems we reach the impossibility of 
describing the archaic. Our references to Freud become overly dense and over-determined in 
narrating the ontogeny of subjectivity—as much a ‘thing’ as a process—as we experience 
our own regression, our learning through compression, condensation. Besides, a trip to the 
archaic with Dolto is bound to leave the reader feeling exhausted and haggard, just like her 
interviewers. So we might well give up hope of ever making meaning were it not that this is 
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precisely where hope for the human story originates. Thus, in the sheer difficulty of 
speaking, a summation of the archaic ironically, passively arrives: there is always a point 
before the loss of hope where hope actually was. It is as if the nanny’s archaic love is 
findable deep in Dolto’s theory, as a hearing within a hearing. But we are beyond surprise 
by now, settled in for the ride. Dolto describes regression as a “surge of affect that 
reactualizes the archaic object” (LF, 99), as “all tension calls to the other or oneself as 
another remembered” (SS, 42). And what is the nature of this «époque très archaïque» (SS, 
157)?  It is a repressed «imbroglio émotionnel archaïque» (SP2, 27), a «vécu [lived] 
antérieur» (SP1, 76), «plans archaïque» (LF, 283), a «soubassement archaique» (LF, 92 & 
103), and a «structure unitaire à l’intérieur» (CE, 29). Archaic, unconscious libidinal 
organization is idiosyncratic (LO3, 170), as a «souvenir du langage interrelationnel… à 
l’origine de la structure psychique de la libido» (SF, 216). And what is the nature of this 
relation? It is an “archaic identification” (CH, 31; SP1, 90) with «parents archaïques» (SF, 
208), a «famille intérieur» (DQ, 18) that makes those a child calls “parents” only his 
«premiers autres» [first others] (PS, 22). Freud writes of the infantile roots of love (1915, 
166); and an early letter refers to a “prehistoric, unforgettable other person” (1896/1954b, 
180). But Dolto has an unmatched willingness to speak about the archaic, as if she were 
sweeping away ashes in the basement of psychosis with a bold Cinderella’s broom. A «mère 
archaique» (SS, 41), or «mère phallique orale» (SP2, 130), is introduced. But even more 
prominent is an archaic, pre-symbolic father (CD, 179; DW, 100; SP2, 107 & 125-130; SP3, 
204-206). The “father in space-time is not the real father” (DW, 100), Dolto states patly, and 
“the real father is never foreclosed” (Ibid). Further, “the only parents that are important are 
those within us” (SP1, 20), and what matters is living to “honour the parent inside…so the 
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internal parent is proud of you” (De Mezamat, 2008a). Dolto believes “the archaic always 
continues to exist within us; constantly there is a level that is archaic” (VO, 52). Thus, «ce 
qui les guérit, c’est de retrouver le père symbolique» [what heals them is to refind the 
symbolic father] (SP3, 204-206). Here is a fantastically dense yet subtle concept to which 
we will return: the «repère» [‘re-father’ and ‘landmark’] made possible by the father 
separating from the «co-moi papa-maman» [co-me father-mother] (EM 39; also CE, 27; QS, 
14; DW, 166) of dream-work, and the archaic identification of the pre-subject with the one 
who, like himself, is a part of the mother yet not. We will eventually understand this bit of 
dream-work as the first moment of the pre-subject. Meanwhile, our historians disclose the 
particular interest of French psychoanalysis in “subjectivation”—this time, referencing 
Dolto with one sentence in a single footnote (Birksted-Breen, Flanders & Gibeault, 2010, 15 
& 24f). But by now, the loss of the name, Dolto, cannot help but appear as a symptom that 
tries to hide its own mourning and obfuscate the path of its own regression. Then again, if all 
goes well, we are all too willing to forget the enigmas and paradoxes of the archaic. Thus, at 
the risk the losing the wide doorway Dolto opens onto autism and psychosis, we witness the 
very public tendency to relegate Dolto to an infantile amnesia. For Dolto takes up Freud’s 
narrative of precocious sexuality where(in) it is most provocative, at the dawn of the subject,  
and she seems engaged in a struggle for a hearing against the repression barrier itself. And 
teasing out Dolto’s notion of the ‘archaic parent,’ we find not the ‘super-ego’ or ‘ego ideal,’ 
but what is ontologically prior: dream-work, a phantasy of a parent. For nascent 
proprioception informs a dream of provision (under the pulses of conservation) that in 
developmental ‘progressions’ (paradoxically, in non-time) convey an enigmatic witnessing 
with an indissociable other that ensures survival—whose most ubiquitous material (remains 
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of the day for dream-work) are sounds. Repetitive sounds, then—environmentally 
contingent phonemes—become richly invested in this association with what we will come to 
know as the «père pré-symbolique.» Henceforth, the child will be unconsciously securitized 
by remaining in a continual «colloque muet affectif intime» with himself (SS, 41). 
Wild transference 
Deep in the womb now, we will at first barely hear the soft slide of meaning from 
physicality to something far more nuanced and dreamier: both maternal and paternal 
security are included in the mother (CE, 172; LF, 87); every mother is also a father (CD, 
178; CE, 27; DW, 166; SP1, 126; 1988, 14 & 77); and the father is the one who occupies the 
thoughts of the mother (SP2, 125; TL, 43). Further, Dolto adds, because “archaic filial 
history is existential security” (CE, 243; SP1, 37), the primal scene enriches primary 
narcissism (SP1, 216-217).  Yet oddly enough, we are far from Klein’s “primal scene,” with 
its fearful combined figure of a primitive couple, parents fused in intercourse—the mother 
containing the penis and the father containing the breast (Bott-Spillius, 271). For Dolto, the 
primal scene may be one’s own conception (SF, 141; SP1, 123).7 So we cease imagining 
mingled, mangled flesh to let ourselves fall beneath and before, onto a landscape described 
only by Freud, in the “combined figure” that is a piece of dream-work, as common features 
unite persons (Freud, 1900a, 112, 293, 321 & 324; 1900b, 342); one dream thought 
represents more than one dream element (Freud, 1896/1962a, 196; 1900a, 279 & 284); 
dream-content is over-determined (Freud, 1900a, 284 & 306-307); and the amount of 
condensation is indeterminate (Freud, 1900a, 279).  Dolto takes Freud as her invisible cloth, 
as she deftly weaves her articulation of a continuously accessible, unconscious, combined 
but de-combinable parent as a «repère» that opens up her theory to some landmarks for our 
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own travels. And what we find emerging powerfully is the notion of a means for progression 
to reality (along the model of de-combining), and for regression to the archaic (along the 
model of re-combining). For the dream-work translating what permeates the fluid medium 
of primary narcissism makes possible the impossible in the offer of a critical path—one that 
enables us to theorize just how it is that projection could ever develop out of the passive 
domain of our archaic prehistory. I suggest that Dolto’s thought invites a homonymic 
masterplay on the declaration of subjectivity itself, «je suis»—both ‘I am’ and ‘I follow.’ I 
further believe Dolto answers, inadvertently, the provocative question posed by Laplanche 
and Pontalis in their dictionary of Freud’s oeuvre: “How is it possible to pass from a monad 
closed onto itself to the progressive recognition of an object?” (1967/2004, 263). 
The liquid dream-work of the narcissistic environment renders archaic identification 
as an enigmatic, securitizing witnessing in an ironic, continuous potential wherein the pre-
subject and combined parents are inseparable yet dissociable—a kind of ‘two’ that is also a 
‘three,’ we might say. Critically informing this paradox, we come upon Dolto’s notion of 
«prolongement» [prolonging], invoking both fusion and reversibility: “The human being is 
the «prolongement» of the being he loves, and that being is his «prolongement.» If they are 
apart, he believes he is that being—he is not where he is but at place of other” (CE, 262-
263). Further, Dolto takes the path of “prolonging” toward the transference: all humans are 
mediating objects, and patients lend solutions to her while imagining what they’d do if they 
were the doctor and she were the patient (VC2, 206). Dolto believes all babies are fusional 
(Nobécourt, 2008c; PJE, 97), fusion happens better in sleep (SP3, 175), and children incline 
to “reversibility” (EN, 96). And where there is fusion, there is “fusional transference” 
(1985c, 197). Thus, Bernadette eerily remarks, “If I die, I will go live in my daughter” (JD, 
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137). If we listen well, we can hear the dream-work’s preference for reversal and contraries 
(Freud, 1900a, 326-327); the lack of differentiation between inner and outer world (Stärcke, 
1921a, 200), or between the sucking child and breast (Abraham, 1924, 450); the blurring of 
“subject and other, losing and receiving” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 78); and the 
“repeated alternation between becoming one’s own and not one’s own…[that is] a prototype 
for the process of projection” (Stärcke, 1921a, 198). Thus, in “fusional transference,” we 
locate the origin of projection in passive pulses—and of Dolto’s famous «poupée-fleur.»8 At 
stake is a subject regressed so far back that he cannot find in his surroundings «des objets de 
transfert adéquats» (SS, 72). As flowers have life but no movement or speech (JP, 42), and 
are free of “digestive dependence” (JP, 40-42), the oral stage is «en resonance» with it (EM, 
149; JD, 104; JP, 40-42)—as a kind of similar-enough other, or an as-if third. By this 
resonance, it opens the possibility of projection to liberate oral affects (JP, 47-48), securing 
abreaction even if found accidentally (JP, 37). Further, since it has no will, it is free of 
vengeance, enabling the “recuperation of narcissism without anxiety” (JP, 48), a clean start. 
And in an uncanny echo of Dolto’s angel, BAG—who, it seems, is still right here—
Bernadette and Nicole, independent cases, each state (while heaping verbal abuse and guilt 
on it) that the flower-doll’s way of being good is being bad (JD, 140 & 154).  
Of interest, Klein herself heard about the «poupée-fleur» in Paris in 1949 (JP, 8), and 
we also discover that Dolto attended one of Klein’s ‘control sessions,’ candidly reporting 
that she was «horrifiée,» because “the subject was reduced to relations of parts of his body 
with other parts of partial bodies” (DW, 40-41), in an «amputation de la théorie…de Freud» 
(Ibid; italics mine, re her subtle play on parts). Morgenstern also reported shock about what 
Klein told children (2003b, 253 & 286-287). So while Dolto credits Klein with working to 
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“dephobize mental illness” (SF, 332), she believes Klein was too theorized and failed to 
appreciate how “every child really brings something new” (D&R, 13). Further, she disagrees 
strongly with Klein’s notion of the internal object (see Bott-Spillius, 2011, 409-412):9  
One never constructs an internal object—fortunately for the subject—because the 
internal object is madness. The subject of desire must construct himself for someone, 
with someone and by (through) someone [italics hers]. Never is desire satisfied 
outside of the presence of someone—a presence sometimes hallucinated, as for 
psychotics who have the illusion of hearing the voice of the loved one. It is the 
«parole» [speech, word] of a third that presentifies, for a subject, an absent person. 
There is a presence restituted only in language, but always by a third [italics mine] 
(DQ, 203).  
 
Dolto met Klein often (DW, 40-41; D&R, 13), commenting that one could “feel the theory 
in her head” (Ibid; DW, 40); and that Klein’s “stunning charisma” (DW, 40) and 
“securitizing human contact” (DW, 45) healed her patients, not her theory (DW, 41). She 
seemed like “an English nanny,” Dolto suggests (DW, 40). And archaic echoes jump the 
elusive gates of subjectivation into the wild outdoors. 
Dynamic complimentary regulation 
Believing a subject is constructed in relationality, Dolto makes potent claims about 
unconscious transmission. The notion of unconscious inheritance is familiar on French 
terrain, as Roudinesco explains (1982, 108 & 210; 1986, 584). And Freud writes of 
neurotics passing disorders to their children (1905c, 224 & 236); “hereditary transmission” 
(1937, 240); and “archaic heritage” (1896/1954b, 180; 1937, 240 & 241; 1940[1939], 167). 
But Dolto’s unparalleled observations lead to two phenomenal discoveries about infants: 
first, their unconscious «rôle dynamique complémentaire régulateur» (DV, 301; also DW, 
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104; SP3, 176; 1977/1984, 243) with parents; and second, that their libido wakes fragile 
adults and threatens that fragile state (CD, 243). In brief, the infant is in a state of hypnosis 
with parents, always between consciousness and unconsciousness (CE, 16, 268 & 293), 
sharing phantasms with the mother (NE, 243; SP1, 29), so the mother’s dreams and ideas 
structure the fetus (DW, 34; SP1, 125; TL, 37); also, a newborn reacts to the unconscious 
projections of parents (LF, 98). As a result, every child becomes an “anxiety sponge” for 
parents (EM, 220; LF, 206-208; NE, 190; SP2, 213; 1980, 213), thus inheriting suffering 
(SS, 167); psychotic enclaves (QC, 67); phobia (JD, 19f; SS, 166); guilt and fixations (CD, 
19; EM, 28; LF, 98-99; TL, 150); unconscious conflicts (SS, 172); and “libidinal mutations” 
(JD, 202)—essentially, archaic history (SP1, 31). Thus, what is “silenced in the first 
generation, the second generation wears on body” (DQ, 113; also EM, 82; SP2, 191), in a 
relation of complimentary “co-knowing or co-non-knowing” (JD, 281), and “co-being or co-
non-being” (JD, 282). Dolto even speaks of the “dispatching of libido in a family” (NE, 
190), «l’économie familiale» (EN, 108), and the regression of a whole family “by 
contamination” (CD, 214; LF, 219). “Destructuration is contagious” (CE, 33; also EM, 222-
223), thus “narcissistic devaluation is a simple operation” (VO, 197)—one, to stress, 
contingent on idiosyncratic pre-histories of audition, affect and anxiety. In sum, Dolto is 
unequivocal on a matter of staggering import: we each inherit an unconscious education 
from our sources of affect. Such is the radical truth the archaic silently speaks, and that 
Dolto so acutely hears. 
As Dolto puts it, “his own infancy is to an adult as foreign as the vital needs of a 
tadpole are to a frog” (AI, 192). Indeed, her corpus is an astounding demonstration of the 
play at the origin of thought, as digressions take us, lost stories insist, sentences continue 
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elsewhere, and theory is inferred. Further, as the transference enlists the archaic register of 
words—long before we are dealt a sentence, so to speak—language harbours what Derrida 
calls a hypothesis from underneath (2003b,167), a countersignature (1991,160)—i.e.,a game 
in language (1967b, 73) of reversibility and repetition (1999/2004, 17) that “disorganizes 
and disturbs literalness” (1967c, 337). Psychobiography values these “unconscious ruptures 
in spoken language and contradictions” (CD, 206) because “contradiction [is] inherent in the 
human” (PS, 84; also CE, 320; SP1, 43; TL, 155; 1985/ 1989, 68), and a revolt of conscious 
narratives, from the unconscious, offers the possibility of something new, originality, in an 
ironic return from our origins. Not only does unexpected material arrive, but unexpected 
processes do too—dream-work, passive pulses—as “unconscious material…brings its own 
modes of working along with it” (Freud, 1940[1939], 167). Thus, as Freud states, 
“unconscious ideation” (1896d, 151) or “unconscious thinking…is also active in the day”  
(1900b, 613), making each of us a “dreamer in daylight” (1908a, 149).  
Concluding this chapter, I offer that Dolto’s corpus opens the rare possibility of 
finding the trace at work, what Britzman superbly describes as, “the incredible and inaudible 
meaning, shards of history that compose and decompose psychical life” (2011, 5)—along 
with ample evidence that our “most unresolved problems concern the question of origin” 
(Ibid, 95). For in every sense, it is Françoise Marette, the “libidinal child who dreams yet 
still desires knowledge” (Britzman, 2003, 53), who underwrites the work of Françoise 
Dolto, the woman of genius. Like her theory, Dolto’s life reveals that a continuous wish for 
security that begins in fetal life is serviced by an enigmatic, archaic wealth perpetually 
inhabiting our narcissistic core, to which we remain unconsciously tethered and can return in 
our encounters with ordinary (and not so ordinary) suffering. Derrida, himself a 
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«revenant»—«rêve venant» [dream coming]—of rue Saint-Jacques, narrates the archaic as 
an “inheritance of transference” (1980/1987, 339) and a “silent coming that resonates, re-
sounds” (1986b, 166). And upon that very street Dolto also walked each day comes another 
hearing within a hearing: the call of a sister, long absent, who returns on the name, as if our 
losses were never really lost at all. Thus, the archaic delivers unconscious assurance in our 
psychical advances and retreats, rooting each one of us in an “inscribed orient” (Derrida , 
1999/2004, 216) of our own, whose echoes reverberate lifelong. And thinking of what 
resonates silently, we curiously find more common ground between Dolto and Derrida. 
There is questioning of the middle name, as Derrida shares Élie was his «prénom secret» 
(1991, 51-52; Peeters, 2010, 20; ‘and bed/read’). There is infantile suffering, for Derrida 
was a replacement child for the absent Paul Moïse, who died in infancy the year prior (1991, 
51-52 & 130; Peeters, 2010, 22). And there is Derrida’s mother who, at his birth, refused to 
leave her poker game (1991, 42). Derrida and Dolto never met except (we could say) once 
on the same page (VC2, 906), and once in the same sentence (Roudinesco, 1986, 15). They 
do not, in fact, identify with each other on their infantile stories. But I do: “one ego has 
perceived a significant analogy with another…an identification is thereupon constructed on 
this point” (Freud, 1921, 107). I confess this is the reason I will invite key others to the 
textual space Dolto opens—Bertha Pappenheim, Hanna Segal and the Princess—for I trust 
their thoughts. As Warner says of the psychobiography by the Princess on Poe, she 
identified with his “early traumatic losses” (1991, 446). And Young-Bruehl divulges that in 
her psychobiographic writing on A.Freud and Arendt, her empathy was “grounded in 
identification and imitation” (1998b, 20). So one encounters the works of a stranger and yet, 
everything happens as-if it is the elusively unsaid more than their words, the instability of 
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play in dreams that arrive upon shared affects—a passive experiencing with, as-if, through 
an other—that vouches for the veracity of history. 
  
68 
 
Chapter Three: Infancy & Audition 
Abstract: In this chapter, I study the relation between precocious audition and the 
transference. I follow Dolto into the clinic, where she demonstrates acute listening to the 
suffering infant. I reveal some of her evidence that the infant is unconsciously vibrant and 
seeking familiar echoes, thus alert to the transference in continuity with his archaic history. I 
relate her narrative of affect weaving with repetitive phonemes, like names, in the liquid 
landscape of primary narcissism. And linking Dolto’s ‘phoneme’ to Freud’s ‘word-thing,’ I 
explicate the suggestibility and the slippery subjectivity that inheres in the co-narcissistic 
state Dolto theorizes, and the inventiveness of her terminology. 
 
Dream, poetical idiom, melancholy, ruin-abyss [abîme] of childhood…the secret resonance 
of the voice or of the voice-able sounds [vocables] that wait in us, like at the bottom of the 
first proper name. (Jacques Derrida, 2002a, 29) 
 
If one word is repeated throughout the Dolto corpus more than any other, it is 
‘Trousseau.’ It appears in virtually all her books, and a movie about her work has «l’Hôpital 
Trousseau» as its setting (Le Péron, 2008). In countless interviews, her daughter lovingly 
explains how she and her siblings knew this word from childhood because it came up so 
often. After all, Dolto worked there for almost 40 years, from 1941 to 1978 (ATP, 195). She 
had received her medical certification in 1937, after nursing accreditation in 1930 
(1985/1989b, 124). And in her long career, there would be other hospitals, a private practice, 
and countless seminars. But nowhere was Dolto’s commitment greater than at Trousseau. 
Yet we have just entered the world of Dolto, where we meet a surface that impresses, only to 
discover there is far more than meets the eye. For it turns out Dolto was never paid for this 
work. Yet every Tuesday for nearly four decades, from 9:00 to 14:00, she listened to 
children’s suffering (TL, 49f; AI, 224). “I never missed a consultation, I never missed a 
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Tuesday,” she says, “ça me portait» (ATP, 196). And here, a bilingual reader feels a transit 
of something, as if an unseen window has suddenly opened. For while the phrase is a 
common idiom, ‘it carried me’ (i.e., it was naturally fulfilling), the «Ça» is also ‘the 
unconscious.’ Dolto has, in fact, just said that the unconscious carried her. Or has she? 
Recent translators sponsored by the French government, precisely to disseminate her work, 
comment in their preface about their own discomfort with her language (Hall, Hivernel & 
Morgan, xv-xvi). And one of her best interviewers admits to feeling “exhausted and 
haggard” after, though Dolto was barely fatigued (at nearly 80) (DW, 17). For Dolto’s 
rhetoric is a fluid mix of conversations and provocations from beneath that disturb, suggest 
and question, in interminable echoes that take some getting used to. Our translators note odd 
time-shifts in her story-telling, too (Hall, Hivernel & Morgan, xvi). Then again, why not? 
After all, Dolto says—as if it were commonly known—time is what is splitting (EN, 40). 
But where is she to talk like this? What is the vantage point of someone who speaks from a 
subject position prior to time? At the age of five, Dolto was already musing that she might 
be «née trop tôt dans un siècle trop vieux» [born too early in a century that is too old] (ATP, 
46; VC2, 61). And even in adulthood, her location in reality seemed contestable: «Suis-je en 
retard, suis-je trop en avance?» [Am I late? Am I too early?] (VC1, 215). In fact, Dolto’s 
work is located on an archaic dreamscape where it is naturally easy to lose space and time, 
just as invented word-things arrive to describe those experiences, like «mamelonnairement» 
[nipplelingly] (LF, 97), and «chosifiant» [thingifying] (SS, 147). For an availabilty for play 
and nuance is required to be drawn by Dolto’s unusual discourse to the foremost element of 
her practice and theory: finely tuned audition. Thus, the reader too will need to be listening 
very carefully to hear the infant—the infans—the voiceless one who is prior to speaking.  
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At Trousseau, Dolto maintained an unusual practice for which the lack of payment 
soon seems secondary. For one, she worked with a Mme Arlette for every one of those 
years—yet Mme Arlette is silent in the analytic literature. She was, in effect, an assistant 
installed in the hall just outside, who served as a relay between (usually) the mother and 
Dolto. Letters and artwork, completed since the last visit, were also passed through Mme 
Arlette. Parents came into the consultation room with the child, and Dolto filled the 
remaining space with as many trainees as could fit. “It was barely big enough for five,” she 
tells us (VC2, 413; photos VC2, 390 & 391), with regret. And while Dolto is known for the 
symbolic payments (rocks, stamps, snippets) she asked of her patients, what should interest 
us far more is the trademark greeting Dolto addressed to every child, welcoming him by his 
first name, and how everyone present repeated it, “in choral” (CE, 74; QS, 11; SP1, 49; VO, 
226). “You must always introduce yourself and address a baby by his name,” she iterates 
through her corpus (e.g. CE, 64; EM, 185). Here is the first hint that Dolto engages language 
differently, giving the name unique valuation. In turn, her practice will include detailed 
anamneses, and every case places the child in a story with family members and anyone else 
with a possible influence—each associated with their names. Dolto’s critical assumption is 
that the child is a subject of language from conception, so his subjectivity is always at stake 
in the encounter with words. And her project, above all, will show that the human subject is 
conceived in languaged relations and destined to be inserted in these relations. 
Precocious audition  
The assumption of a languaged being from the start takes us right to precocious 
audition, or the infant’s pre-language. Human existence begins and continues because “we 
are welcomed into language,” Dolto explains (LF, 207). We need a long moment here to 
71 
 
understand, then, that when Dolto says “all is language” (EM 230; IIC, 367; TL, 24), she 
intends passive receptivity here: it is not that the child speaks in every way possible (not 
yet), but rather, that at the archaic stage she is narrating, the child is purely passive and that 
in a state of receptivity, he makes every experience into a communication because that is 
what it means to be humanized. For “audition is prior to vision” (JD, 277) as a simple fact,  
she notes, and the fetus from conception inhabits a «climat sonore» (VC2, 239). Audition, 
then, is what “lures” (JD, 277) on a landscape of unconscious desires investing audition, and 
that will turn out to be critical. Further, we will always need to remember that when we 
speak of «désir» with Dolto, we are not speaking of which objects a subject might want for 
his use. Rather, we are speaking of the “pre-subject” (JD, 275) and his “unconscious desire” 
(VO, 185) for communication. For the fetus lives an “extraordinary social life in utero, right 
from conception,” Dolto posits (CE, 350; EM, 178), wherein his “audition is perfect” (LO1, 
26 & 130). Here, he is in a «relation d’écoute» [listening relation] (LF, 73) with his mother, 
as he is effectively engaged in an “intra-narcissistic libidinal dialectic” (JD, 274; LF, 95; SF, 
48, 71, 210 & 334; SP1, 176; 1977/1984, 192)—a dream of discourse, we might say. His 
audition is his access (JD, 276), and everything from the human heart to the mother’s 
organic affects and respiration are his language (LF, 86; JD, 277; LO2, 79; DV, 115), one in 
which the «paix des organes» [organ peace], in a two-time rhythm, represents the base of 
life (DV, 48; NE, 212; PJ, 105; SP2, 157 & 241). We stop for another moment to consider 
Dolto’s offer: it is an engagement with sound in a completely unconscious state, where 
inertia is the answer to our call for organic peace. We have, in effect, arrived at the notion of 
a wish of perfect provision. Everything happens as if, she says, babies “register their 
emotional climate” (SF, 153). In this way, “phonemes of the mother tongue” and “even 
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foreign languages” are heard before nine months of age (CH 16; JD, 250), while the child is 
in a purely passive state of expectation, living out organic peace in a fetal «purée de 
signifiance…la purée de mots» (PJE, 106)—a purée of words and their affects—so that 
audition is literally like eating (JD, 275-7; VO, 234). Thus, the child is born “waiting for 
human communication” from the outside (JD, 272), literally looking for «le chemin d’une 
écoute» [road of a listening] (CE, 17; VO, 154)—using «repères langagiers fantasmatiques 
archaïques» [archaic phantasized languaged landmarks], simply to refind archaic security 
(DV, 117; SS, 41; my emphasis), as perception slowly develops, and interiorized sensations 
first experienced as if they were words are replaced by actual words (ATP, 170; DV, 300). 
This is a critical turn not to be missed, for on the word there is a migration to reality—and a 
conduit to and from the archaic. Simply put, the body is a “mediator (but never a possessor) 
of truth” (PS, 92): access to a cultural-temporal history the child is born into, that continues 
after him. Further, so receptive is the passive child that he can “intuit his filiation,” having 
an innate sense of his story, including who his parents are (CE, 16-17, 133-134 & 242; EM, 
63 & 230; PJ, 95), being in a “telepathic relation” with them (CE, 268 & 293; SP1, 120). 
This “symbolic filiation dominates over carnal filiation” (CE, 44) as “interpsychic 
communi-cation” from fetal life through to birth (TL, 23), arising from «entendement 
intuitionnel» (CE, 339) [intuitive hearing] from three or four months’ gestation—or earlier, 
depending on his fetal history, what is heard, and his affective reactions (CD, 7; CE, 350; 
SP1, 119).  
And so it comes to be that in 1955-56, the reader meets Lionel, an orphan, age four 
(SS, 95-104). Lionel likes to watch himself bleed, plays with his own excrement, and 
destroys all that he touches. His symptoms include encopresis, incontinence and insomnia, 
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and he is covered in scabs and scars. Small for his age, his arms are frozen to the touch and 
he smells horrible. Yet Dolto places him on her lap and they begin to model clay together as  
she carefully re-narrates with and for him the confusing story of a family where key men 
have the same name, and the mother and grandmother share theirs too, so that Lionel thinks 
his grandmother is his mother (SS, 95), and he has, thus, effectively lost in his own history 
his own dead mother. There will be a remarkably rapid return of cleanliness and sleep, and 
Lionel will begin to make friends in the public home where he will be placed in lieu of the 
psychiatric hospital where he was headed. At every rereading, this case evokes my tears in 
its powerful conveyance of empathy in the service of suffering. For Dolto had heard about 
Lionel from hospital staff and had insisted on a chance to see him, believing there was hope 
because, as she said: «Lionel parle encore» [Lionel still speaks]. Thus, beneath and before 
theory, we begin to sense Dolto’s sincere reply to the distressed infant—her desire to help.  
Soma of understanding 
In a single sentence that could sum up her entire view of fetal life, Dolto states that it 
is as if “gestation is an affective incarnation along with the somatic, and the fetus constructs 
himself by an organo-emotional induction” (LF, 90). The words themselves are ‘vintage 
Dolto’—inimitable, genius, strange—a liquid flow of the oddly phantasmatic with the 
radically new that challenges normative discourses. Here is a non-space, non-time where 
bodily sounds and syllables, “veiled” for now (JD, 273), are auditorily invested, as ears 
“symbolize the soma of understanding” (JD, 62; SP3, 156). And in this fluid dreamscape of 
self-sufficiency and security that is oral passivity, there is only one other: Freud. Freud was 
the first to note the critical role of the word in our coming to reality: “becoming 
conscious…consists for the most part in the verbal consciousness pertaining to…the 
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associated word-presentations” (Freud, 1896e, 232; also 1915c, 209-215). Freud’s notion of 
the word-thing also helps explicate how words are subject to condensation and 
displacement, as-if things (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 418). And if first syllables can 
do this, Dolto’s work suggests, all can. For a sound in phantasy is without a definition—
free.  
So we locate the social life of the fetus in the nascent proprioception of sound that 
feeds the dream: “That the senses aroused during sleep influence the dream is well known 
and can be experimentally verified; it is one of the certain but much overestimated results of 
the medical investigation of dreams” (Freud, 1901a, 680). Further, we note that “stimuli 
arising during sleep are worked up into a wish-fulfillment” (Freud, 1900a, 228). Freud also 
explains how, “infantile experiences are …sexual experiences affecting the subject’s own 
body…sexual intercourse (in the wider sense)” (1896a, 203), and elsewhere speaks of the 
“universally recognized influence exercised upon our dreams by states of excitation in our 
digestive, urinary and sexual organs” (1900a, 221). Ergo, we begin in a dream spun upon 
sounds in the elaboration of the wish to which all stimuli encountered in an unconscious 
state are subject. Thus, language always locates the symptom for Dolto, being the mediating 
object of unconscious content. And while her corpus is rich with clinical cases (easily more 
than 100), one that merits particular attention—not only because it is the only one with its 
own book—is that of Dominique Bel [beautiful], age 14. A footnote explains that “a few 
modifications of names and places were necessary” (CD, 8f) and enigma immediately 
arrives. For Dolto says he “dominated his mother, conforming to his name,” (CD, 71) and 
interprets “the sonar meeting of the patronym of the family and the adjective caracterizing 
powerful specular seduction” (CD, 75); yet elsewhere, we learn that Dominique is a Russian 
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restaurant in Paris (VC2, 123f), and was her favourite man’s name back in 1928 (AI, 88). So 
has she changed his name or not? And despite our new attunement to the phoneme, Dolto 
adds that the modifications do not hamper the «valeur associative significative» (CD, 8f).  
Perplexity inheres as she waited almost ten years for publication, then provides a 
detailed analysis that hinges on family names. Nevertheless, through 12 sessions over a year 
and a half, her work with Dominique will explore the relation between his surname, «bel,» 
and its antonym, «laid» [ugly], as a homonym of «lait» [milk]; a regression to his nursery, 
«la salle» [room] as a homonym of «la sale» [dirty one]; a sister named Sylvie («si’il vit» [if 
he lives]), whose name evokes the death of an uncle; Dominique’s desire to be a pirate, a 
«voleur de mer»—homonymically, «voleur de mère» [thief of the mother]; and an invisible 
river called «Elmoru» [she died]. Dominique’s recovery is credited to his learning that there 
is such a thing as a «maire» [mayor], an exact homonym of «mère,» [mother] but male; and 
thus his becoming entitled to «lait» [milk; homonym of «laid»] despite being a «bel,» so 
being authorized to assume life in his name (CD, 9-172). The freefall of logic is spectacular, 
and a bold testament to how the oral passive stage is a startlingly different setting for 
thought, as the symptom takes the word as an opportunity to express the enigmatic affects of 
primary narcissism. Yet Dolto is always ready to risk herself for truth. Here, in turn, is 12-
year old Tony, missing school for months due to acute pain in his «genoux» [knees]—
homonymically, ‘I-we.’ Dolto comments: «Genoux? Je, nous…On dirait un jeu de mots ou 
de maux» [Knees? I, we?... It seems like a game of words or pains; italics mine on 
homonyms] (IIC, 365; also IIC, 363 & 371-372; SP3, 76). Disorientingly original, then, 
Dolto finds inroads for archaic regressions and progressive re-narrations right on the name. 
Further, we detect Dolto’s unspoken awareness of the ‘slippery pronouns’ that herald 
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primary narcissism. Yet the healing is real. But why this symptom, Dolto is asked often in 
seminars (e.g., SP3, 43); “I have no idea,” she replies, “I am asking if you have an idea.”  
Mamaïser 
As a result of Dolto’s foundational beliefs about early audition—namely, that the 
infant is unconsciously attuned to the flow of language around him—much of her work will 
consist of untangling family stories, listening for the dream-work of words. “I listen 
otherwise, in effect,” she says cryptically (ATP, 24; italics mine). Working backwards along 
a regressive path to the archaic—not so far back for children—she will search for 
«malentendu» [misunderstood; but literally, ‘mis-heard,’ and ‘evil heard’]. For inherent in 
the notion that passive encounters with audition are formative to psychical structuration is 
the idea that such encounters can cause de-structuration, too—knots of libido, condensations 
upon a word that need to be released, unspun. This approach to the role of words in the 
psychical economy will critically inform her method in ways that cannot help but strike the 
unfamiliar reader as remarkable: one must warn a child that he will be told lies (DV, 30); 
one must never lie to a child (PJE, 17-18); every infant has a right to his truth, to know the 
trials he survived (CE, 40; SF, 156; SP3, 146); if you speak to a baby as an equal, then you 
will have an equal with you (CE, 255). Roger Bacon, currently one of the most sensitive 
readers of Dolto, rightly says, “How odd, how ‘other’ [is] not just the direction of her 
thinking but the language” (2013, 520). Always, Dolto is disarmingly candid and drily witty, 
professing she is a «zinzin» [dingdong] (VC2, 453 & 709), working with a «clientele de 
zinzins» (SP2, 230; TL, 38) in a «zinzinnerie» [dingdongery] (TL, 39). There is no 
pretension here, no sign of the bourgeois girl from the 16
th
. And there is no sign of a theory 
of illness either. For on the one hand, there is no coincidence: «Il n’y a pas de hazard» (DW, 
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25; SS, 99 & 113; VC2, 495). But on the other hand, there are no generalities either: «Il n’y 
a pas d’en général» (LF, 123 & 248). Thus the oral passive stage, and its sense of no-place, 
no-time, saturates the terrain of Dolto’s discourse. Her translators point out the continuous 
‘I-we’ reversals, where the reader remains uncertain if ‘we’ means ‘colleagues’ or the ‘royal 
we’; how the subject pronoun is often uncertain for gender (unusual for French); and the 
slippery point of view (Hall, Hivernel & Morgan, xv-xvi).  Time is unsettled, and space 
shifts, too. And in a story worth remembering under the giant clock tower at Trousseau,
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Dolto once commented comically that in the early century, «l’heure juste» [right time] was a 
funny idea simply because no one had it (ATP, 32 & 41). And here are more archaic echoes, 
as the bilingual reader hears another homonym: «leurre(s) juste»: ‘just (ethical) lure(s).’  
Wary of the tenuousness of making meaning from so much homonymic play, we 
might choose to refuse it. And yet, by this very play, we are led to the uncanny discovery of 
one of the most useful words in her entire project: «mamaïser» [to motherify]—a term «qui 
dit bien ce qu’il dit» [that says well what it says] (JD, 281; LF, 126; SP2, 158; SS, 157). To 
«mamaïse» is to mark the present by the mother’s voice, to lure to reality. Soon, just like the 
fetus in his auditory climate, then, we too begin to detect sounds to which we can attach our 
phantasies as primitive ideas—where primitivity is not in the least the domain of 
debasement, but rather the force of life in the basement of man. For on this verb, 
«mamaïser,» the project turns. Here is the mother, hopefully at her best, as an “auditory 
caress” (SF, 359) on whose rhythms the child is dependent (LF, 102), leading Dolto to speak 
of the “psychical vitality woven to organic vitality” (PJE, 15). Our bodies depend on the 
«paroles» [word-speech] of our parents (LO1, 98) that is “more subtle than liquid” (SP1, 
61), she says. Dolto is creating a narrative of life whereby we are drawn into reality by 
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hearing, from very early in gestational life, as language on the “outside” lures us into 
relations with the sources of those voices (TL, 15). Language is what “humanizes the world” 
(JD, 273), making it worthy of engaging, simply because in utero, “audition tempers 
anxiety” (VC, 329). Herein, within the security of the “language bath which is our body” 
(CE, 16), our wish to live is met by a dream of perfect provision that invests audition, 
whereby we are “conceived in language” (CE, 16). Thus, the subject survives by a 
«dialectique exprimée…par la parole et par les fantasmes sous-jacents à la parole» [a 
dialectic expressed…by word-speech and by the phantasms subtending word-speech] 
(1977/1984, 249). To stress, we are effectively “lured towards reality by being spoken of” 
(LO1, 111; emphasis mine). Enigmatically, this address needs no words—and here, we are 
reminded of the absence which is essential to any rhythm, by definition, and also of our 
dreams of discourse upon organically resonant sounds. Thus, Dolto says, there are mothers 
who speak to their babies in silence and others who engage in empty discourses (CE, 255). 
And we find in this provocative statement the foundational belief affecting Dolto’s approach 
to the infant, wherein she listens in silence to the one who listens in silence: that  
unconscious communication between mother and child, the ‘unsaid’ that necessarily 
precedes and exceeds anything that is said. As a result, the mother can “only be maternal in 
her mother tongue” (LO1, 130), the “language of her dreams” (SP1, 120), and her untimely 
death (or loss) will represent the “end of history” as the source of word-speech, «parole» 
(JD, 252). This is a radical concept to which we will find ourselves returning—the notion 
that mother and baby dream upon the same word in a “continuum that creates a memory of 
myself-other” (SP1, 196-201). The baby begins to be spoken of when the mother begins to 
have «émois particuliers»—“particular affects” for the child—and speaks of him, while 
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pregnant (CE, 55). But by now attuned to Dolto’s condensations and the homonymic play 
informing them, we take a moment to reflect on her word here: «émois,» literally, ‘and-me.’  
Moi-mamère 
Again, we might easily take this word-play as just another bit of madness of our 
own, except that it leads, once more, to another critical Dolto notion, the infant’s 
indissociable state with the mother, for which Dolto coins another word: «moi-mamère» 
[me-mymother] (SP2, 127). Effectively, this term is a conceptualization of an indivisible, 
fluid psychical space that is not mother and child—and this is critical—but rather, mother as 
child, and vice-versa. In a nutshell, the term is a narcissistic «prolongement» [prolonging] 
(CD, 224; CE, 262), with all of the nuances of space and time folded in. This «sensorium» 
(JD, 125; also DW, 78; JD, 299; JP, 24; PJE, 87; SP1, 57; VO, 222; 2008b), credited to 
Pichon (in an atypical act of citation), is an environment she elaborates lifelong as an 
undifferentiated liquid mass (VO, 34); a liquid current (SS, 184); a gestational interpersonal 
emotional rapport (LF, 86); an unconscious fusional communication (EM, 37; 1989a, 68); an 
unconscious continuum (CE, 29); and an emotional climate (SF, 153). Like no other, Dolto 
elucidates the life of the human infant as a rising sense of presence inside incoherence. In 
sum, she says, the baby is in a state of «covivance» [coliving] with the mother (JD, 280). 
And for Dolto, crucially, this is interesting not as a dyad or as physical symbiosis, but rather 
in terms of the infant’s primary narcissism being necessarily “co-narcissistic with the 
mother” (VO, 11-12), with huge effects. For one, we will share dreams and have 
“complimentary phantasms with our mothers” in unconscious life (SP3, 176; 1977/1984, 
243). This alone is a shocking suggestion of “inherited education” (EM, 222), as “archaic 
transference” from our parents (SP1, 31; SS, 78)—a deep unconscious relation extending to 
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those we encounter in words in our families, for about three generations (CD, 242; 
1985/1989b, 123). In fact, Freud himself expressed in his earliest work how, “an 
unexplained hereditary predisposition may be accounted for as having been acquired at an 
early age” (1896a, 202). With Dolto, ‘early’ has merely shifted months back. And critically, 
in this inseparable fusion of «moi-mamère,» as the mother is spoken to, the child becomes 
an unconscious addressee as words are first lived with soft, permeable boundaries between 
self and other.  So archaic regression will necessarily entail an experience of the world 
through another that is as-if the mother (PJ, 95; SP1, 29; SP2, 18-19)—an inherent 
“reversibility of subject positions” upon the one to whom we speak (DW, 123), in whom we 
recognize “sameness” (JD, 256). And this, in a nutshell, is the archaic geography of primary 
narcissism, where it is not just a matter of finding traces, but where traces are the only thing 
we can find. The power of this analytic construct to the origin of the transference cannot be 
overstated. She asks: “Who speaks to whom, when someone «se tutoie» [refers to himself as 
‘you’] in his «for intérieur»?” (SP1, 75). Indeed. For Dolto’s work reveals that the 
transference subtends human relationality as a circulation of discourses, a call to an-other-
as-self in an inherent, unconscious reversibility. And what she bequeaths in legacy here, 
very provocatively, is the notion that the infant feels addressed within a text addressed to the 
«moi-mamère»—where the body is the conducting matter, the materia. Herein originates the 
passive experience of an address within language as an unconscious hearing-within-a-
hearing, rooted in an archaic prehistory wherein we obtain security precisely because 
passivity is assured—thus whose continuity we instinctively need, so unconsciously desire.  
In articulating Dolto’s work on the oral passive stage, then, we can say that subject-
object reversals will privilege oral passivity as a highly receptive state for unconscious 
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security. Reciprocally, oral passivity will always evoke the affective experience of a subject-
object reversal because it is a condition of fusion—a living ‘with, as-if, through’ an ‘other,’ 
a state of psychical indissociability wherein reversibility necessarily inheres. And the high 
degree of receptivity of the oral passive stage—a sort of active passivity, in effect—is 
precisely what is at issue. As a case in point, in 1954, we meet le «petit schizophrène» (DV, 
30-37; SP2, 167-170; 1985c), during whose session something happened Dolto says “she 
will never forget,” as it unsettled her so much (DV, 31). At age 13, he is highly phobic 
(especially of scissors), volatile, insomniac (never sleeping more than one hour), and 
illiterate. Dolto works with him every eight days, and in what becomes the penultimate 
session, she helps him move clay shapes towards a scraper on the table. Surprisingly, she 
then helps his hand scratch the back of her hand with the scraper, saying, “You see, it is not 
you that is hurting, and this does not even hurt me.” “That is all?” he asks, in a flash of 
lucidity. And then, from his mouth, comes a haunting discourse in two voices, one high and 
pleading, the other older and stern: “You slut, you will never have him….” “Mother I want 
to keep him….” The next day, Dolto receives an urgent request from the mother for a 
meeting, because when he got home, he slept all night and woke up calm, «différent». In the 
conversations that ensue, Dolto learns the child was adopted and the conversational «bande 
magnétique» was real—overheard by the adoptive mother as she waited in hospital to 
receive the baby in a private arrangement between families. So horrible was the argument 
that the adoptive mother had never told anyone what she had been privy to between the birth 
mother and grandmother, and she experienced shock learning that Dolto knew, and how she 
had learned it. At his next session, the boy could not even remember having said it. But 
cured of his phobias, he inserted himself in the social—and he became a tailor! 
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Narcissistic cohesion 
What we find most overdetermined in Dolto’s practice, then, is a profound vesting of 
audition—a keen listening to words for which we will locate deep connections to Freud’s 
earliest work. Foremost is her conviction about the critical value of a child’s first name as a 
“symbol of primary narcissism” and “narcissistic cohesion” (CD, 198; CE, 239; DQ, 49; 
DV, 21; IIC, 46 & 93-94; JD, 125; PJ, 107; SF, 206; SP3, 145; SS, 117; 1977/1984, 
202).Strong prescriptions issue from this belief: never change the first name of any child, 
including adoptees, as there is no way to predict the “toxic effect” on primary narcissism 
(CE, 239-240); and beware of the unconscious effects of giving the name of the dead (as 
when names are handed down), whom the child now represents in language (VO, 196-197). 
Furthermore, every child, even the profoundly deaf, must have a way to hear his name 
symbolized as early as possible (PJ, 108), for the absence or loss of a name leads to 
«déréliction narcissique» (VO, 42), as the name is what wakes up the child (IIC, 46 & 94). 
We are dealing in dream-work here, and Dolto herself urges us to keep in mind the key 
relation to overdetermination (CD, 183). Dolto then engages in what seem like wild 
discourses indeed, staking her own reputation to explain how the first name is “engrammed” 
like a magnetic band (IIC, 93); that a midwife assisting birth can be a «sorcière de malheur» 
[evil-bearing witch] (TL, 35), who marks destiny “as if it were written” (1977/1984, 234-
235); and that “babies live from words” (PJ, 14). Amid the derision of nameless critics 
populating the edges of her project—and, sometimes, through the warm laughter in seminars 
of the most informed—it is easy to lose sight (in an auditory world without vision) of the 
very deft movements on the oral passive stage that are, quite literally, at play here. And 
while Dolto leaves drawing the connection to Freud to the reader, we will indeed find it 
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helpful to shore up her work on primary narcissism with Freud’s, as we explore the pulsions 
of auto-conservation on the elusive first scene of  “oral eroticization” (Freud, 1905/1953c, 
181 & 205; also 1905/1953a, 52).  
Thinking with Freud’s watershed paper on narcissism (1914b), we consider not 
where the pulse is headed, towards the ego, but rather where it is coming from: a prehistory 
when the sexual libido that will eventually enable object relations is indissociable from 
primitive instincts, and conflict with reality is non-existent for the infant in a state of blissful 
satisfaction. Oral passivity informs that liquid first scene of eroticization as an unconscious 
experience of audition sourced in the orality of the other—sounds that arrive through 
enigmatic rhythms and silences in a phantastic weave with the affects they evoke, dream-
work upon words in service of the wish. Freud’s earliest studies on hysteria tell of Frau 
Emmy Von N., who called out her daughter’s name—the same as her own—to “help her 
back to clear-headedness” (1893a, 80). Elsewhere, Freud remarks that, “a sleeper is much 
more certain to be woken by the sound of his own name than by any indifferent auditory 
impression” (1900a, 223), and the “best method of waking a sleeper or a sleep-walker is to 
call him by his own name” (1907, 27). There is also an uncanny reference on hypnotism, 
where the “subject behaves to the rest of the external world as though he were asleep” 
(Freud, 1905b, 295) while he hears and attends only to the hypnotist—a situation Freud 
precisely compares to “a mother who is nursing her baby” (Ibid). Dolto’s work simply 
confirms this relation exquisitely. For our first encounters with words are actually right off 
the register of reality—deep inside a dream. Morphology is marvellously murky.  
Eventually, listening to Dolto and her patients, the reader becomes accustomed to the 
unusual surroundings. We meet Isabelle, the trilingual who cannot add or spell in French 
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because this represents a separation from her father (SP1, 95); an 11-year old who becomes 
incontinent when he brings an English book home, as if the new language castrates his 
father (SP1, 99); Patrick, the eight-year-old who learns Italian from his nurse while in a 
coma for three months (SP1, 117); and Katia, whose analysis opens on a «ficelle» [thread], 
for which Dolto takes up the homonym, the «fils-elle» [son-she], as a direction for 
interpretation (SP1, 51). There is a nine-year old who howls and eats dirt in identification 
with a beloved dead gardener, Robert, and who names himself «Robert tombé par la 
fenêtre» [Robert fallen out the window]—homonymically, «feu-n’être/naitre» [the fire of 
non-being/birth]; there was hope, Dolto says, because he could “say the name,” so she 
understood he thought he was the gardener’s dog (SP3, 88-90). And there is the twelve-year 
old who was—according to Dolto’s favourite adjective for her patients, «superbe»—yet who 
had grave academic delays because his mother and father had the same last name, and 
because the maternal grandmother had died, he thought the paternal grandmother was the 
mother of both his parents. “What is the theoretical plan for an interpretation?” a seminar 
attendee asks. Half-laughing, Dolto answers, “You interpret the «chosification» 
[thingification] of living beings who are not seen as a meeting between two subjects” (SP3, 
158-163).  And there is Jeanne, one of the 16 cases in Dolto’s watershed dissertation, whose 
pivotal symptoms are a reversal of syllable order and saccadic speech (MA, 244);  about a 
decade later, another is reported with a similar symptom, Nicole (age 5), who speaks only 
one syllable at a time (JD, 150). And there is Gilles, whose phobia of “murderous angles” is 
connected to the departure of a beloved uncle to war, in 1940, to join «les anglais» [the 
English] in «Angleterre,» homonymically «angle-taire»[hushing], as he became so anxious 
in keeping silent about collaborating, while his family were forced to host Germans (IIC, 53-
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55; also Bacon, 2013, 521). One hardly knows where to begin or end the examples—and 
there is no clear line between them either. For Dolto’s oeuvre seems compelled to convey by 
its style a message of continuity and reversibility, as-if it were an uncanny literary 
metaphor—an incidental performative—of primary narcissism as the condition of our 
origins in a non-space, non-time wherein there is fusion between self and other, 
inseparability. Dolto opens very provocative questions indeed about where a life, a subject, 
 or an autobiography begins—or ends. So doing, she challenges our very view of ‘history.’ 
Phonème 
Yet by these strange travels, we arrive at a deep pool entirely without landmarks: 
Dolto’s original psychoanalytic conceptualization of the «phonème» (e.g., IIC, 275; SS, 
210), and the phantastic affective history of words it entails. The bilingual reader who has 
begun to play with homonyms will hear enigma announced on the word itself (one escaping 
her consciousness?): «faux-name» [false name]—and «faut n’aime» [must not love], as if it 
were a warning about reality itself. What in the world is going on in this thought-space? We 
are certainly far from the definition of a syllable as a mere organizer of speech sounds, a 
phonological building block on the thin surface of reality. For the infant is still silent, is he 
not? And yet, Dolto will show that the phoneme is the first mediating object between 
phantasy and reality, returning us to word-things in Freud’s German: wortgebilden—words 
that build, form, infuse and structure. Words are pictures, in effect, for our earliest 
audition—only we repress the legacy of this dreamscape, as if reality itself were a troubling 
journey from synesthesia to amnesia. Dolto brings us right back to the discovery of the 
word-thing that is the blur of the autobiographic at the heart of analysis, beginning with 
Freud’s book on dreams (1900). For she provides countless examples where words have 
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marked like «bandes magnétiques» as first significations of narcissising joy or de-
narcissizing anxiety (in Grignon, 1997, 16; also DV, 73; DW, 76; EM, 178; PJ, 15; SP2, 96; 
TL, 34).  
On July 29, 1987, less than a month before her death, Dolto stated that with Tout est 
langage [All is language], she had finished writing (VC2, 858). And in that book, she is 
asked: “So a word spoken in childhood can decide a whole life?” «Oui,» she responds, and 
silence hangs (TL, 91-92). Yet this astonishing statement perfectly resumes her thinking on 
the infant—and the phoneme. Further, what is at stake is not only what is said, but also what 
is not said. For in the “auditory climate” of primary narcissism, «ce qui n’est pas nommé 
n’est rien» [what is unnamed is nothing] (SF, 156). In this way, Dolto explains, we are all 
born into “the language of our parents, a language sworn to silence” (1977/1984, 191), 
inheritors of suffering “that did not give its name” (SS, 167). Here is the word in tension 
with its own reversal, as two key theories coalesce ironically: the «non-dit,» i.e., what marks 
because it is not said; and the homonymic «nom-dit,» the given name, i.e., what marks 
because it is said. Contradiction is installed right at the word, endowing it from our first days 
with the ongoing capacity for silent dreaming. Words are “heavy with phantasms for 
intelligent children” (VC2, 876) she states, and children experience language «de façon 
métaphorique, de façon métonymique» [metaphorically, metonymically] (SS, 181), playing 
with words, living words, and rooting truth in them (CE, 41; EN, 64; LF, 283; PJE, 14; VC2, 
808 & 844).  
The resulting “suggestibility of a child” (JD, 58) has staggering implications. For 
from the first moments of audition, «nous legions, en dette ou heritage, dans l’inconscient de 
l’enfant» [we bequeath in legacy, as a debt or an inheritance, in the unconscious of the child] 
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(CE, 344). Here again is the idea of an inherited education, as an unconscious trace that 
always exceeds the subject. In fact, even before his dream book, Freud wrote about how a 
“sound image was not perceived as a sequence of letters…[that] the word sound was a 
whole” (1891/2011, 36 – 37), and that “word-associations [were] evoked by the spoken 
sounds” (1901b, 60). We also recall how words are subject to condensation and 
displacement (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 418), and the “invariable rule that the 
words spoken in the dream are derived from spoken words” (Freud, 1900a, 304). Here is a 
very delicate tension in theory where words are remainders of the day for dream-work—that 
then return, archaically re-invested, to our encounters with reality, “reviving once more the 
sensations to which the verbal expression owes its justification” (Freud, 1893b, 181). I posit 
that this tension is exactly how Dolto’s project on the early human begins a remarkable 
reciprocity with Freud’s earliest work, whereby she is supported by him and also provides 
evidence for him. Furthermore, the investment of words with unconscious affect begins 
precisely because of the “credulity such as the subject has in relation to his hypnotist [as] is 
shown only by a child towards his parents,” and this leads to “mental-physical behaviour 
corresponding to the idea’s content” (Freud, 1905b, 296). There will be a moving example 
from a friend dying of Hodgkin’s, who dreams of a string of ‘meaningless’ syllables that 
filled her with a sense of being loved. Recalling her friend lived in India from age one to 
nine months (having had a beloved local girl as a nanny), Dolto wondered if these 
«phonèmes» might be real, and she advised her to consult a translator. In fact, the words 
were from a common Indian lullaby that said, “My dear love, whose eyes are more beautiful 
than the stars” (DV, 77-81; EM, 177-178; SP2, 174-177; SS, 238-239; 1985c, 199). The 
phonemes said “nothing to her when she was awake,” Dolto points out, but in her sleep, they 
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gave her “unspoken narcissistic joy” (SP2, 177). Thus, in the narrative of the oral passive 
stage Dolto elaborates, the word is woven with the wish, and archaic audition is tethered to 
private histories of love and suffering, as interminable movements of dream thoughts 
become both irrepressible and accidental through language. What is a word, then? A word is 
a signpost to unchartable regions of psychical life—and right off the sonar of linguistics. 
Continuum of security 
With unusually keen listening for manifestations of the oral passive stage, then, 
Dolto embarks on a career spanning 50 years, almost all of it overlapping with Trousseau, 
where she will begin uncommon observations: that the oral pre-moi stage is humanising and 
marked by archaic desires (JD, 296-7; P&P, 33; SS, 16); as important as gestation is first 10 
-12 months, before “character” arrives, being rooted in much earlier incidents (DV, 169; 
DW, 87); and the intelligence of infant is fully in the service of oral passive survival (JD, 
27) until about nine months of age, the time of first teeth, when weaning is recommended 
(EM, 311; IIC, 104; PS, 25; 1961, 34f)—as teeth suffering demands biting (P&P, 34). Here 
is a fine movement we should note carefully, for passivity suffices until there is suffering, 
and passivity is prior to suffering; suffering at orality is what necessitates exterior libidinal 
investments at orality. Prior to reality, in other words, the baby hallucinates while sleeping 
(JD, 274), and the entire oral passive stage takes place in a dream-like, quasi-hallucinatory 
state that avoids the “devastation of solitude” by the continuous delivery of “unconscious 
pleasure” (CE, 16 & 33; P&P, 1; PS, 75; SP1, 157 & 161; SP3, 146; VO, 185; 1939/2013, 
17). This dream of perfect provision secures the “wish to sleep” (Freud, 1900b, 570 & 590; 
1901a, 680), in primitive auto-eroticism where “satisfaction is obtained from the subject’s 
own body and extraneous objects are disregarded” (Freud, 1909b, 44). It is a perfect 
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“continuum” or “habitus” of security and unity (APP, 32; CE, 29; JD, 256, 290 & 299; PS, 
22 & 86; QS, 17; SF, 209 & 362; SP1, 20; SS, 41 & 184). And so pleasurable is this dream 
state that Dolto views anxiety as a “resistance to eroticization” (SP1, 27). Further, she 
explains, it is the enigmatic remains of that prior libidinal organization, our pre-verbal 
internal language that is “experienceable in transference” (LF, 103; PJ, 92). For Dolto, then, 
transference is a continuous interrelational phenomenon that begins at conception and is 
«perpétuellement présent» in human relations as a “receptive resonance” (DV, 8 & 158; 
PJE, 92; SP3, 11), the continuation of what is living, unconsciously, at the source of life 
(CE, 283; LF, 9, 11, 20 & 247; 1977/1984, 249) that is the archaic origin of language (CD, 
189; LF, 68; SS, 117). Summatively, Dolto believes libido is “woven to the body but of the 
order of language” (SF, 334), animating the «fonction symbolique» (SF, 48).  
We will also want to remember as we travel, exploring all that is accidental yet 
compelling about the movement of transference in Dolto’s texts, that the unconscious, 
“affective roots of language” (SP3, 192-194) are entirely idiosyncratic for individual human 
capital (LO3, 170; SP2, 151; 1977/1984, 205). Freud explains how “a combination of 
individual factors, physiological and accidental…determines how a person shall behave in 
particular cases of comparatively intense objective stimulation during sleep…to 
suppress…[or] overcome the stimulus by weaving it into a dream” (1900a, 229). Thus, 
idiosyncratically, the child engages “continuous unconscious rapports to a past from which 
he cannot be disjoint to assure his future” (SS, 41). So it is not merely that transference 
endures—but that we endure because of transference, as a resourcing by (in) passive pulses. 
And to understand Dolto, we will need to engage our own passive learning, as examples 
‘arrive’ and become discernible not as single objects with definable edges, but as a quantity 
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inside a liquid, non-defineable space, only palpable in repetition. And that is how we come 
to value highly the odd case wherein Dolto explains the body as “fruit of «paroles 
échangées»” (SP3, 142-153). The 15-month-old boy is «superbe» during the day—in contact 
with others and objects, she says. But he is a profound insomniac, wailing all night, in full 
opisthonos, when he does not recognize his mother. Dolto sees him four times, biweekly. 
The last time, in a provocative session that disturbs the reader, she explains to him that he 
wears the name of a stillborn son preceding him (along a family tradition of handing down 
names), and that his mother is sad not to be able to think of her dead child with a name, so 
that perhaps he fears sleep as he is afraid to represent the dead child. The toddler pulls 
himself up to Dolto’s chair and gives her a long, penetrating look, then quickly asks to leave. 
Of note, other toddlers will say the same thing over the years—asking their mothers to leave 
this horrible woman. And yet, so typically, Dolto’s intervention installs a cure in a rapid 
après-coup, whereby he “refound sleep,” and began to catch up in maturity—sitting, 
drawing and modeling. “But was this an interpretation or an intrusion?” a seminar attendee 
asks. “I don’t know,” Dolto answers. “It had «un effet libérateur,» but I don’t know” (SP3, 
152). And soft laughter follows, like warm water. Of course, the reader cannot but wonder 
about his name. Yet it is never given, in a case she calls, “The lack of a name in the Other.”  
Marguerite & narcissus 
We now move backwards in time in the style of Dolto herself, to «pas plus tard 
qu’hier» [not later than yesterday] (JD, 273). The year is 1949 and we meet Bernadette, a 
five-year-old schizophrenic who issued blood from her anus and mouth for 10 days 
perinatally (JD, 133-193; JP, 19-33). She remains a hemiplegic schizophrenic who talks 
openly of her hatred of her mother, walks with her head bent to one side, and speaks in a 
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monotone voice. She is anorexic, phobic, and very hostile, and she suffers from debilitating 
anxiety:  “I had never seen such a grave case,” Dolto says (JP, 25). From the first, Dolto 
attends to Bernadette’s curious language, as the child turns objects into verbs: «se luner» [to 
moon yourself], «sapiner» [to fir-tree], «chaiser» [to chair] (JP, 25). And in a typical session, 
Bernadette draws a tree and narrates that she «sapinait» [was tree-ing] or making 
«sapinades» [tree-collectives]. Dolto offers the noun, «sapin» for the drawn tree, and «ça 
prenait» [enigmatically, ‘it took/worked,’ or ‘the unconscious took hold’].  Dolto saw 
Bernadette 18 times over 20 months in 1946–1948 (JP, 86f), and while the hemiplegia 
remained as the sequela of birth injuries, she became a well-adapted child. In turn, 
Bernadette became the inspiration for the «poupée-fleur,» a doll with the head of a 
«marguerite» [daisy], cathartic for injuries at the oral stage, Dolto explains (AI, 56; JD, 158-
159; JP, 40; SS, 21). Simply, Bernadette had expressed in an early session that she disliked 
animals and dolls. “Perhaps Bernadette would like a flower-doll?” Dolto inquired. “Oh, yes, 
a flower-doll!” the little girl replied. “What in the world is that?” asked the mother. “I have 
no idea,” answered Dolto, “but it seems this is what she’d like” (JP, 27; JD, 139). So Dolto 
requested the mother make one, providing instructions.
11
 The dolls would be used 
successfully to heal other children, becoming iconic of Dolto. Here is theory arriving in 
unanticipated moments made from unpredictable movements, then being welcomed. There 
is a lovely footnote, fifty years later, that a letter was found after Dolto’s death, forwarded 
by this young patient, now an orthophonist. In a strange circularity, she had found it after her 
own mother’s death, by accident. And though she recalls being told she had been treated by 
Dolto because of anorexia, she had no «souvenir de la poupée-fleur» and was moved to read 
her case (VC2, 258). Dolto relates finding «marguerites» [daisies] as identifications in 
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primary narcissism, perhaps because the “idea” came from her (AI 56; JD, 139)—
overlooking here that it is her grandmother’s, and her own, middle name. Yet by now 
familiar with homonymic play, we hear the «marguerite» also as the «mère guérite» [healed 
mother] and «mère guerre-ite» [warring mother], as we find ourselves returned to the 
construction of primary narcissism as a co-narcissistic state with the mother, and the 
corollary that is Dolto’s prime clinical stance: that a psychologically well mother is the key 
preventative against childhood mental illness.
12
 It seems knowledge has gone completely 
rogue, as theory is prompted by phantasies informed by word-things, whereby there is 
“change in the verbal expression of the thoughts concerned” (Freud, 1900b, 339). And while 
we ponder the marguerite on the soft ground between the biographical and the theoretical 
here, we cannot but recall the narcissus, flower and myth, amid the echoes of primary love. 
In sum, Dolto’s project narrates our difficult encounter with reality, and explicates 
how continuous resourcing in the unconscious is the only thing that makes the strain 
bearable: “Once one leaves the womb, life is not always as one would want it” (EM, 22), she 
states drily, thus life is “indelibly associated with suffering” (JD, 57; JP, 41; SF, 362; SS, 
234), because the umbilical separation from archaic security is a wound (PS, 27; SF, 362; 
SP1, 213). Her project flows with a powerful current in psychoanalysis, while also infusing 
its roots. For Dolto discovers that constitutional melancholy is intrinsic to human 
structuring, and the purpose of psychical work (cure and life), is therefore “to heal our 
suffering, but not to replace it” (SP1, 52).13 For Dolto, suffering is our undeniable heritage, 
not something to erase, and thus wellness means “transforming pathogenic suffering into 
useful suffering” (1989a, 133). As Dolto explains it from the vantage point of oral passivity, 
the problem is simply that we have, in our archaic prehistory, «beaucoup de peine à 
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s’exprimer» (EM, 96). The phrase is a spectacular play on «peine» [harm, hurt, sadness] that 
relates, at once, our great difficulty in expressing ourselves—and our great sorrow. 
Souvenir 
Dolto shares that she kept a great «souvenir» all her life of Trousseau (ATP, 195).
14
 
So we journey there, in mind, with the help of a lovely photo that moves any witness (AI, 
225), and the difficulty of living that is patent in Dolto’s project. A little girl touches the 
necklace Dolto wears, and Dolto’s empathic gaze, as she is bent to eye level, overflows 
words entirely. Thus we are returned, as if in a dream, to her beloved Irish nanny, summarily 
fired for stealing a necklace, a river of «diamants» (AI, 144; EN, 62). Dolto does not engage 
her own homonymic play here, but by now, we cannot miss it: «dit-à-ma’an» [words of the 
mother; also ‘tell mother’] or «dit-à-ment» [word(s) for lying]. And there is an uncanny 
presence of Dominique’s invisible river here too, «Elmoru» [she died], that we detect yet 
release (for now). For there is always more dreaming possible, and always something held in 
silence that we will never hear. The word opens onto what is heterogenous to its origins, for 
long before the first utterance is the phantastic unconscious prehistory of words. Elderly, 
Dolto will recall her nearly dying of double pneumonia at six months upon her nanny’s 
departure, as their love was so great (EN, 62-65). In fact, the necklace had been the mother’s 
most prized wedding gift (EN, 62), amid a rich «trousseau» [dowry]. Dolto regrets no one 
remembers her name (EN, 64), as she recounts how the incident left a lingering 
«malentendu» with her family (DW, 66). Meanwhile, back in her twenties, when tensions 
ran highest and her mother kept interrogating her, Dolto felt her mother took everything: “I 
have nothing for myself,” she says, “So why live? I have not even a souvenir” (AI, 55). 
Dolto will spend long hours staring out the window when she is just four years old, 
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reflecting on death at the «fenêtre» [window]—the «feu-naitre/feu-n’être» [fire-birth/fire-not 
being], she muses homonymically (EN, 14), as-if the word play itself invests her genius. 
Poignantly, she offers, “it was my guilt at the window” (EN, 12). Indeed, the nanny’s 
departure left a big hole in her life: «un profound trou» (MF, 21). Arriving here, I cannot 
help but muse on the name, Bernadette—burn-a-debt? For the pseudonym of her famous 
patient is decipherable only in the nanny’s tongue, as we sense but cannot confirm that we 
are teasing out fragile but tenacious remnants of the deep sorrow of an infant who would 
have gladly repaid what the nanny owed, if only to keep her. Even the word, souvenir, 
seems to inscribe a silent story of rupture with the past, as if by suggestion in language 
itself: «sous venir» [under (to) come]. 
Seeking help ‘objectively’ specifying Dolto’s contributions to the study of the child, 
I locate the only other dissertation on Dolto, uncannily written by another «Québecoise,» 
Marcelle Gauthier, in 1995 (BNF, n.d; Worldcat.org, 2015b), whose research team met 
Dolto in France, in 1983 (Féger, 1983). Supervised by Arlette Mucchielli-Bourcier, a French 
scholar on dyslexia (Wikipédia, 2015a), Gauthier inquires into «ce que fut [what was] le 
phénomène Dolto» (1995, 15)—as if it has passed. She samples 132 parents and specialists 
in Nice and Montreal, collecting 8000 responses decidedly praising Dolto’s simple language 
(Ibid, 254-257); her advocacy for children (Ibid, 258); her clinical experience (Ibid, 264); 
her courage, humility and honesty (Ibid, 264); and her concern for the public good (Ibid, 
265-266). Respondents refuse only Dolto’s instruction to evict children from the parental 
bed, and to grant them autonomy by age eight (Ibid, 259). The biggest contrast between sites 
is that Niceans, who listened to Dolto’s radio programs, want help with their children, while 
Montrealers, who did not, seek help working with children. Yet in ‘using’ Dolto differently 
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if heard (or not) in their youth, is there not a hint of  “editions of transference” (Freud, 
1905a, 116; 1915b, 168)—paths made variant by (in) the après-coup of listening? Gauthier 
actually mentions the transference only once, crediting the discovery to René Morichau-
Beauchant, in 1909 (1995, 28). That this error would escape her supervisor, though, leads to 
the unanticipated and unsaid: Morichau-Beauchant and Mucchielli-Bourcier, with their 
oddly parallel names, both come from Poitiers—a fact that draws me into discovery only by 
the magnitude of the slip. But the ‘mistake’ is richer still, because this ‘first transference’ is 
actually (and homonymically) the first (postal) ‘transfer (to) France.’ For Freud writes to 
Jung on 3 December 1910: “I have received my first letter from France, from a Dr. 
Morichau-Beauchant” (Hoffman, 2011; also Douville, 2009, 50). Thus even in a purportedly 
quantitative study, unconscious affects countersign conscious works, as truth cannot help but 
be inscribed. Ergo, the past is never fully passed—and objectivity entirely eludes. 
Working inside the Dolto corpus, one loses then refinds the subject, over and over. 
There is no direct correspondence between a case and a construct, or any one book that can 
make sense of the whole. We will never find unquestionable, explicit links between her 
childhood and her theories. In reality, our tethering will always be the stuff of dream-work, 
inviting still more questions. Thus, we will simply need to be content with playing if we are 
to learn anything at all, as Derrida counsels: “a «folie» [folly, play] must «veiller» [keep 
vigil] over our thoughts” (1992, 349). For we will be following diffuse associations upon 
unusual grounds for thought where sense issues only paradoxically, in ironic returns on 
suggestion and contradiction—what is ‘spoken’ against the flow of what is spoken. I believe 
we have, then, what Britzman calls, “thinking as our most personal narrative revolt” (2011, 
126). Dolto herself felt she was “chasing an enigma” (AI, 157; also AI, 55; DW, 170). And 
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with Dolto, but without bearings, we come upon abundant evidence of “the unconscious [as] 
a particular realm of mind with its own wishful impulses” (Freud, 1916b, 212), whereby the 
nascent psyche develops in an organizing silence, as Dolto says—a hearing-within-a-hearing 
as the ineffable “text of the other…arrives in silence with a more or less regular cadence” 
(Derrida, 1980/2007, 152). This early association between survival and sound—and between 
self and other—bestows on language the potential to deliver securitization as an unconscious 
conveyance. For the fetus dreams in a long-established auditory world, and birth is an 
“originary self-estrangement” (Britzman, 2011, 60). Thus, our words will forever carry the 
traces of our unspeakable pre-histories—telling silent stories beneath the stories that we tell.  
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Chapter Four: Reading & Presentification 
Abstract: In this chapter, I explore texts as a source of material for dream-work, ergo as a 
site-means for the transference. I survey Dolto’s childhood setting and its associative 
pathways, as I find echoes of her early history with books in her writing, and diffuse 
transference across her corpus. I observe how word play inhabits phantasy and reality, and 
the legacy of archaically invested phonemes to the mother tongue. As homonymy becomes 
more salient, I note the luring effects of unconscious security in ‘presentification’: coming to 
reality as libidinal stratification upon our pre-histories. I consider the crucial element of trust 
in learning from texts, as I ask, ‘What is reading?’ 
 
I become conscious to the point of being able to admit to myself of what in reading imprints 
itself in me, at the centre defended but prepared for mute joy…in a word, the resemblance 
«esquissée» [traced, outlined] by this homophone…the phantom at the bottom of the word 
(Jacques Derrida, 1987b, 17). 
 
In the summer of 1913, Dolto learned to read when Mlle first arrived to help 
Suzanne with her fifth infant (ES, 10; VC1, 61). Dolto’s rich retelling of this story of 
learning (AI, 114-116; ATP, 81-85; ES, 9-14; 1985a, 214-226) makes patent her remarkable 
capacity for biography, and for witnessing childhood. Mlle used a Fröbel-inspired method—
and “what is funny, is that it is very important for me that psychoanalysis be a method,” 
Dolto quips (ATP, 85). The book selected for daily sessions—sounding out syllables, 10 
lines at a time—was a prize Dolto’s scholarly father had won, «Les Babouches de Baba 
Hassein,» a collection of Orientalist stories by H.Balesta (1894) (the last, interestingly called 
«Le témoin» [witness]). This 237-page book that “most marked” her childhood (ES, 11) 
features 16 images, of which 10 are partially hand-coloured. Dolto recalls a “little donkey” 
(ATP, 82)—in fact, a scene where a mounted «passant» hears the faint cry of a rope-bound 
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child named Abd-Allah (p.157). Dolto hoped the book would explain how, as she opened 
and closed it repeatedly, its images seemed to move—though when she looked at each one, 
it did not. That it failed to do so became “one of the biggest deceptions of my life” (ATP, 
82; ES, 11), revealing that “books were not at all that they promised from their images” (ES, 
11). Devastated, she tried to unlearn reading by refusing to look, as she wept so profusely 
she needed a «mouchoir» (ATP, 85). After ‘theorizing’ about this anecdote for two years, I 
notice one day that the boy on the cover repeats on p.35; the shoe on p.7 is thrown on p. 35; 
the man on the title page returns on p. 105; and so on for a rosary (pgs. 47 & 93); a rope 
(pgs. 117 & 131); and a sun/moon (pgs. 7, 145 & 151). Still, any explanation masks the 
great significance at play. After all, why expect a book to narrate its own structure? Why is 
an inability to account for displacements discouraging? And why invest such promise in 
texts? Freud believes misreading stems from “an intense wish to reject what we have read” 
(1916a, 71). In obverse, then, Freud pens the enigma of reading to which Dolto testifies: text 
somehow receives, and carries an expectation of returning, unconscious investments.  
Dolto memorized pages of Babouches, convincing almost everyone she could read, 
sounding out “syllables that meant nothing,” in an “absurd activity that led nowhere” (AI, 
116; ATP, 84). But Mlle “saved her,” she vouches, by telling her to listen to herself (Ibid). 
She calls the moment sense arrived from her own voice a «miracle» (AI, 114; 1985a, 214), 
as a sentence became «activée, enchaînée» (AI, 114). “They were separate syllables,” she 
recounts, “but they meant something if you joined them while listening, linking them” 
(ATP, 84). So more questions beckon. Why aren’t word sounds naturally linked? And why 
is securing sense from one’s own voice difficult? In any event, from that day on, reading 
was “her happiness” (AI, 116), she was “full of vitality” (Ibid), and never wanted to «lâcher 
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le texte» [let go of a text] (ATP, 84; also EN, 80). Yet while the book’s stories are, as she 
puts it, «idiot» (ATP, 84)—including the 6th and 8th, both set in Algeria—I notice a stunning 
bridge to her reality. On one side of 1913, two generations lived through the colonization of 
Algeria (Berkley Centre, n.d.), including Dan-mé Étan, the maternal great-grandmother born 
in 1839, when «Algérie» was named (Ibid). Its annexation was surely discussed in this 
educated family. On the other side, in 1915-1916, her mother sponsors a wounded soldier, 
Mohamed Ben Meckri (AI, 75); Oncle Pierre’s company is the Sidi Brahim (VC1, 44); and 
Pierre writes fiction for her about a hero, Sidi Vava Ben Abdallah (VC, 58-59). So foreign 
words arrive, unconsciously registering in difference, repetition and affect, as reality plays 
with phantasy. And when Dolto asks gravely, How can you live if you don’t read? (AI, 116), 
insisting it is «nécessaire» (EN, 81), she draws attention to its deep psychical work. I 
confess that it is here that I most feel with Dolto, “the secret of a shared autobiography” 
(Derrida, 2001b, 46). Dolto calls that first book “magical” (ATP, 82), and my own copy of 
this rare text feels that way too, full of portents. Asking myself why, I realize my deep 
investment in Dolto, who herself invested in it. Thus, in affective conveyance, the 
transference, I believe that it is possible to detect an enigmatic inheritance of trust, and the 
lure of a similar-enough other to follow. Then again, what else should be expected from the 
work of the passive pulses, begun under the sway of the instinct of conservation (the 
ultimate source of ‘trust’), when life was manageable only ‘with, as-if, through’ an other?  
Writing the year Dolto was born, Freud reminds us “creative writing…is a 
continuation and substitution…for the play of childhood” (1908a, 152)—and I submit that 
this compels the notion of a chain of custody in reading (with incalculable implications for 
translation). For example, a term of great significance in my thinking about the work of the 
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unconscious in texts is narrative revolt. Admittedly Kristeva’s (2000), it achieved use as a 
tool for me only upon my (re?)finding it in Britzman (2011; citing Kristeva). Prior, I had 
somehow over-looked it in Kristeva. Is there in reading simply what any analyst knows: the 
transference needs relations of trust?  For it seems the reader is unconsciously affected in his 
ability to think with words—his capacity to ‘take someone’s word’—by their witness.  
Écho de Paris 
Thinking about the unconscious in autobiography, I favour what Britzman calls 
“something unknowable” (2010), where reading is an encounter with “communities from the 
limits of experience” (1998, 60)—a “transferential relation where we risk ourselves” (Ibid, 
55 & 95), vesting hope in “refinding lost objects scattered in the world” (2009, 52). Freud 
begins his project by noting that reading is “very complicated…and entails a frequent shift 
of the direction of the association” (1891/2011, 75-76), sharing that when walking in a 
strange town, he reads “every shop sign that resembles the word in any way as 
‘Antiquities’… betray[ing] the questing spirit of the collector” (1901b, 110). There is in the 
treasure of Freud’s example, in one direction, a “disturbance in reading…utilizing a ‘switch-
word’” (1901b, 274) as “pre-cathected word-images provide a passage for discharge” (1895, 
365-366), while in another direction, “reading…provid[es] an abundant and not easily 
traceable source for…dreams” (1900b, 419 & 495; 1901a, 668). But how are word-images 
pre-cathected? Britzman is right—we will need to “read slowly” (2009, 48). For reading 
emerges as a potent, archaic-systonic act offering to audition an echo of our pre-cathected 
word-things, in a reparation that returns our lost objects. Thus, each one of us cannot help 
but be what Derrida called, a “transferential addressee” (1996/1998, 3), who is receiving 
“the gift…of the trace at work…a counter-reading” (2003/2005, 157). 
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Dolto savoured reading each morning at dawn (ATP, 85; ES, 12; 1985a, 215). Flash 
ahead to 1939, and she advises a 10-year old patient to read Jules Verne and science books 
(MA, 210); and in 1952, she counsels a peer to prescribe stories “with a free lion or tiger” 
(VC2, 213), to invite “useful aggression” (Ibid; also EM, 209). Her dissertation even 
references Cinderella’s passivity (MA, 109)—ironically deleted from later editions. Children 
“use fairy tales to construct themselves in reality,” she states (DQ, 123; LO3, 37), as 
phantasms deform, develop—or help one escape—one’s own story (EM, 296; Nobécourt & 
Simonetta, 1978). Thus, Dolto recommends “contradictory narratives” (SP1, 121) and 
reading fables without explanations (CE, 324), to enable the author’s presence (APP, 27; 
also ES, 107-108; LO3, 41; SP1, 79). Defending since childhood her right to phantasy—
“Why do you call it imagination? Maybe it’s true!” (ATP, 21)—Dolto becomes a resonator 
of the archaic. Thus, for a child, a fairy “is not a story, it is true” (PJE, 15; TL, 36); she takes 
seriously Bernadette’s claim to be a wolf-child (JD, 142-145); and she translates a child’s 
problem with moving as a lack of a trail of crumbs (EN, 66). Freud notes the relation of 
dreams to fairy-tales is not accidental (1900a, 246); and he plays with their metaphors, 
explaining he “once experienced a beautiful fairy tale” (E. Freud, 1961, 29); titling a key 
draft, “A Christmas Fairy Tale” (1896/1954a, 146); and declaring himself “delighted as the 
dwarf” (1896/1954e, 322). Conversely, the psychoanalytic ‘object’ feels embedded in the 
exegesis of folklore by Vladimir Propp (1965). Even in Derrida, we paradoxically find: “If 
you devour more, says the grandmother and wolf for whom you work, it is still in the service 
of mourning…If it were me, I would have preferred never to have written that” (1987b, 39-
41). Hearable is the arrival of otherness as an event that betrays its continued residence, 
along with seepage from the oldest strata of one’s reading to the present scene—and the 
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discomforting slippage of subjectivity entailed (Who is ‘me’? Who is ‘you’?). At merely 61 
pages long, its source—«Feu la cendre» [Cinders]—is as marginal to Derrida’s corpus as 
Freud’s DaVinci (and just as remarkable), invoking not only Little Red, but Cinderella too. 
For in that text, Derrida reflects on his mentions of «cendres» [cinders, ashes] over 15 years: 
“I thought it was ingeniously calculated, mastered, subjected, as if I had appropriated it 
myself. But since then, unceasingly, I must admit the truth before the evidence: this sentence 
«s’était passé» [evaded, got through; also, ‘it was past’] without any authorization” (1987b, 
7). The rogue movement of this word in his corpus speaks to its unruliness, and impels its 
use in countless concepts and discussions over the years. Yet as for the destination of even 
the same childhood story for different subjects, no two paths will align. For example, I 
submit that Bertha Pappenheim, who wrote lovely fairy tales (1888/2008) after her own 
passage in the analytic literature, derived from her prior personal relation with Cinderella the 
first definition of psychoanalysis: “chimney sweeping” (Jones, 1953/1982, 224). Thus does 
early reading legate elusive objects to literacy. And while this material rarely sees light, 
being normatively hushed in academic writing, as-if associating with primitivity precluded 
serious thought, Dolto rightly believes the opposite is true: phantasy drives trains of thought.  
 Remembering her subscription to L’Écho de Paris, a gift from her grandmother with 
a children’s page (EN, 73), and the weekly Semaine de Suzette she calls “an enormous thing 
that helped me live in reality” (EN, 67), Dolto reflects that texts arriving in her home 
enabled her to “love society,” since it meant there were others outside her family who 
understood children (EN, 68); and there were children like her, since they were interested in 
the same things (Ibid). So this “little donkey,” as Mlle called her (VC1, 70), spent the prize 
money she won (mostly for her marks) buying more children’s papers (EN, 73). And upon 
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her death, Dolto’s children placed a wreath of flowers on behalf of the phantasy characters 
that populated their family life, such as Mr. Passe-Passe and «les petits êtres» [small beings] 
(AI, 15). For Dolto remained aware lifelong of the archaisms that subtended her childhood. 
Recalling time itself as an enigmatic encounter, Dolto relates her frustration at age 10 that 
one could study, in a single year, both ancient history and Lafontaine (EN, 39-40). She 
sought connections but found none (EN, 40), she says, searching the dictionary for the 
meaning of «litérature» (EN, 39), only to discover it was about “people who spoke 
otherwise than ourselves” (Ibid). Chronology is a kind of «morcellement» [splitting], she 
concludes (EN, 40), and a text is an offer to “read messages coming from persons alive in 
another space, another time” (ES, 13). But one should never attract readers by colour or 
presentation, she warns, for a book only “brings something” as «une expérience de la 
réalité» that can be “put back into real life” (LO3, 41; also CE, 94). Dolto’s careful musing 
draws attention to the work of phonemes in our coming to reality—our «présentification» 
(IIC, 278; also IIC, 35; PS, 21-22)—as “quantities of synchronous external and internal 
encounters take on the value of language signs” (TL, 27), and the child constantly “imagines 
himself in an activity that valorises him” and sustains his «allant-devenant» [going-on-
becoming] (TL, 31): 
Sounds…interweave with the perception of his body in tension with needs, or in 
«fantasmes de désirs»...These sonar signifiers…are necessary to retain the child in 
reality through an ephemeral articulation of a perception that has come from the 
exterior world to which he remains attached, that is, «bribes de fantasmes» (IIC, 
276). 
 
Strange address 
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Still in 1913, just as the auditory landscape of Babouches arrived, Dolto moved with 
her family from 18 rue Gustave-Zédé to the 5
th
 floor of an even more prestigious address at 
2 Colonel Bonnet, a new building offering views of not only the Eiffel Tower and the Seine, 
but the renowned «Maison Blanche,» where once lived Maupassant (Murat, 2001/2013) 
[«mot passant»: ‘a/the word passing’]. Forbidden to look, she watched through a sheer as 
nurses served «thé spécial» in the garden to their patients, sometimes howling (ATP, 52). 
Even her building bore the “sign of syphilis” (Roudinesco, 1982, 210), as evident in her 
extended description (ATP, 52-64). For on the 6
th
 was a man who periodically held a bag out 
the window, threatening to drop his (long-deceased) wife. A Russian princess-type lived on 
the 4
th
 with her mentally disabled daughter, a tall girl who “resembled Dante” or a “witch” 
with a yellow face; the daughter’s husband, a giant hunchback dwarf; and a “caricature of a 
basset.” Another daughter, a skeleton, died at 18 of anorexia nervosa, while a gorgeous son 
twirled like a top to avoid clothing touching his skin. As the elevator was out during the war, 
families met on the stairs and Mlle advised not looking at him, as “the poor man has ideas in 
his head” (ATP, 61). On the 3rd lived «Quatrebarbes» [fourbeards]—“But he had only one 
chin, it gave me something to think about!” (ATP, 62). And on the 2nd, a woman with 
mystical delusions, who screamed at full moons, kept a heated table to lure children. “On the 
fifth,” Dolto sums up drily, “I knew madness well, I lived in it!” (AI, 60; Nobécourt, 2008a).  
Reality and phantasy have entirely permeable boundaries here. For the new home has 
an elevator, recalling the lost nanny; story characters share her building; the mad take polite 
tea; and what one reads comes into circulation around the table, or on the sidewalk. With 
Dolto, like no other, we find the “strange address of childhood’s residency” (Britzman, 
2011, 31), where “things are never what they appear to be” (Ibid, 47). For the child does not 
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separate reality from a “series of dreams continuing over weeks or months based on 
common ground” (Freud, 1900b, 525), perpetually living in the “neighbourhood of wish-
fulfilment” (Ibid, 562), that “playground of transference” (Freud, 1914c, 154). And what 
makes Dolto extraordinary is her enduring comfort on that archaic landscape:  
I close my eyes and I see quantities of things. I see…people who are walking about, I 
see cities…And these people…have features, they have a body, and I could, if I had 
the time, draw them all and represent them, they are not confoundable with any 
other, and yet, they are «anonymes»…I see «paysages» [landscapes, scenes] that are 
very specific, characterisable; it is not at all just anything, and it is new all the 
time…The visual creation is always in colour…But I ask myself this question: What 
is this, these people that I see, and that do not exist? (AI, 45). 
  
Dolto accepts the richness of childhood that is her permanent heritage, in a “theatre of the 
mind” (Britzman, 2011, 128) highly reminiscent of Pappenheim’s “private theatre” (Breuer 
& Freud, 1892, 22)—and she lets it inform her relations and her work. It is “fantasy [that is] 
subtle and structuring…fantasy as a resource” (Britzman, 2010). Thus, Dolto is happy living 
“not knowing exactly where she was going” (ATP, 26), with one foot, we might say, on the 
«terrain de l’inconscient» (SF, 38 & 216), where “the echo of an archaic peace of one’s 
being resonates, peace prior to the time of appearances” (PS, 80).  
So grounded in the archaic, Dolto’s cartography naturally adopts the water-and-road 
metaphors of Freud’s drive theory, wherein geography informs biography: his tributaries 
and channels (1900b, 479-480 & 483; 1905c, 232 & 237) of “an instinctual stream” (1905c, 
232); and displacements along roundabout, connecting or indirect paths (1900a, 311; 1900b, 
532; 1913, 168; 1913, 167; 1917c, 350). Humans live a “life of exchanges (a current)” in our 
“dynamic participation” with one another (CD, 67 & 67f), Dolto says, as libido flows like “a 
106 
 
sea” (MA, 14) towards its “dynamic creative goal” (VC2, 165). If detoured, libido “resumes 
a path previously employed” (MA, 19), or “meanders,” depending on the “terrain and 
quantity of the flow” (MA, 18). Any excess flows through «brèches spontanées» at the 
“point of least resistance” (MA, 19). Following the imaginary walk of Freud’s dream book 
(1900a, 122f)—his own archaic co-ordinates—Dolto believes archaic desires remain, and 
the child unconsciously projects them into vegetation, animals and nature, as security is 
unconsciously represented by “natural shelters” (SS, 59; CE, 351), especially around 
water—and phantasy, not reality, is his originary security. Childhood wishes can always 
return as experience is merely overlaid in «strates,» Dolto explains, extending from the 
«terrain actuel au terrain le plus ancien» (Ribowski, 2004). In the child, there are simply 
fewer layers, so transference is easier (Morgenstern, 2003b, 291). In sum, as Freud states, 
“in a particular province…relics of the past still survive” (1896/1954b, 175) upon which are 
structured “successive transcripts” (Ibid)—in a kind of layering (distancing) from an 
“archaic heritage” (1921, 127). Reality is always a displacement from that very first setting, 
as progressive associations move us psychically forward from, and by, dream-work. 
Habitus de securité  
Regarding her new home and its liminal characters, Dolto shares another gem: her 
angel, BAG, arrived at Colonel Bonnet—he was not at Gustave-Zédé (ATP, 71). He 
appeared in the days when she asked Mlle, newly arrived (EN, 66), hard questions about 
death and she felt «schizoïde» (Ibid). Associations to that nanny were surely left behind in 
the shift, but given any child’s blur of reality and phantasy, we cannot know what was lost 
that mattered most. The child has a «habitus de securité» (JD, 290), Dolto theorizes, and this 
“emotional climate” is unnoticed unless it goes away (JD, 289; also JD, 250-252; SF, 153). 
107 
 
For the child is attached to a place recalling security (SF, 105), context-bound (DV, 84). 
Further, the present is layered upon the past in messy ways, as time itself is felt to be 
splitting. In sum, just how unconscious security arrives is neither easily understood nor 
rational. Dolto’s patient, Dominique, for example, regains his voice upon moving (CD, 22), 
while Morgenstern’s patient loses hers (in Ribas, 2006, 11). Then is there only so far from 
our own archaic ‘natural shelter’ we can go at once? And just how do we port our 
unconscious investments in security from one place to the other, in coming to reality?    
Thus, after meandering along circuitous trails and libidinal rivers, it seems we have 
re-found some questions, though they seem to be a long way from our queries about reading. 
But are they really? In fact, lifelong, Dolto could not easily be still (D&R, 18; MF, 29-30). 
Even when vacationing at Laforgue’s, she walked extensively, hand-painting arrows to mark 
trails (PF, 75). And while working, she ran around her building between patients until one 
day, she says, she noticed she could just read a page of Racine and listen anew (DW, 166; 
Nobécourt, 2008b). Her interviewer seems dislodged momentarily by what cannot easily be 
reconciled with reason, as Dolto tenders brilliance, then moves on. Yet in a seminar 
(elsewhere, years earlier), Dolto once commented, «dévorer des yeux c’est courir» [to 
devour with the eyes is to run] (SP3, 47). Here again is this curious relation between reading 
and displacement, in a conjunction of statements that share neither time nor space. But the 
reader becomes accustomed to how, with Dolto, it is precisely in the tension of contradiction 
that genius arrives; further, that while time splits her project, as she warns, if her thought is 
gathered by its condensations instead—collecting word-things in quanta, associating notions 
from disparate regions of her corpus—her work begins to tell its truly radical story. Thus, in 
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being at its most comprehensible as dream-work, her project performs its main message: the 
unconscious directs all human psychical activity from the start, and in perpetuity.  
So if reality and phantasy are blurred for the child, who lives comfortably with the 
logic of the wish, and if every landscape in reality involves a slow, uneven migration from 
the archaic—two steps forward, one step back—how is a story setting any different from a 
real one? Why would a word from an author or character have a different capacity to hold 
and move affect than a one spoken by family, or neighbours? Is this not, in fact, the deep 
provocation of Babouches and the peculiar terrain of childhood? That for the one whose 
dreams are many but whose strata are few, Cinderella is true? For the unconscious is a 
“blind force” (MA, 14) with us from our passive origins, when a word was not easily 
assignable from inside the veils of our passage, and dream-work played with whatever 
arrived. So why would we not retain the capacity to use any audition as a means of 
displacement: to vent by the transference in texts? Further, it is a given of drive theory that 
excitation requires an outlet in motility, so we must keep libido circulating to be well (e.g., 
Freud, 1900b, 566; 1917b, 139; 1919[1918]a, 163). Thus, a highly intelligent child, 
traumatized into feeling «schizoïde,» who had lost the love of her life and then, in a move, 
lost the tethers leading back to her, would need just what reading could offer: a bridge 
between phantasy and reality upon the word, taught by a middling being who, by her role, 
linked those infant dreams to her new reality. Do we not start to feel here the restitution of a 
secure climate? At the very least, we certainly have grounds to ask, what is reading? 
Further, reality does arrive, so I muse about the role of the real parents as words echo 
in dreams. Dolto believes it is critical for children to be «alimenter en vocabulaire» (SS, 
194), fed words, especially if precociously intelligent. She relates how children need to 
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«têter des paroles» [breast-feed words] (SP1, 83); “drink the words of a new teacher” (CD, 
45); or “devour books” (ATP, 84; SP3, 47). After all, she says, the “gift of food is proof of 
love” (CE, 316), and the stories a mother tells are «lait culturel» [cultural milk] (JD, 281; 
SF, 88). She seems close to Schmideberg’s view, that absorbing knowledge corresponds to 
oral introjection (1930, 411); and to Strachey’s insight on the oral influence in metaphors for 
reading (1930, 324), such as “eating another person’s words” (Ibid, 326). So I pause among 
friends to daydream about how reading is, as it opens now, a feeding of oneself. In fact, 
Dolto states, every child needs to «s’automaterner dans les épreuves» [mother himself 
through trials] by age three (EM, 26; LO3, 65; TL, 51). On Dolto’s view, then, learning to 
read would mean psychical self-sufficiency—freedom—essentially, ‘auto-materning.’ 
Transferential colouring 
But as Freud advises, “let us stop and look back, and consider whether we have not 
overlooked something important on our way hither” (1900b, 511). For it was not her mother 
but her father to whom Dolto credits her «liberté de lecture» (EN, 80; Ribowski, 2004). Mlle 
was also key, as she let her plan her own education from her 7
th
 year of (home)schooling, 
giving her time to read (AI, 111; ES, 9). But as Hall (2009, 317) notes, it strikes any Dolto 
reader as a paradox that she valued literacy so highly, yet referenced virtually no one. The 
human defends his liberty since small (EM, 344), Dolto states, as liberty is what makes us 
human (SP2, 114). Liberty must “promise surprises…and allow refinding the self” (EF, 10); 
thus we must not restrict a child’s «liberté individuelle» (MA, 58). Freud places the 
transference in the service of free association, as Roudinesco says (1982, 55), and free 
association places words in the service of an “exteriorization that discharges anxiety” (JD, 
189). So in refusing to suggest readings (as analysis refuses suggestion), does Dolto carry 
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her conviction about freedom to its ethical end? And while Suzanne was a great reader (e.g., 
MF, 129), Dolto recalls talking about books only with Henry (AI, 116; EN, 81). He allowed 
her to read everything in his huge library other than Zola, that “chamber pot” (AI, 110; EN, 
80; Ribowski, 2004). Oddly, Zola’s «Une page d’amour» mentions rue Vineuse (Wikipédia, 
2014r)—something Dolto never notes, but that raises a somber question about Henry’s ban. 
As ever, it seems that the beloved lost nanny is still right here. 
So I take up the offer of strange play that inheres in that auspicious word, Vineuse: 
its near-homonym, ‘new life’—a word «mamaisé» in its time, now threatening the return the 
repressed (repressed because mamaisé?), silenced, perhaps deliberately. Just what is at stake 
in the free circulation of words in the social, anyhow? Evoking an archaic terrain, Dolto 
describes the social as «un champs d’écoute» [field of listening] for the “symbolic being” 
(SP1, 41), a «chemin d’écoute» [road of listening] in many directions (VO, 154) whereby 
the transference is diffused and diffracted (CD, 5-7, 196, 207 & 211; EN, 120). By simply 
communicating with other psyches, then, in what is the “greatest human pleasure” (JD, 286; 
Ribowski, 2004), we are naturally «renarcissiser» in society (SP3, 172). Her view endorses 
Freud’s that “outside analysis, it [the transference] must be regarded as the vehicle of cure 
and the condition of success” (1912a, 101). For the “wish-fulfilment’s power of 
representation is diffused over a certain sphere” (1900b, 562), Freud writes; likewise, the 
transference prefers our “diffuse general sensibility” (1900a, 35). Thus, the analyst listening 
for the work of the primary processes must be an attuned witness, freely «disponible» 
[available] (CD, 193f) through «attention flottante» (Ibid), Dolto states. And grounded in her 
conviction, she innovates a «mode de travail avec témoins» [work with witnesses] (CD, 5). 
This «coeur antique» [ancient choral] (QS, 11; also SP1, 49), “choral assistants” (JD, 168), 
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become “confounded” with her in “transferential colouring” (JD, 169). For the witnesses 
greet the child together (SP1, 49), then typically hold silent, taking notes as Dolto does. The 
witnesses are, of course, analytic trainees, doctors themselves, both learning and helping. 
Dolto’s application of diffusion is original, and her preference for this setting is at least 
partly accounted for by her belief that “humans have a caution against rooting themselves 
unsafely again and again” (DV, 66). Thus freely moving in the social, a wide field where the 
transference is diffused, “interrelations take you out of narcissism” (CE, 78), Dolto states, in 
a splendid tension whereby we are not just nurtured (renarcissisized) but also externalized.  
The enigma is left unresolved: “speech passes between us without us knowing how” 
(SP1, 114-5; also CE, 368). Dolto believes the transference happens even in sleep or a coma 
(SP1, 114-115), when we lack only the capacity to react (Ibid). And as it does, it heals (SP3, 
235), offering “fruit” (VO, 39). Her metaphor evokes a gift devoid of any predefined sender 
or addressee—a “stimulus from the transference” (Freud, 1919 [1918]a, 162)—in a strange 
exchange by association to unconscious material in the listener, a silent translation from one 
to another operating somewhere in the viscinity of language. As Roudinesco explains, for 
Freud, the transference is only a particular case of the displacement of affect (1982, 168). 
And just as the transference is rogue for space, so it is for time—anachronistic as a “transfer 
of energy” originally belonging to an unconscious wish (1900b, 594; also 1900b, 546, 562, 
589 & 596; 1900a, 141), that unpredictably repeats the past in the present (1914c, 151), as a 
“refinding” of lost objects (1905c, 222). As Dolto puts it: “every other is an object of 
transference from a location that is much more archaic” (SF, 208). Here is the social, then, 
as a hodgepodge of objects from different strata, vested or muted, until what finally appears 
as a “shared reality” is (even for adults) phantastically complex and idiosyncratically 
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textured. Dolto explains: the symbolic function, both atemporal and aspatial, secures our 
capacity to wake in others a “receptive sensory resonance attuned” to our own through a 
«simultanéité d’émotion» awakened by a «signal médiateur» that achieves «reconnaissance» 
[homonymically, ‘re-birth’] of a «semblable» [one similar], as the transference testifies to 
the “trial of separation being surmounted,” all this while consciousness is “not really awake” 
(DV, 158-161). Thus, while the transference is an intermediate region between illness and 
real life (Freud, 1914c, 154), Dolto compels the realization that we inhabit this intermediate 
region in perpetuity, as the transference quietly puts libido back into circulation (APP, 34; 
also MA, 148). Thereby, Dolto inadvertently ushers in a new theory of narrativity, as the 
social displaces affect haphazardly, and we each unconsciously seek the enigmatic 
resonances that hold the promise of our liberation. Through the transference, then, “humans 
are lured, more or less, towards a unity that never existed in body but that exists interpsychi- 
cally” (SS, 234), she believes, as “we give to one another the lure of the approval of 
jouissance as a consolation for our perpetual suffering” (SS, 234).  
Bain sonore 
Such are the «effets leurrants du transfert» (VC2, 762; also VC2, 678), enabling the 
“restitution of continuity” (SS, 146). Central to Dolto’s view is the archaic root of our 
unconscious securitization in a rhythm of presence and absence, a dream of discourse where 
our call is answered by an enigmatic, indissociable other. Thus born, we “lure each other to 
the present” (SS, 256; also ADO, 127; CD; 198; CE, 78; PS, 63-65; SS, 185; TL, 15) using 
an unconscious register that recalls (and thus returns) our originary safety, as we help each 
other out of “uncreative solitude” (PS, 54; also (DV, 117). Freud begins his own project 
thinking about how sound directs attention (1895, 367; 1916a, 68); and how key phrases can 
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provoke excitation (1900b, 497), or offer a passage for discharge (1895, 365-366). “Speech 
is thrown out so it can be taken up” (DW, 29), Dolto declares inimitably. Yet if her call 
sounds bold, its echo is exquisitely delicate. For in this return of archaic objects upon 
audition, by listening or reading, we will discover a movement sufficient to symbolize the 
promise of the other to follow, «un semblant de vent [wind]» (SP3, 13). With Dolto’s 
objects of transference, we are returned to the basic economics of drive theory—to a “need 
of transference on the part of repressed ideas” (Freud, 1900b, 563-564; 1905, 116) that is so 
critical that release can happen even under a “mild and unpronounced transference” (1914c, 
151). For the story of libido is simple at its core: insofar as humans are embodied subjects, 
venting is essential to regulating excitation (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 12, 325, 329, 
333 & 340). In Dolto’s words, our relations must manage «l’économie libidinale» towards 
«l’homéostatie» (PS, 64). Thus, the infant intuits that the «bain [bath] sonore du groupe», 
(JD, 270), the «bain de paroles» of the social, is a source of securitization (JD, 59; also CD, 
43), as auditory perceptions introduce reality (JD, 285) throughout his «acquisition de 
l’autonomie» (DV, 157). To emphasize, psychical development begins in a ‘language bath.’ 
Needless to say, wild transference makes wild things happen. I take but one example 
from Dominique, whose sessions started in the summer of 1962, five years after Mlle died—
a span and season recalling learning to read—and six months after Suzanne died. 
Dominique’s uncle, like «Oncle Pierre», is «perdu dans les montagnes» [lost/killed] (CD, 
113). Also coincidentally, 1962 marks Algeria’s independence (Berkley, n.d.), though he 
doesn’t mention it. But I pause first to note that in Babouches, “The three steers,” features 
the boy named Abd-Allah, the picture of the donkey, and a red steer sold to help widows 
(Balesta, 1894, 135-160). Dominique draws «chameaux» [camels; but also ‘cat word’] (CD, 
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61), and makes a clay model he calls a «nomade» pulling a «vache» [cow] he calls «Mlle» 
(CD, 61). He explains how the cow was sold (CD, 98), and “has just awakened from 
dreaming it belonged to a nomad” (CD, 60). Then, in two consecutive sessions, Dominique 
tells this story, ostensibly about «Fifi Brin d’Acier» (Pippi Longstocking) (CD, 48-54): ‘He’ 
had red hair, and his/her mother died when ‘she’ was a baby. She did a lot of nonsense…She 
had red hair and she put on the high heeled-shoes of her mother…She left…and when she 
knew her friends cried, she wanted to stay…the boy said, I will keep this one [red pup], but 
the father sent it away.” How have the lost nanny, Mlle and Babouches been displaced from 
Dolto’s archaic history to Dominique’s phantasies? Small wonder it is a problem if an 
analyst takes members of the same family, as Laforgue had with Phillip (his uncanny 
nickname, «Fifi»), for siblings “encounter themselves as twins,” as Dolto puts it (SP1, 31; 
SP3, 179). Dolto’s spectacular narrative of the transference—and the fact she herself never 
draws conscious attention to it—poses vibrant questions about the “production of common 
means” (Freud, 1905c, 183), about the how of the transference. Roudinesco believes Freud’s 
exposition of the transference is an “epistemological and theoretical act as important as the 
discovery of the unconscious” (1982, 168). And as I believe we begin to grasp, the 
transference and the unconscious testify for each other. By now, I offer that we should also 
understand, with Freud, that the chief “characteristic of libido is mobility, the facility with 
which it passes from one object to other” (1940[1939], 151); that “mediating ideas” are 
needed (1900a, 235); and that words serve as “nodal points” (1896a, 198f), enabling affect 
and ideas to “call up the other” (1900a, 236)—even if we can’t always figure out how 
bridging happens since “the tertium comparationis often eludes us” (Freud, 1913, 177). 
Dolto’s most significant contribution, I submit, is precisely here, in articulating the common 
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means: “words are the mediators between the unconscious of the patient and the 
unconscious of analyst,” she states (AI, 220; Ribowski, 1987), «objets transitionnels 
subtiles» (SP3, 128). Yet as we explore the “mediating object’s role in bringing affect to 
consciousness” (APP, 37), we will need a loose notion of the word: “what is needed are 
verbal signifiers, not always a hearable spoken language, but a code of relations between 
two subjects” (PJ, 93). Not necessarily words, nor language, nor hearable, our relations are 
nonetheless verbal, as sounds and phonemes are subject to dream-work. But how?  
Archaic phonemes 
By a vigorous walk in archaic woods, then, we are returned to the phoneme. A 
“selection of cries valorizes mother tongue” (JD, 251), as “archaic phonemes [are] taken up, 
or not in the mother tongue” (SS, 37), as it is learned sometime during the “suffering of 
dentition” (MA, 28-29), after weaning (IIC, 102). We should be attentive to the pain 
coinciding with the “vocal and auditory selection coupled with mimicry” of the «langue dite 
maternelle» [tongue said to be maternal] (JD, 251; also LF, 112). For ‘the mother tongue’ 
arrives on an auditory scene of long duration rooted in a perfect wish, as “libido weaves with 
the body, being of the order of language” (SF, 334)—where, since the onset of audition,“the 
mother tongue produce[s] its own history in a perfectly natural, autistic, and domestic 
manner” (Derrida, 1967b, 62). Archaic history is thus a phantastic play with bodily sounds 
and phonemes arriving in difference, repetition and affect in a dream of discourse rooting 
our security. Thus, the infant is already the “translation of a subject” (SS, 210; also IIC, 246 
& 275), emerging from a phantastic prehistory with words. From here, he slowly begins an 
«apprentissage verbal» in the «habitus physiologique» of his group’s code (JD, 287; VC2, 
702), as his relations are “unconsciously mediated by the first humans who welcome him” 
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(SS, 117), and he adjusts to “this spoken or secret discourse going on prior to [his] arrival” 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1964/2010, 326), ergo learning ‘the mother’s tongue.’ 
The child needs maternal mediation for all that is new (LO1, 145), Dolto states, as 
what is «mamaïsé» delivers securitizing continuity (EM, 191). Thus, the mother tongue (if 
all goes well) offers «mamaïsation sécurisante» (LO3, 48), as unconscious affect is invested 
on the phonemes of our individual prehistory. Here, Dolto quietly theorizes an origin for 
projection, while also presaging the value of old literature, maps, inscriptions and 
dictionaries (words of elders). For as the mother tongue offers mediating objects and the 
unconscious recognition of similitude, the mother facilitates libidinal displacements offering 
abundant associations on a field of archaic phonemes—a transferential harvest. On Dolto’s 
view, then, the loss of access to the mother (or a beloved nanny) would diminish this luring 
to reality through a reduced audition of archaic phonemes, hence slow or stall 
presentification. And wherever we place our feet on this new terrain of thought, Freud’s 
river runs. Freud describes how the preconscious comes about by thing-presentations being 
hyper-cathected through links with word-presentations (1915, 207-208; also 1896e, 232), 
and how dreams use residues of verbal presentations (1900a, 49). It naturally follows, then, 
that the phonemes of the mother tongue will become remnants of the day for dream-work, 
and be richly cathected with libido. “Transference uses the mother tongue” (SP1, 120), 
Dolto states, which is why adults in analysis dream in their mother tongue (Ibid), and an 
analyst needs to speak to a child using archaic phonemes (Ibid). We should understand 
better now why an anamnesis is so critical for Dolto, as unconsciously invested phonemes 
are idiosyncratic. For example, we learn that Mlle (photos: AI, 63 & 97; VC1, 23)—dearly 
loved and “never mean” (AI, 114)—was from Luxembourg (VC1, 23f), so spoke German on 
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their walks, reciting German poetry (ATP, 86). Thus, Dolto’s prehistory of affects arises in a 
confluence of German, French and English, as her archaic phonemes become entirely 
unfathomable—unique and unrepeatable. Besides, “the child’s phonemes may not have 
sense for us,” (LF, 283) she explains, and “under the same words, people have different 
experiences” (DW, 22; also VC2, 844). Thus, in Dolto’s notion of the phoneme as a 
mediating object for the transference inheres a profound regard for all that is individual in 
the notion of liberty—unique and idiosyncratic to each human being’s archaic prehistory.15 
Affective truth 
In fact, “syllabic chemistry” (1900a, 297f) is also central to Freud’s project. 
Beginning in 1891, Freud describes the word as a thing, an object of dreaming (1891/2011, 
77; also Ibid, 36-37 & 83; 1900a, 295-297 & 303; 1900b, 340); and he shares a very rich 
example from Maury (1878), of a dream on “lo,” with kilometres, kilograms, Gilolo, 
Lobelia, Lopez, and lotto (1900a, 59). Freud believes dream-work has a “susceptibility to 
homonyms” (1900a, 59f & 320; 1900b, 596; 1905a, 99), as words serve as intermediate 
links, bridges or switches in displacing affect (e.g., 1900a, 177, 206 & 295; 1900b, 339, 375 
& 605; 1901b, 30f, 58 & 109; 1905a, 65f, 90 & 105f; etc.). Dreams also engage in “auditory 
hallucinations” (1900a, 32 & 49-50), that “rediscover suggestion” (1917c, 446 & 451), 
working to get power over displacement (1900b, 567; also 1914c, 150; 1917c, 290)—just 
like “corroborative dreams” follow the analyst’s suggestion (1911a, 95). And this inimitable, 
idiosyncratic weaving of phonemes, dream-work, hallucination and suggestion is exactly 
what is at play in Dolto’s highly productive notion of  ‘presentification.’ 
Homophones are very rich (DQ, 21), Dolto concords, and believing in the 
unmitigated force of the unconscious, she is informed by them continuously: the «nez» 
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[nose; a homonym of ‘born’] is critical to narcissistic libido (SF, 320-321); and the analyst 
needs to search «sous terre…sous taire» [homonym: ‘under ground/hush’] (CE, 340; DQ, 
21; Ribowski, 2004). In a letter re a colleague’s young patient named Clément, Dolto 
explores his name, «clé ment» [key lies] (VC2, 482); in another letter, she muses that a 
child’s regression may be rooted in his believing his name, «Romain,» as a near-homonym 
of «gros main,» ‘big hand,’ suggests inability (VC2, 808). A 12-year-old at Trousseau 
ashamed of his father, a «boxeur» [fighter], is deemed to behave like a «boxeur» [dog] (SP3, 
183); the «épicerie» [grocery store] in a child’s drawing is read for its carry of «pisse» [pee] 
(APP, 32); and she reiterates that reading as an act cannot be understood without considering 
the homonymy of «lit» [read] and «lis» [bed] (ES, 19; VC2, 876; 1979b, 17 & 21). 
Phonemes root words in an enigmatic “biological, affective truth” (CE, 41) that informs her 
emphasis on speaking truth to children. The resulting «justesse» of words (TL, 175) returns 
Freud’s “similarity between the stimulus and content of dream” (1900a, 24). And as stimuli 
may be misunderstood in a dream (Freud, 1900a, 221), literality heralds the suffering that 
marks the dreamer’s encounter with reality. In her keen witnessing of childhood, Dolto even 
remembers the first time she noticed this phenomenon, when WWI ended in 1918, and she 
paraded with her family down avenue «Terne» [dull, drab], only to discover that it was 
actually “full of colour” (EN, 36-37). Here is the phoneme in, and as, autobiography. 
Dolto’s musing puts her in concert with two peers to whom she never actually speaks: 
Klein, for whom “when it comes to the unconscious, there is no difference between adults 
and children” (Britzman, 2003, 63); and Isaacs, who believes the inner world of the mind 
has a continuous living reality necessary to reality thinking (1948, 81; also Ibid, 94 & 96). 
The unconscious play arriving in random auditory encounters, to which Dolto draws 
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attention, suggests not only children are context-bound, inviting our play with the fact that 
Derrida, who also walked Saint-Jacques for 40 years, brings such corroborating dreams: “the 
phoneme…is the phenomenon of the labyrinth,” (1973, 104), “hallucination of a language 
determined on basis of the word or of verbal representation” (1978, 213), the “hidden 
resource of homonymie” (1993, 61), a «homonymie contagieuse» (2003a, 39) enabling 
«transferts homonymiques» (1986b, 193f) that “simultaneously impose themselves…«sens 
blanc, sang blanc, sans blanc, cent blancs, semblant» [white sense/direction, white blood, 
without white, one hundred whites, pretense] (1972/1987, 40), effecting a “parody 
(«simulacre») of the same word subterraneously” (1986b, 47). The phoneme entails a 
“disposition to transference” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 498), as idiosyncratic pre-
histories of audition retain the capacity to convey affect, and place itself has its say. So 
while De Saussure pleaded, “we must avoid speaking of the phonemes that make up the 
words” (1959/1974, 66), in fact, «phonocentrisme» is universal (Derrida, 2002/2008, 461; 
1995b, 135), abounding in the most archaic languages, as in the “dense, rampant 
homophony” in Chinese (Tan & Perfetti, 1998, 37 & 40). Thus, catachresis is installed deep 
inside language, as the phoneme troubles the word with the ethical claim to a narrative 
revolt from the unconscious that is not only possible but inevitable, and we meet the 
impossibility of saturating meaning. Such is the “fort-da game by which we enter language” 
(JD, 7; SS, 220), Dolto states, as the child “plays with words” (VC2, 808)—metonyms, 
metaphors, differences and displacements (VC2, 702). It is a “game of forces” (MA, 16 & 
165), as “narcissizing phantasms play their structuring game” (VC2, 457), and the “symbolic 
function is in play, constantly keeping watch over the child” (JD, 292). Thus, in Dolto’s 
theorizing-by-witnessing, and via uncanny echoes from one who shared her geography, we 
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locate the question of our primordial education: “Is there a degree of uncertainty we can play 
with?” (Britzman, 2010). For very early on indeed, Dolto discovers that this «jeu de forces» 
with phonemes assists our hard transition to reality, as we seek “precious compensations” in 
language for the loss of «jouissance» (DW, 36; VC1, 542), and “hidden phonemes bring 
narcissistic joy” (SP2, 177). After all, the “opposite of play is what is real,” Freud reminds 
us (1908a, 144). With Dolto, then, phonemes become a gift in a passive register, returning 
security by representing the wish as “fulfilled in a hallucinatory fashion” (Freud, 1913, 171; 
also 1900b, 566-568; 1901a, 647), as “consolations” (Freud, 1908b, 231). Further, as we 
“only [ever] exchange one thing for another” (Freud, 1908a, 145), since unconscious wishes 
are always active and cannot be influenced (Freud, 1900b, 553; 1909/2001, 53), reality must 
promise phantasy. Thus the transference is a powerful, continuously possible means 
whereby the “ill can repair itself naturally” (PJE, 99).  
And so, by turning in circles, we somehow arrive somewhere new where now we can 
hear what whispers unceasingly across Dolto’s landscape: a rare narration of oral passivity. 
Right from her dissertation, Dolto describes the libidinal passive mode as essential to social 
adaptation (MA, 266; also MA 89, 106 & 109), for oral passivity serves the «principe de 
plaisir» (MA, 253), and «fantasmes autoérotiques hallucinatoires» return the subject to oral 
passivity where, though unable to communicate with the outside world, he is securitized 
(MA, 29-30). Still in 1939, Dolto describes the role of «pulsions passives séductrices» (MA, 
91), as the subject unconsciously “attracts those who protect” him (MA, 112); registers 
everything arriving (MA, 109); and «attend ardemment» [ardently waits] (MA, 114). In 
sum, she believes “passivity exists” (VC2, 296; also SF, 305) and we should value the 
passive in a child (ES, 26), for passive pulses foster intense intellectual activity and 
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receptivity (ES, 14; SP1, 114). In describing passivity as a powerful and continuous 
resource, I offer Dolto follows Freud closely: his “quiescent cathexis” as energy inherent in 
the unconscious wish (1900b, 594), and instincts with a passive aim (1913, 181; also 1912a, 
107). She also prefigures Isaacs’s superb portrait of the child content in phantasy until the 
external world “forces itself upon his attention” (1948, 93). Even in De Saussure, the 
“passivity of speech is first its rapport with language” (Derrida, 1967b, 99). And as De 
Saussure himself says, every language has a fixed number of phonemes (1959/1974, 34) 
subject to “passive agglutination” (Ibid, 176-177); and resonance characterizes phonemes by 
absence as well as presence (Ibid, 43)—fort-da—play at the origins of affective security. 
Presentification 
In fact, we have just re-found an old question about how a subject of the passive 
pulses, secure in autoerotic hallucination, ‘ardently waiting,’ ever emerges from a closed 
monad. Dolto’s theorization begins with time itself: the «présent» is “now and a gift” (IIC, 
93). Yet unsaid, a «présent» is a gift only in English, or in archaic or literary French—not in 
standard French, where the right word is «cadeau.» In turn, a «fête» [party; homonymically, 
‘what is done or made’]—wherein of note, presents normally arrive—is “liberty in security” 
(EF, 9), a “scansion of time” (EF, 18), and an «éruption du gratuit» [what is free] (ATP, 
210; EF, 25; PJE, 59; VC1, 416). I play now with the uncertainty that opens. For “the child 
is always in the present” (LO1, 100; VC2, 808), Dolto notes, and “the present is rooted in 
repeated exchanges with same person” (JD, 251). Further, “audition exists in utero, not 
sight,” so «conditions de présence et d’absence…dépendend(ent) de l’audition seule» (VC2, 
329; also JD, 277). On Dolto’s view, then, a beneficent arrival initiates a desire to follow 
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onto the landscape of reality—the same process by which invested absence (suffering) 
nurtures phantasies we follow in reverse, to archaic landscapes, into dream-time:  
On «les avenues de langage» conjugated with the knowing and the «reconnaissance» 
[recognition; homonymically, ‘rebirth’] of the self and the other elected as co-being 
of pleasure…whose absence arouses his research…are supports for the 
«présentification» of the other in space and time, the other momentarily absent 
whose objects are a co-existential having(ness) of security in the solitude of the baby 
separated from the tutelary being he knows, and representatives of subtle  
communication, albeit lured (PS, 21-22). 
 
In swirls more apt to a river, Dolto alludes to how the “thing and representation of a thing 
are equivalent for the primitive psyche as the object perceived and invested in its absence” 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 415). Coming full circle, then, dreams depend on waking 
life (Freud, 1900a, 19, 26, 39, 174 & 228; 1909b, 35), while associations in reality depend 
on first being dreamed (Freud, 1900a, 206). Yet Dolto is unselfconscious about how her 
phrase, ‘avenues of language,’ not only recalls the first time she noticed suggestion on 
invested phonemes, but is also a priceless example: «a venue» being, in archaic French, 
‘he/she/it arrived.’ The archaic is an odd landscape where our «attention flottante» helps, 
while our eyes confound us. For around the corner is Henri Paté, Dolto’s home from 1937—
at number 13, with Laforgue at number 8 (De Sauverzac, 1993, 91)—a five-minute walk 
from Oliver Freud’s (in 1933), at 36 rue George Sand (E.L.Freud, 1970, 54). As with 
Derrida, autobiographies do not appear crossed; yet Laforgue analysed Oliver’s daughter, 
Eva, in the Midi in 1934-1938, the same years Dolto was in analysis, walking the same trails 
(Geni.com, 2015; Systemique.be, n.d.). Henri Paté is itself a strange address: one, the name 
of her father and grandfather, and homonymically, «en rit» [within laugh], as-if signed by 
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the pleasure principle; the other, humorously suggesting ‘food of the father.’  Here is a 
radical education where the nature of knowledge changes, and the last dreams of our walk 
begin. 
“If a father is absent, the analyst must make him present in words” (CD, 197), for 
words return “the reparative object” (DQ, 196; PJE, 15), as Dolto’s «repère» arrives like a 
transferential burst at the end of analysis. The father is discontinuous (CE, 27, 29 & 172; 
EM, 63), one who goes and returns (TL, 141) and takes his value from «l’attente» [waiting] 
(SP2, 126)—homonymy evoking all that is latent in psychical life in utero, and the invested 
absence by which a passive being engages a phantasy of projection on a filiation of 
testimony. With Dolto, a father in reality is merely a «prête-nom» [lend-name] (ATP, 126; 
ES, 9) relative to the archaic pre-symbolic father of the original transference situation 
securing indestructible wishes. Thus, Dolto rejects Lacan’s ‘foreclosure’ of the father: “I do 
not believe it is true,” she says, since “you can «déforclore» him” (DW, 99):  
[We help a patient] to become conscious that the father who engendered him is 
always in him and totally integral (intact) (DW, 99)…without that, he would not be 
living (DW, 104)…. The one who represents the model for his development is taken 
for the father, but he is not. He is only a resonator of the father that each one of us 
has in us (DW, 142). 
 
On this perennially viable, pre-symbolic father rests Dolto’s deep belief that any child can 
«autopaterner» by five or six (EM, 26; LO3, 65; SP2, 14), being “auto-directed without 
being dependent on his mother or father…. as a sort of dialectic will structure his person” 
(SP2, 115). All we need is the transference available in the open circulation of language, 
including texts—as free associations in reading, «relations épistolaires,» are “sufficient for 
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the function of the symbolic father” (QS, 36)—returning venting despite our (perhaps 
pathological) relations of dependency. The notions of an indestructible archaic father and of 
reparation via diffuse transference guide Dolto’s work with even the most traumatized 
infant, one «sans désirs associés, sans repères» (SP3, 71; also 1977/1998, 81). Such is the 
economic role of the word, as the transference liberates affects in the social. So health 
requires refinding in the present objects of the archaic transference situation: phonemes. 
Hence, even the child deprived of the transferential harvest can find enough to eat. 
Voies subtiles 
Yet unlike tireless Dolto, her reader begins to feel dizzy on the unstable landscape, 
as-if reading about presentification oddly transmits the feeling of fragile subjectivity at the 
blurry edge of reality (where is the subject?)—while images move, but we don’t quite know 
how. And as I daydream about how this chapter’s journey began with Babouches, a random 
«présent» arrives in echoes of «parlai vrai.» For its homonym, «par livret» [by the book] 
returns reading, as seemingly discontinuous ideas achieve unity unpredictably. More sense 
comes in irony, too, as Dolto was never by the book but absolutely unique. Thus my research 
itself seems subject to passive pulses, as I wait ardently and play with whatever arrives in 
sufficient quanta to be discernable to my attention. Theorizing that experience, Dolto 
narrates how repeated phonemes from idiosyncratic, unconscious prehistories are invested 
with affect, becoming lures to reality, thus making words mediating objects for the 
transference. And in the process of distancing from the enigmatic witness in an indissociable 
elsewhere, reality is engaged only if it is good-enough—in offering a confirmation (the 
arrival of what is dreamt) or consolation (an unexpected ‘present’). Critically, in this gradual 
process of presentification, reading and hearing are equally usable sources of audition. Dolto 
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also reveals how the transference disregards space-time, using passive pulses that predate 
consciousness and thrive outside its control. In turn, the transference facilitates structuration 
if phonemes are associated with good-enough affect (dream continuity); or destructuration, 
if phonemes are associated with anxiety (dream discontinuity). Dolto’s is indeed a very 
complex corpus fusing life and work, wherein I believe we cannot grasp what she theorizes 
so originally (and subtly) without applying that very same theory. Further, by enigmatically 
learning about the transference in transference, a vital truth emerges: all that is new in Dolto, 
her genius, comes from all that is old in her. For Dolto fully taps her archaic inheritance in 
her witnessing, and so I agree with Lacan that she really does give good gifts (VC2, 422), of 
which the transformative experience of reading her is not the least. Dolto will actually make 
her way to Morocco in 1933, with a five-year plan to study medicine there (VC1, 356). But 
after a «féerie de 12 jours» [12-day fairy tale] (VC1, 369), as her father calls it, she returns 
to Paris. A decade later, in 1943, a charming photograph shows her first-born, Jean, nine 
months old, dressed in a homemade tunic and turban, the caption reading, «un prince 
asiatique faisant [taking] une promenade incognito» (AI, 178). So it is that lost stories 
tendering their truth in childhood become cryptic maps for an inimitable «chemin parcouru» 
[road travelled] (IIC, 275), each human’s unique traverse on the terrain of biography, where 
the transference transects on «voies subtiles» (IIC, 69) [subtle routes; homonymically, 
‘subtle voices’]. Thus, through coalescing notions of associative pathways, as I invest 
Dolto’s texts with promise, one thing leads to another—though I can never say exactly how.  
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Chapter Five: Society & Interdiction 
Abstract: In this chapter, I follow the wild transference of invested phonemes in Dolto’s 
public legacy. I find echoes of her prehistory with words in her social projects, such as her 
radio programs and «Maison Vertes.» I demonstrate the importance she gives to speaking in 
liberating unconscious affect, and how this theoretical stance informs her construct of 
symbolic castration, her inroads on identification, her clinical attitude, her tireless efforts to 
teach, and her radical views on education. I observe her originality and, with it, her 
susceptibility to criticism for unconventionality. With Dolto, I show how transference 
mediates structuration as translation in the après-coup of libidinal history. 
 
The route named translation remains as improbable as an accident, though intensely 
dreamed…Fable that you can retell as the gift of the poem…You will hear beneath this word 
the shore of the departure, as well as the referent towards which a translation carries itself 
(Jacques Derrida, 1992, 305). 
 
Françoise Dolto recalls the end of WWI as an inflation of the senses—«a fièvre de 
vivre» [fever of living]—though she missed the Armistice Parade, watching out the window 
as her parents took her older siblings and the ladder (ATP, 43; EN, 36; LF, 273). She credits 
her love of a new commodity, radio, to her father, who sent her to “hear what was new,” 
including Branly’s conference on «transfert sans fil» [wireless] (ATP, 31 & 43; EN, 81; 
Wikipédia, 2015c). Using tips in the «Petit Sans-Filiste,» she made her own crystal radio by 
age eight, and she taught herself the «ti.ti.ti.» with her Larousse (ATP, 31 & 42; EN, 74-75 
& 115; VC1, 167). Back in 1914, she had learned war was “declared” by reading a notice 
board in Deauville (AI, 66). Now, translating Morse, she told her family news—“She’s 
crazy! She’s dreaming!”—yet the next day, the papers confirmed it (LF, 273). After Morse, 
Dolto notes, time was added, then music, as she imagined sound rippling across space like a 
«caillou» [pebble] in water, and English signals from America faded and returned (ATP, 32-
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33, 41 & 49; EN, 74-76; VC1, 154). The world opened after 8 pm, “bringing people not 
there before,” like the voice of beloved Radiolo, and songs from the «Chat Noir» [black cat] 
and «Lapin Agile» [agile rabbit], cabarets in Montmartre (ATP, 33 & 42; EN, 75; Radiola, 
n.d.; Wikipédia, 2015b & 2015g). Movingly, she adds that radio in 1920 offered «du vivant 
de Jacqueline» [what was living] (EN, 75). For her pretty sister, who loved dances and 
celebrated the Armistice at 16, was dead by then, departing at 18, the same age as the Irish 
nanny who so loved Paris nights, whose name was already lost (EN, 106-108). Dolto’s 
parents kept secret that Jacqueline was dying (even from her) for 18 months, inscribing a 
“hidden drama”—and dead, her name was banned (ATP, 74; EN, 106-108). But in the 
consolation of dance music, can we not hear two losses echo jointly? Ahead to 1947, soon 
after the near-death of Dolto’s infant, Catherine (AI, 183; C.Dolto, 2005), Nicole asks her 
mother to make a «poupée-fleur» with the head of a rabbit, after hesitating between a cat or 
rabbit; in parentheses, Dolto notes Bernadette also recently drew a rabbit (JD, 142 & 156). 
Do we not hear an odd echo, in two animals among so many, of Dolto’s new grief reopening 
old chasms? And in this fleeting «transfert» of the «transfert-sans-fil,» we encounter 
interdiction: that potent tension between what is spoken, the «nom dit» [noun/name said]; 
and its ironic, homonymic reversal, what is prohibited, the «non-dit» [unsaid]. For in the 
broadcast transits the silent paradox of historicization: we release and retain all that is loved.  
Docteur X 
Forward 20 years to 1969, and Dolto is Docteur X in a phone-in radio program—
«S.O.S.Psychanalyste!»—30 years after declining radio in 1939 (Frémeaux & Guéno, 2006; 
Vasquez, 1976; VC2, 25).
16
 As Dolto insisted on anonymity, a text assembling its 187 
programs does not even bear her name (Vasquez, 1976). Medical colleagues complained to 
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Europe 1 about her free advice—but the real reason, she offers, is that it was painful to listen 
to the children (D&R, 35). A decade on, in 1976-1978, Dolto returns to radio, in her name, 
for «Lorsque l’enfant paraît» [when the child appears] on France-Inter (D&R, 34). Subject 
to wide coverage, its content proliferated (e.g., LO1, LO2, LO3; Marc-Pezet, 2004; VC2, 
192-193 & 197). Parents wrote letters of at least five pages—many were helped just by that, 
Dolto notes (D&R, 36; DW, 154-155; Nobécourt & Simonetta, 1978). Dolto then carefully 
chose letters for the program with her daughter, who recalls it as a rich collaboration (Dolto-
Tilitch, 1998). Thus was psychoanalysis put in service of a whole society (AI, 228-229; 
Delphine, 2008; Nobécourt & Simonetta, 1978). Dolto reports great anxiety before agreeing 
to the show (D&R, 34; DW, 152). For at stake was a complex history: after the evacuation 
of children from Paris in 1940, she saw 60 a day for treatment, and radio was a chance to 
help these kids, adults now, with their own (Nobécourt, 2008a). But children listened too, 
like Sophie Chérer (2008), who shares how it supported her. Thus Dolto became as loved as 
Radiolo. Yet the reader cannot help hearing, in her history with radio, the Second World 
War as an echo of the First. Can history be thought, then, as ‘editions of the transference’? 
With Dolto, as Farley writes of Winnicott, psychoanalysis develops alongside the 
wireless (2012, 449). Thus, radio propels Dolto—«freudienne» above all (Golder, 2002b, 
122)—to the “center of a dramatic French infatuation with Freud” (Turkle, 1995). France 
becomes the country with the most analysts in the world (Roudinesco, in Coronel & 
Mezamat, 1997c)—Dolto, its most popular analyst (Psychoanalytikerinnen, 2013). Hers is 
truly an «immense héritage» (Berger, 2006) transecting her society, as hundreds of places 
are named after her: streets, gardens, libraries, schools, even a star (Fédération Nationale du 
Patrimoine, 1988). The web is flooded with Dolto blogs and citations (e.g., Faye, 2008; 
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Freixa, n.d.). An American film festival showing «Le désir de vivre» (2008) declares Dolto 
“invented psychoanalysis for children” (Leonard, 2009); while the movie, The Class, is set 
at College Dolto (Cantet, 2008; Hamelin, 2011b). There are publications by non-specialists, 
and tributes by famous persons (e.g., Chapsal, 1994); even a well-researched work that 
places Dolto with Hannah Arendt, Marie Curie, and Eleanor Roosevelt (Adler et al, 2006). 
Dolto is as likely to be talked about in «Télérama» (Portevin, 2008, 40) as she is by 
Roudinesco, who notes her “fantastic optimism and vitality” (Ina.fr, 1988). Known above all 
for her “utter respect for the autonomy and intelligence of the child” (Reeves, 2010, 318), 
this “great woman of her time” (Ribowski, 2004) still met ordinary visitors, like a Canadian 
who recalls, “After meeting Madame Dolto, we don’t listen to a child or speak to him as we 
did before” (Camaraire-Santoire, 1983, 81). Yet while Gallimard (2015) has 51 active Dolto 
titles and Seuil (2015) has 28, unpublished materials fill the «Archives Françoise Dolto».
17
 
And though Dolto has the same volume of works as Klein, Lacan or Winnicott (about 400), 
and is translated into more languages (about 20), she has only one-quarter their library 
holdings (Worldcat Identities, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c & 2015d).
18 
More perplexing, a 
scholarly Dolto dictionary omits the «phonème» (Ledoux, 2006). It is as if no matter what is 
present of Dolto, there is always more is in reserve. And while famous for her off-the-cuff 
“humour and auto-derision” (Grellet & Kruse, 2004, 142), her writing is “difficult for its 
density” (Halmos, 2000, 34). Thus Dolto’s words late in life are prophetic: “I am beginning 
to be a bit known” (in D’Ortoli & Amran, 1990, 28). Perhaps a simple reader says it best: 
“She gave me a love of my own human condition” (‘IC’ in Gauthier, 1995, 246). Or little 
Justine, who holds her new mother’s pen, as they sign adoption papers together (Coronel & 
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Mezamat, 1997c). For this is «l’héritage Dolto»: “human dignity is a precocious sentiment” 
(IIC, 265).  
Of course, her project carries liabilities, too. Foremost is a vain search by some for a 
debt to Lacan (e.g, Guillerault, 2003; Ribas, 2006, 24; Sudaka-Bénazéraf, 1987/2012, 26-27; 
see Note 2). Dolto can also seem more religious than she was, simply for being “comfortable 
within the tradition of Catholic moral philosophy,” as Turkle (1995) notes (e.g., Binet, 1999; 
Guillerault, 2012; Dolto & Severin, 1977, 1978, 1979). Her marketability is exploited, with 
catch-phrases like «doltomania» and «enfants-rois» [baby kings], as her project is 
“gadgetized because it disturbs” (Halmos, 2000, 35). Oddly enough, another Kathleen from 
Quebec City becomes Dolto’s official biographer in 2004, but the project just vanishes (AI, 
188; Beuve-Méry, 2008; Kelley-Lainé, 1997). True, Dolto’s generosity in giving interviews 
at 78 (on an oxygen tank) was not always to her advantage, and she could be “naïve,” her 
daughter admits (AI, 14). But supporters note how she is labelled ‘crazy’ or a ‘witch’ by 
peers (Yannick, 1999a, 34)—deemed, as Roudinesco puts it, “too charismatic” (1999, 186), 
with “too much intuition and not enough method” (1986, 496). ‘Witch,’ is a telling epithet, 
suggesting Dolto is branded by her work on the archaic, provoking an «interdit» of its own. 
What else explains, against all evidence, the vehemence of the comment that Dolto had “a 
reputation far beyond her own historical importance” (Geissmann, 1988, 293)? 
Roudinesco believes Dolto never understood the hate she aroused (1986, 657), yet 
Dolto’s own theorization offers a full explanation. First, hate is a dynamic that originates in 
fear and functions as a “translation” of suffering (DW, 123 & 139; LF, 20). Society needs 
those who can tolerate hate, since hate is not the opposite of love—indifference is (DW, 
140; 1988a, 218). Thus, hate is comprehensible. We find further inroads in her work on 
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«jalousie du puiné» [younger]. For Roudinesco thinks Dolto “incites a re-interrogation of the 
archaic” (1986, 518), and as Dolto says simply, “jealousy of the younger is actually a 
regression” (SP3,176).“Listening about regression regresses listeners and incites defenses,” 
she explains, against an «intrusion énigmatique» that tempts destructuration, being an 
identification offering a «danger d’involution» (JD, 49-50 & 124-126: SS, 13). And as 
regression returns the pre-symbolic father prior to reality, “humans are jealous of those who 
don’t need a mother or father to be happy” (SP1, 18; TL, 130). Are not Dolto’s statements 
an entirely new sound arriving from someone who was not present before on our side of the 
English Channel? Thus, the difficulty with Dolto is not merely in translating her from 
French to English (or any other language), but in translating her non-temporal material into 
temporality. The work is akin to deciphering dots-and-dashes, an as-if «rhythme binaire,» as 
we make ourselves available for endless echoes in Dolto’s wildly busy social oeuvre, and for 
affect arriving in all directions via that most archaic conduit, the «transfert,» in her 
transmission of an archaic prehistory that is not, and yet is, spoken. 
Libidinal life 
Dolto kept up a dazzling conference pace, from Geneva in 1936 (VC1, 508), to 
Canada in 1983 (VC2, 859). She held seminars at the EFP in 1971 (VC2, 495), while 600 
attended the «Institut Océanographique» in 1972 (VC2, 523-524)—two granting university 
credits (VC2, 732)—and 400 were registered at the «Institut National des Sourds» [Deaf] in 
1981 (VC2, 698). There were waiting lists for her training clinics, prompting Grignon to 
jokingly offer to be her driver just to attend, believing she “pushed furthest the place of 
trauma in psychogenesis” (2002, 37; VC1, 557-559). From bed in her last weeks, she still 
read manuscripts sent to her (C. Dolto, 1989, 9; C. Dolto in Yannick, 1999a, 5); and she 
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collaborated intensely with her daughter to help adolescents and families with infants (F. 
Dolto & C. Dolto-Tilitch, 1989; C. Dolto & C. Faure-Poirée, 2008; also C. Dolto, 2007), 
covering everything from incest to fetal audition of “the rumour of the world” (C. Dolto, 
1985, 37). Even her husband’s book on kinesitherapy concludes, “It is in speech that the true 
relation is effected” (B. Dolto, 1976, 356)! And there are elusive legacies, too, like Anna 
Freud’s reading of two Dolto papers Spitz sent her in 1949 (VC2, 174; papers: JD, 96-132; 
EM, 63-72 & 94-107); and Dolto’s support of the next generation of analysts, like Aulagnier 
(1975/2001) and Mannoni (1965), with whom she was in regular contact (e.g., D&R, 24; 
PM, 9; VC2, 465, 486 & 585). Yet months before dying, Dolto insisted: “Remember, I don’t 
have any students!” (De Mezamat, 2008c; also, D&R, 33). In fact, she is right. For thirty 
years on, there is no following for Dolto, as for Lacan or Klein—and rare adjectivisation, 
«doltoïenne» (Guillerault, 2002, 1). There are, instead, innumerable minds worldwide 
inspired by Dolto, in the absence of any prescription for ‘doing Dolto.’ It is as if the teaching 
by which she encourages a return to the archaic acts on her society of readers and listeners, 
and emerging from their encounter, they each take unique, unpredictable paths. In sum, 
Dolto does not inspire adhesion—but she did not wish to: “If to live well we had to identify 
with our parents…we would still be Cro-Magnons” (1983). For a child who always wants to 
please his parents and thinks they are correct is in bad health (EM, 21), as imitation is 
“simian” and “inhuman” (CE, 330-331; EF, 31; EM, 175; JD, 40 & 128; VC2, 885). So, like 
Dolto, who consistently refused institutional work (VC2, 732), are not Dolto’s ‘(non-) 
students’ just what she teaches, and hopes for, them to be—free? 
Dolto’s propositions “revolutionize education” in schools, too (Louchart, 2008; also 
Meirieu & Kübler, 2001), which she deems a “prophylaxis of psychosocial morbidity” (EM, 
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309; also 1965, 43). She rejects civilizing for useless things (CE, 25; EM, 373) and the 
sacrifice of independence to groups (APP, 39), believing “good habits are a violence against 
liberty” (EM, 313). Expecting others to please you extinguishes their potential (De 
Mezamat, 2008c; 1979, 15), she says, so adults should not impose ideas on children (DQ, 
120; EM, 106; JD, 99). The problem, she adds drily, is that “when obsessional symptoms are 
shared, we consider ourselves well” (SP3, 18). Her solution is in opening up spaces, age 
groups and curricula, and reducing years of forced schooling (EF, 27-28; Ina.fr., 1978; SP1, 
201-202; 1985/1989b, 130). Besides, a real education should awaken our critical sense (CE, 
24 & 95-97; IIC, 17 & 346). For while “we all live upon what is false, it is important to 
make the child aware of the false that is important for us” (PJ, 103; also DW, 73). Dolto’s 
views invite a lively uptake (e.g. Binet, 2005; Chébaux, 1999b; Wittwer, 1992) that 
culminates at l’École Neuville, outside Paris (C.Dolto in Monteiro,2009,94)—an exploration 
of learning centred on talk, where children plan their own multi-disciplinary curricula within 
rural freedom. Dolto had a “passion for this place” (Ibid, 96), helping it secure a bank loan 
(Ibid, 95), visiting, and counselling its founders, D’Ortoli and Amram (Nobécourt, 2008b). 
Books and movies are devoted to it (e.g., D’Ortoli and Amram, 1990 & 2009b; Nobécourt, 
2008d), including a school visit to Vienna (D’Ortoli & Amram, 2009a). For an education 
with Dolto always returns Freud. Thus, educators need to grasp the «rôle de la vie 
libidinale» (MA, 60; also EM, 99), and give children autonomy by 7-9, as «l’Oédipe est 
resolu» (CE, 20; DV, 29 & 87; PS, 44 & 67; SS, 134; VC2, 889). And her boldest words rise 
from her work: “Do not wreck the education of a child who almost dies but lives” 
(Ribowski, 2004; SP3, 138); and “schools overvalue conscious motivation and active pulses, 
missing the genius of unconscious motivation and passive pulses” (ES, 14). Thus, with 
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Dolto, psychoanalysis serves democracy, and the child is a citizen (EF, 48-50; JD, 285; PJE, 
18).  
Interdit & inter-dit 
But of all the Dolto offshoots, the Maison Verte (MV) [green house] is unarguably 
her “key legacy” (Canu, 2009, 144; Nobécourt, 2008c). An MV offers precocious 
socialization for under threes and their caregivers (De Mezamat, 2008a; Dolto, 1985b; D&R, 
38-42; Hamelin, 2011a; Malandrin, & Schauder, 2009; Nobécourt, 2008a; also CE, 378-380; 
EF, 12; PM, 19; Ribowski, 2004; TL, 95; VC2, 627, 715-716 & 876-877; Dumas, 1997; 
ina.fr.2, 1998). Opened collaboratively by varied local stakeholders, MVs are found 
throughout Europe and Latin America, with 154 in France alone (Archives Françoise Dolto, 
2001a & 2001b)—and three in Canada, all in Quebec (Krymko-Bleton, 2012; Maison 
Buissonière, 2014; Maison Ouverte, 2011; Normandin, 2012). The web is full of MVs: 
hours, committees, news (e.g., Rekhviashvili, 2008), and blogs—like one from Armenia 
with huge matryoshka dolls (Larajan, 2012)—as groups culturally mark and name each one. 
Research on 15 MVs in France, in 1984-1992, noted 1000-1500 visitors each (Neyrand, 
1995)—200,000 yearly! “Françoise liked doing good,” Roudinesco notes (D&R, 39). Dolto 
won a prize from Lego for the concept (VC2, 876)—money she reinvested in children—and 
she continued to attend the flagship site she helped open in 1979 (D&R, 38; Maison Verte, 
n.d.; VC2, 793). Each MV is staffed with at least three analysed persons, among them a 
male and an analyst. But if we enter for a moment that «maison»—«mes sons» [my 
sounds]—Dolto dreamed about for 15 years (D&R, 40), I submit that we cannot but hear 
Dolto herself in its “echo and ricochet effects” (Hamelin, 2011a). 
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     The original «Maison Verte» was named by children in a story Dolto fondly 
repeats, explaining they called it green though it was blue (ATP, 192; CE, 380; Malandrin & 
Schauder, 2009, 368; 1985b). Like This (2007), I wonder, does the ‘green house’ echo the 
Emerald Isle? Dolto cites the importance of telling an MV’s two rules: wearing a 
waterproof apron to play with water, and not crossing the red line with vehicles. Thus the 
“interdit becomes the inter dit” (Canu, 2009, 152). But do we also hear an echo of 
«m’arrête» [stop myself]? At an MV, communication confirms who a child is, and basic 
prohibitions aid his becoming (Hamelin, 2011a), as he “uses his libido in social activities 
that are tolerated or stimulated” (MA, 19; also EM, 340; JD, 159, 283, 302 & 336; LF, 108; 
MA, 10 & 58; SS, 234). There is also the “technology of the ladder”—climbing play (D&R, 
40). Is this an echo of the missed parade? Questions flow freely, with neither tracking nor 
reporting to outside agencies. We quickly note the paradigm shift re Tavistock’s extensive 
record-keeping and their talks with parents without a child’s permission (Harris & Bick, 
2011). For there is anonymity at an MV, as only the child’s name is written on the board at 
the entrance. Is this an echo of the big board in Deauville? The project offers infant-
caregiver pairs a transition from being home alone, aiming to prevent sharp ruptures at entry 
to daycare or pre-school. Is this an echo of children being evacuated during the war? As 
children socialize, staff depathologize ordinary baby behaviour, “drinking” or “sponging” 
adult anxiety (VC2, 641; 1985b; also, Malandrin & Schauder, 2009, 213), that risks a child 
becoming a «hémiplégique symbolique» (Hamelin, 2011a). For a subject enters the world 
with his own desires and our task, Dolto says, is not to become human, but to remain so 
(Ibid). “You feel stronger as a parent when you leave” an attendee remarks (ina.fr.2, 1998). 
And true to form, Dolto is incredibly serious with the infants attending. There is no baby 
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talk, only intense attention and respect. And as we leave that «petite maison» (PM, 19)—an 
echo of a fairy tale?—we hear potent theorization floating about in chit-chats about MVs: 
[1]The way we greet children wakes up a child’s attention, as the child is a “taker” if 
he knows he is with someone listening (Hamelin, 2011a); [2]The dead object [a toy] 
does not become living until someone takes hold of it. The child ignores that he 
himself has the power to give life to the toy, but accords that capacity to his 
«semblable» (Dolto, 1985b; SP3,13); and [3]The fact that we speak to a child in 
front of his mother signifies that we accord him an identity that is relational to her, 
but not fusional (Dolto, 1985b). 
 
Awaiting for meaning to evolve, we “accumulate signs for later use” (AI, 189). In fact, 
transferential effects at MVs are so common that some even write of «transfert sur le lieu» 
[transference on a site] (e.g. This, 2007, 147 & 158-162; Vasse, 2006, 95, 269 & 301); while 
others note rightly that “transference on place” actually requires a witness (Durif-Varembont 
et al, 1999, 305). Dolto herself is unequivocal that the transference requires a human 
presence: “healing takes more than displacement, it takes a relation for the transference to 
put libido back into circulation” (APP, 34; also DV, 188-198; JD, 269; 1939/1971, 239; 
1977b, 43); and “the transference necessary for referencing oneself…must be lived on a 
socially integrated human being” (VC2, 228 & 799). So an MV is a «lieu de lien 
narcissisant» [site of a narcissizing link] (IIC, 69). Can it properly be called it, then, a place 
of witnessing? 
Transfert fantasmatique 
Freud explains that the transference is an exchange of affect that is present in all 
relationships (1900a, 177; 1909/2001, 51), and language is its privileged setting (Laplanche 
& Pontalis 1967/2004, 497). True to Freud, Dolto describes her therapeutic role in terms of 
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«transfert fantasmatique des relations passées» (SS, 157; also IIC, 33; SS, 113; 1985b), 
wherein she serves as a «prothèse temporaire,» “lending herself” to the subject (DW, 165; 
SP3, 173; SS, 16, 113-115 & 128), during difficult work that is «déréalisant» (SS, 16; also 
AI,104; Dolto & Hamad, 1984/1995, 13; MA, 60; SP3, 192; VO,173). She believes effective 
analysis revives the archaic (CD, 149; DW, 104; SS, 127-128), so the subject can “express 
repressed pulses while reducing his guilt” (APP, 37; MA, 161). Thus, her clinical attitude is 
simply to be “available” to receive projections (Dolto & Nasio, 1987, 66; DW, 163; MA, 22; 
Ribowski, 2004; SP2, 157; VC2, 200; VC2, 762; 1985c, 197), becoming a “resonator” to 
“wake” the subject’s “own analyst” (DW, 61 & 143;  SS, 77; 1985/1989b, 134; VC2, 219). 
In effect, is she not elaborating how self-healing requires an analysed witness, a resonator of 
the archaic? Does this not return the notion (above) that a child is a taker if someone is 
listening? For is not “psychoanalytic listening always for the child in the adult” (Hamelin 
2011a)? Repeatedly, Dolto notes the child listens better while busy, as if not listening (DQ, 
80; SP2, 219; SP3, 35, 144 & 146; TL, 24; VC2, 728 & 808; VO, 226)—when he is passive, 
as a “third” in the conversations of others. Is the child a taker, then, when someone else is 
listening? Is this why a witness matters? But our questions stay open as more echoes arrive. 
The child needs a «fil» [wire/thread] up (SP1, 229; SS, 113) until he can be «sans-filet» 
[wireless] (VC2, 706). Thus, Dolto is optimistic for all her patients, even psychotics, or 
infants “in the throes of mortifying anxiety” (AI, 218; VC2, 796-797): “As the child has 
managed this long without you…there is no reason to assume he will do less well now that 
he has your support” (SP1, 43). But is there not an unsaid telling of her history with radio 
here—and of how suffering can turn to hope? For with Dolto, as Grignon says, “the analyst 
is for life” (2001, 142). Funny enough, Dolto’s first office (1936) was in a tiny flat on 
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Dupuytren:“I often forgot my key…so I had to climb up the ladder to the little window…but 
I was there at last!” (AI, 146). How can we not hear those war echoes of the missed parade?  
True to form, Dolto is not bothered by the hatred that can arise in analytic relations, 
as it is a “duty to show tolerance for what others do not tolerate” (VC2, 763). She is 
“horrified” to hear of any “hate in the counter-transference,” as “you cannot work under 
these conditions” (SP1, 80-81). So, specifically to address hate, she invents her famous 
“symbolic payment” (e.g., ATP, 196; CE, 371; DW, 139; SS, 124-125; TL, 112; VC1, 342; 
VC2, 890): patients bringing a stamp, stone, coin, ticket, etc. Forgetting it, she says, means 
an unconscious refusal of treatment (DW, 139; TL, 112). The payment also prevents a 
patient from “mythologizing” the analyst (SS, 124), so while it is always desirable, it is 
critical with young children still resolving their «Oédipe» (SS, 15 & 125f). Dolto employed 
it from 1968-1988 (CE, 371), and an uptake seems to be starting (e.g., Puskas et al, 1991). Is 
there an echo here to details we had overlooked until now—about her wartime hobby of 
buying medals, and a medal ceremony for Oncle Pierre (MF, 22; VC1, 43 & 175)? For like 
the analyst, the symbolic payment works in phantasy, representing something unique for 
each person (VC1, 342). Oddly enough, then, Dolto inspired the children’s character, 
Caillou (Wikipedia, 2014d) that, though named by someone else, somehow echoes her 
daydreams about radio waves. In 1981, ironically at the Institute for the Deaf, Dolto 
comments on the political discords around her: “There are stories happening in all of these 
transactions, but I have only vague echoes” (VC2, 698). Could we not say the same? For 
what her uncanny corpus reveals is that no moment in time stands alone: all is ricochets, 
reconnaissance and après-coup—later editions of infantile history. Thus, the transference 
139 
 
itself is the interdit—what is banned from consciousness but still endures as an «articulation 
vitale» (IIC, 275), an “affective exchange that increases vitality” (JD, 57-58): 
There is somewhere a subject who has his own desire, veiled, and who watches in his 
passive pulses for the moment when he will be found by someone…It is this 
availability towards the encounter with the most archaic pulses of a human being that 
is the essential transference of the psychoanalyst. Especially, of the psychoanalyst of 
children (IIC, 275). 
 
Thus emerges a remarkable unsaid narrative, as primary processes secure self-regulation 
lifelong, and language (including its silences and slips, and eluding time) enables us to take 
in and release affect. So we can conceive of the transference simply as a passive operation 
serving a kind of unconscious circulation between subjects, one that sustains our survival. 
Témoin, tiers & triangulation  
Herein arrives Dolto’s theory of the «tiers, témoin» (SS, 15) [third, your yesterdays; 
witness, your lessers], silent and hidden in the “thickness of her propositions” (Halmos, 
2000, 34). I do not claim a full grasp but offer only my translation of Dolto, as meaning 
arrived by a gradual condensing of dispersed associations. We begin with a fact: the fetus 
“cannot lose continuity” to survive (SS, 144). This causes a need for “relays” and 
“mediators of the symbolic function” (CD, 194; DV, 64-65; VC, 496; 1985d, 15), as the 
“securing of pleasure calms pulsions and abolishes a moment of time-space” (JD, 286). 
Developing, the “symbolic function…permits the substitution of pleasure from a short 
circuit of desire, immediate, to a longer circuit that mediatizes pulsions” (Ibid; also IIC, 83; 
PS, 29-30). Thus the fetus is referenced to unconscious security within a unique archaic 
transference situation consisting of a co-narcissistic «pré-moi» and an enigmatic other(ness) 
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of dream-work as a third, a pre-symbolic father. Near the horizon of time-space, through 
birth, substitutions of pleasure and the reversible circulation of affect effect a slow, uneven, 
anxiogenic migration to reality as the «pré-moi» remains unconsciously fusional with the 
mother; while restorative dream-work investing audition secures continuity with the archaic, 
returning as (an) otherness or third, so the pre-symbolic father offers a «fil» to the social. 
Triangulation is then observable in the relation of an infant with his mother and (usually) his 
father, as progressive substitutions enable longer circuits for taking in and venting affect 
from diffuse sources. Somewhere here is the porous place of ‘introjects.’ The reversibility 
inhering in triangulation means that a «pré-moi» holds shifting positions between himself 
and his mother, and between himself and the other, resulting in a blurry, ‘liquid’ 
subjectivity. Crucially, then, ‘two’ is always one, as a child in a pair returns to 
«prolongement.» Ergo, the child needs a third, a witness, in order to be one. Put another 
way, triangulation is necessary for individuation.  
 Dolto explains: “We are born in a triangular situation…[so] the child needs this 
triangular situation to continue (,) to develop” (CE, 333). The “triangular situation is 
constructed…completely unconsciously” (SP1, 216), as “any other perceptible by… 
effecting emotional variations on the mother…is, like him, felt to be in dyad…qualifying 
and quantifying her dyad” (LF, 87). She adds, “a common interest unites them emotionally. 
It is the beginning of a «situation à trois»…two united relative to a third (the thing)” (SF, 84; 
also, SF, 373). Here is a critical notion: the child’s first «semblable» is the other of the 
mother. Thus, a word-thing is a ‘confirmation’ restoring triangulation, a phantasy of a 
common interest—a mediating object—while a «repère» is an archaic landmark in reality. 
Ergo, witness, third, «repère» and confirmation condense. And as triangulation securitizes, 
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“the child wants to be witnessed” (Hamelin, 2011), phantasizing trees, birds, nature and 
even anthropomorphized objects as his witnesses (AI, 204; CD, 53f; SS, 39; VC, 734): “the 
child is always an interlocutor with an other, who is an interlocutor with an other. It is 
always a triangle” (Ribowski, 2004). So “you need to be careful that there is always a third, 
always a third, when you have relations with children” (CE, 333). Is a powerful 
recommendation not implied: securitize a child with a triangular situation? Further, since 
triangulation is driven by passive pulses, we refind those ‘toys in the hand,’ as a child is 
unaware he can enliven (himself) until he follows a «semblable» who can. For children need 
“proof of existence,” Dolto explains, and they use each other for identification (Hamelin, 
2011a; PS, 41; SP3, 13; TL, 31; VC2, 762; 1985c, 190). And so the libidinal dynamics of 
passivity are installed. 
In turn, a “social third” or “lateral person” prevents fusion, i.e., the loss of 
individuation (CE, 263; Hamelin, 2011a). Thus the analyst “enters as a third…freeing the 
child” (SP3, 36)—effectively theorizing her own work with witnesses (e.g., Nasio in 
Authier-Roux, 2000a, 21-22). A choral clinic is “more operational,” “radically curative,” 
and an «extraordinaire rapidisant» of work, as it “returns the original triangular relation” 
(Charial, Eliacheff & Valentin, 1999, 50- 53; Coronel & Mezamat, 1997d; 1977b, 28). So 
too for presentification, then, as the “child needs to hear the mother speak to an object other 
than himself” (SF, 210; also EM, 180; QS, 10; SP2, 126; 1985/1989b, 126). This nurtures a 
“mediated relation instead of a dual one” (SP3, 179)—effectively theorizing the MVs as 
what is relational rather than fusional, and a “social milieu as a witness” (JD, 20). Of note, 
Dolto discussed the third, a «présence affective de ‘témoin réactif,’ sensible, passif et 
impartial,» as early as 1939 (MA, 166). I offer that her narration is of a dream of inter-
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subjectivity by which we engage reality as a relational echo of the archaic, as historicization 
presents anxiety to which the transference is a salvific response. And from the issue of 
translation where we began, a new word arrives in the transference, condensing Dolto’s 
difficult theory: «personne» [someone/no one, as-if personifying the said/unsaid]; and its 
homonyms: «père/perd/pair sonne» [father/lose/pair/peer sounds/ rings], and «perçons» 
[we/let’s pierce]. True to Dolto’s genius, triangulation also returns the «interdit», since the 
affect enabling individuation requires the interdiction of fusion. 
We pause for more of Dolto’s generous examples. In 1942, she marries Boris, a 
Russian (AI, 162; VC2, 88). She recalls seeing the Russian Church from Henri-Paté, as if 
“written in her destiny” (AI, 161). Boris first dined with the Marettes to replace her brother, 
Pierre, serving in Morocco (EN, 99-101; VC1, 427f; VC2, 85). Upon first hearing of Boris, 
her father exclaimed, “Of course, she couldn’t help bringing us a Tartare!” (EN, 100). How 
can we not hear (amid echoes of Babouches) the homonym, «tard-tard» [late, late], in wild 
play against her old nickname, Vava [go, go]? She explains that Do l’oto means “sculpting 
tool” in Old Slavonic (AI, 27; VC2, 453)—and we cannot stop its homonym, l’auto, from 
evoking little wheels at MVs that m’arrête at the red line. We also recall the nanny’s 
elevator man, dressed as a Brandebourg, like «généraux russes» (and Oncle Pierre) (AI, 
144; Ribowski, 1987/2004, etc.). In fact, Brandenburg Province joined the Weimar Republic 
after WWI (Wikipedia, 2015d). How can this not return Freud, “born [in Weimar] amid a 
slav population” (1900a, 196)—and Brandenbourg, Luxembourg (Wikipedia, 2015b), home 
of Mlle, that dear nanny replacement? Dolto recalls worrying about Boris meeting Laforgue, 
feeling great anxiety on Blvd Delessert as they walked over (ATP, 148)—its near-homonym 
evoking those 15-day privations of dessert (EN, 21) for naughtiness. Here are abundant 
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substitutions, all on names, as the word-thing (phoneme) serves as a common affective 
interest—a mediating object. So when Dolto says of her love of Boris, that it was “not in 
time and space” (DW, 170), how can we not agree? 
Identification & inter-projection 
To further elaborate fusion, “this first captive mode of object relations” remains 
throughout life (MA, 28). So a child cannot make contact with anything that interests him 
without “anthropomorphizing it” and experiencing «un transfert» (Dolto in Guillerault, 
1989, 137; also CE, 63; PS, 86). Critically, she adds, “it is also possible that the affects of 
pre-genital stages need, in order to be expressed in the transference, a reciprocity of 
behaviour” (JD, 191). And as our first means of engaging an other requires a «semblable,» 
“[primary] narcissism is reversible on whom we speak to” (DW, 124; also Charial, Eliacheff 
& Valentin, 1999, 53). Beautifully, “the child «protéiforme» progressively weds the forms 
he faces” (CE, 78; also DW, 98). At work is simply a «processus psychologique primitif» 
whereby “the human identifies himself with his entourage” (JD, 124; also SP2, 193). Yet 
this sustaining start makes it “hard to learn limits of self,” leading to “over-identification in 
«transfert» that is more and more sticky” (CE, 263; SP2, 193; VO, 170); i.e., fusion causes 
an “infernal cycle” of inter-projections, trapping both people (CE, 263; EF, 31; IIC, 231; 
PJE, 43;VC2, 220, 703, 762 & 807). And in this mode where to love is to be like, “the child 
unconsciously loses” (DQ, 130; CE, 270; EM, 205, 333 & 348-349; VC2, 808). 
Dramatically, Dolto adds that outgrown identifications to parents are «fatale» by age six or 
seven (CE, 243 & 330-331; PS, 39; SS, 51; VO, 109)—being a contamination by 
identification (CD, 211; JD, 50; SS, 38). For symbolic communication requires distance 
(CE, 33, 244, 277 & 355; IIC, 71-77, 99, 102 & 326; JD, 189 & 301; LF, 113; PJE, 103; PS, 
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23, 85 & 89; SS, 73 & 124). And if the mother never separates from the child, he will not 
know he exists (DW, 106; 1985/1989b, 126). Here we pause for another fine example of 
substitution, still on the name. Dolto relates learning, at seven, the good news that Saint-
François (Francis of Assisi) was her patron saint—not Saint-Françoise, as she had always 
thought (ATP, 71; VC1, 85)—calling him a «hippie de la Renaissance» (JD, 247; PJE, 61) 
who “invented a psychodrama of a non-fusional generous maternity” (VC1, 214). Isn’t what 
is at issue here not religiosity at all, but rather, the subtension of Dolto’s theorization on 
identification—and an indissociable fusion of history and work?  
Dolto’s dense texts on incest are also rooted in fusion. “Incest means «pas séparé»” 
(PJ, 44), as separation calls for “assuming one’s identity while renouncing the identification 
to the parents” (SP1, 37; also JD, 126-127). Dolto discusses real incest: “precocious sexual 
initiation, incestuous or not, is always traumatic” (VC2, 589; also, CD, 94; LF, 51; PJE, 44; 
VO, 201 & 206). But even being “phantasized as incestuous,” as a “precious object of 
excessive identificatory love,” incurs guilt (CE, 166-167; NE, 212; TL, 189); and she recalls 
a five-year-old traumatized by a “parody of marriage to his mother” (SP3, 104). How can 
Oncle Pierre not echo here? Dolto explains: “If there is no phantasm of incest, there is no 
humanization; but if there is an actualization of that phantasm, there is no society” (LF, 255; 
also CE, 243; DQ, 19; LF, 54; VO, 207). Thus the most vital education of all is to tell a child 
by age three about «l’interdit de l’inceste» (CE, 73; DW, 167; JD, 260; PJE, 35). Dolto 
credits Freud for articulating the incest taboo, stressing its universality (CE, 354; DV, 22; 
JD, 228-229; IIC, 181 & 186-199; LF, 51; SS, 144)—reminding parents to share that “they 
suffered [it] and survived” (PS, 46-48). But by this instruction, is the «interdit» of incest not 
also a witnessing by a «semblable»?  
145 
 
In fact, Dolto prompts a full rethinking of identification and individuation through 
the (tria)angle of witnessing, opening up radical hope. We return now to Robert, her 
psychotic nine-year-old patient, the mute wolf-child who howls, as we listen a little more:  
There were in him two positive identifications: the animal identification [to the 
gardener’s dog], and the identification to a dead man [beloved gardener dead of a 
heart attack]…. This identification to the deceased was very beneficial because…he 
could relive the trauma of dying by falling out of the window, that is, having been 
separated at 15 days by forced weaning by the mother who birthed him, then at about 
two months, having almost died of dehydration [as his mother lost her milk during 
WWII] (in De Sauvernac, 1992, 169-170).  
 
Recovering a psychotic child, then, requires helping him find «un semblable» to liberate his 
expression (Nobécourt, 2008a). Conversely, the mother perfectly identified to a child, 
dressed as an exact copy, is “a superb creature from the veterinary point of view” (TL, 185), 
Dolto says drily. So from her own life, she offers a tip: “If you remain vigilant and question, 
you will not identify” (EN, 120). For any subject’s true identification is archaic:   
There is always an interiority that precedes, and we must help the child to get rid of 
his false identification, because we all live on the basis of identifications that we 
must, little by little, demolish to refind our authenticity, regardless of what persons 
are around us. It is altogether like the layers on an onion [homonym: on nie on: ‘we 
deny us’] (DW, 99). 
 
At issue in Dolto’s theorization is the endurance of the archaic, by definition. Ergo, if phobia 
or loss precipitate an incapacity for obtaining security in reality (via identification), then the 
transference simply facilitates the return of continuity. Resourcing by regression delivers 
sufficient securitization to then enable progression back to reality by substitutions (new 
identifications) that bridge phantasy and reality. Thus, the notion of ‘continuity with the 
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archaic’ harbours (retains) a phenomenally reparative potential. And so Dolto’s ‘true archaic 
identification’ is merely a return, by symbolic filiations, to the prehistory of each «pré-moi» 
on a landscape constructed in dream-work. Thus, we each need to “keep something archaic 
and stable when identity is changing too quickly” (CE, 31)—as in war (VC1, 252)—Dolto 
says, adding she has always been interested in “what is continuous that links what seems 
discrete” (EN, 42). We recall that our first «semblable» is the other of the mother: the pre-
symbolic father representing our «richesse libidinale» (MA, 58), the “source of life” (DW, 
126), our «filiation languagière» (CE, 44; SP1, 67). Thus, Dolto analyses identifications 
(LO1, 124 & 128; VC2, 208), finding that a child often lives “archaic object relations” with 
his entourage without anyone noticing (D&R, 12). And as regression (therapeutic or 
traumatic) returns prior identifications, she reports being “identified with an older time after 
analysis than before” (AI, 88). Dolto is (again) in fine company with Hannah Arendt: “All 
my life I considered myself Rahel [Varnhagen, 1771-1833] and nothing else” (Goldstein, 
2009, 1); and with Bertha Pappenheim, “identified so deeply with Glückel [von Hameln, her 
ancestor, 1646-1724] that she commissioned a dramatic portrait of herself as Glückel” 
(Guttman, 2001, 191). There is also Dolto’s nearer identification with Lou Andreas-Salomé:  
Later, only, when I read her and I read some works about her, I thought that she was 
like Françoise Marette or Françoise Dolto. I felt myself to be entirely ‘«de la même 
veste» [in/of the same vest’ [of the same cloth? same investments?] as Lou Andreas-
Salomé (D&R, 32).
19
  
 
Beyond Dolto’s audible substitutions, on the name, are unspoken returns of Weimar (where 
Lou met Freud in 1911—Leavy, 1964, 131), as Lou is transferentially coloured with 
Brande(n)b(o)urg, in a fine example of the diffusion of affects in the social. Further, as 
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lovely Lou was «la russe» [a Russian], she returns the lost nanny with the auburn hair (AI, 
144; Ribowski, 1987/2004)—«la rousse» [red-headed female]. So as we listen to Dolto 
explain how, walking in Nimes (in the Midi) one day, she naturally thought of her 
«semblables» 2000 years ago (PF, 35), do we not begin to feel, with her, the marvelous 
fluidity of identifications, and how time-space is indeed a lot more porous than we think? 
Liberating words 
Near the end of her life, Dolto wonders if she is «pas conforme» because the lost 
nanny—who lost her own mother when young (EN, 64; Ribowski, 2004)—was «une 
marginale» whose punishment it was to go to France (EN, 118). Dolto is breathtakingly 
candid here about what is indelible in her oeuvre: her early identification. Nearby, she 
recalls how her mother, depressed after Jacqueline’s death, had identical clothes made: “So 
if she did not dress exactly like me, who was living…” (EN, 120). And in the ellipsis, do we 
not hear a silent echo of the ‘toys in the hand,’ and this human need, born of our enduring 
passivity, to follow life to have life? And are both banned words—Vineuse and Jacqueline—
not pulsing together again, just like in her early radio days? A subject has “a symbolic link 
with no one if no one knows his history or can speak it” (EM, 278), Dolto explains. Thus, 
parents “hold the treasure of liberating words” (1985d, 14), and a child is “most vulnerable 
if he cannot get answers to his questions” (PJE, 20). Again, how can this not echo her own 
difficulty in getting answers to her early questions about death? Thus, it is crucial “to put 
true/just words on suffering” (IIC, 367; JD, 104), returning the notion of the witness: 
Prevention…is not to spare a child from suffering…. It is to put words on that from 
which he suffers, and recognize his right to suffer from it, and that we recognize with 
compassion that he suffers from it.But not to spare him from it, making a zone of 
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shadow on his suffering. This will provoke a trauma that will leave a trace…. If we 
give him the right to suffer from the absence of his mother, we give him the right to 
also accept that another suffers, and that suffering is a part of humanization (De 
Mezamat, 2008b). 
 
Ergo, Dolto’s passionate concern for the deaf: the “most phobic and most persecuted is a 
deaf child” (DW, 94; PJE, 85 & 111; VC2, 242 & 703). Dolto will spend half her Lego prize 
to help deaf children (VC2, 877 & 819f), remarking fondly how, from her window on Saint-
Jacques, she could hear recesses at the Institute for the Deaf (Nobécourt, 2008a; Ribowski, 
2004). And from this acute valuing of words in remediating suffering comes her strongest 
message: desire is a call to inter-human communication (JD, 272 & 283; PJE, 94; TL, 
93;VO, 192; etc.); we only exist because we are linked to others in words (CE, 256; JD, 286; 
PJE, 13-15 & 101; TL, 44; etc.); and what is spoken soothes (CE, 204 & 351; DV, 40 & 89; 
EM, 25, 305 & 326; FT, 198; IIC, 213; JD, 298; NE, 211; SS, 75; TL, 46 & 84; etc.). She 
quips, “psychotherapy begins in the morning, when you live alone, when you  speak to the 
news seller” (DQ, 109). As ever, her simple words port phenomenal complexity: humans 
unconsciously securitize in triangulation via what is said and read. 
In short, the child is a worthy “interlocutor” to whom we should tell the truth (NE, 
210; SP1, 69; TL, 31), while invested words forced into hiding take with them countless 
associations. Take the 14-year old for whom a word arrived, «putain» [slut], by which he 
“refound his story”—details of visits by his mother (a prostitute) to his foster home—
restoring his capacity for learning (SP3, 83-86). Or take Katia, a four-year-old hemiplegic 
psychotic in Dolto’s choral clinics (SP1, 49-56); Katia insists she has «vinguit» friends 
[sic:28], as Dolto tells the reader: “There is a condensation of something here, for this 
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returns a name, Valerie, appearing later, and valgus” [her deformity]. In fact, condensation is 
everywhere (Freud, 1913, 174), and as it is dream-work, the most archaic phonemes hold the 
most associations.
20
 Is this not why psychoanalysis is “a talking cure” (Breuer & Freud, 
1893/1957, 30), and words are its “tools of treatment” (Freud, 1905/1953c, 283)? For 
“language is a substitute for action, whereby affect is abreacted almost as effectively” 
(Breuer & Freud, 1893/1957, 8; 1895, 365-366)—or as Dolto says, “communication 
ventilates everything” (D&R, 39; DV, 66; JD, 22; PJE, 23; QS, 22). Yet as anxiety is 
released by using phonemes (IIC, 328; SS, 37), the “phantasms subtending speech are 
expressible only in the mother tongue” (NE, 249; also, PJE, 95), giving the mother tongue a 
«fonction historisante» (Chaperot & Celacu, 2010, 439). Condensations thus harbour 
narrative revolts, being words that speak in silence (as affect), impose silence on speech, and 
promise a rogue return. So it is that following associations across Dolto’s vast corpus, we 
experience an odd phenomenon wherein the more we gather, the fewer separable notions we 
have, as condensations form, revealing the texture of dream-work in her genius. Dolto is 
correct: “It is a small surface with which we make our speeches, but what is living is entirely 
in the unconscious” (CE, 283). Thus, as we come to understand it, narrative revolt is a 
laborious process of becoming that writes against culture, as the subject achieves unitary 
status in symbolic exchanges, inter-psychically. By it, the unconscious not only legates to 
thought (ergo, to theory), but sustains thought through the continuous transport of prior 
investments and a prehistory of play, we might say—our dream-work. I believe this notion 
of transference in theory carries tremendous implications for cultural receptivity and 
transmission. For, on the one hand, a common language offers common phonemes to the 
neonate; while, on the other hand, no two dreamers ever encounter even a single phoneme 
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on the same intra-psychical terrain, so contingent is any libidinal history. Thus, the 
unconscious predicts the absolute unpredictability of the (hi)story of man: genius as a 
surprise, a sudden arrival, an interruption—and our human groupings as inheritors of dream- 
work engaged in the language baths of our complicated childhoods, in endless ruptures that 
fold elliptically. Needless to say, then, phonemic play and enigmatic condensations make 
impossible the adventure of translation, as Derrida notes abundantly (e.g., 1988, 305; 1995b, 
120; 1998, 66; 1999/2004, 168; 2003/2005, 162).Even just trying to read theory becomes an 
“interpretation akin to a translation” (Freud, 1900a, 277; 1907, 60 & 93; 1913, 176). And 
though, for Dolto, it is true that the “only true transitional support is the word” (Guillerault, 
2007, 56), Dolto’s words are, as she says, «pas classiques» (MA, 13), and plays porting their 
transferential effects are, like slips of the tongue, resistant to translation (Freud, 1916a, 31f 
& 40f). Thus, the English translation of her dissertation (2013) cannot but disappoint—it is 
as if the rebus is gone. And here we come to the tragi-comedy of the present project. Dolto 
shares an anecdote from Deauville, that departure point for Britain where the family 
summered (AI, 66; EN, 25; VC1, 69, 91 & 157).The bilingual news seller stuttered, saying 
15 as «cinq-dix» [five-ten] instead of «quinze» and calling out mititi (the name they gave 
her) as she announced news at «midi» [noon] (EN, 32; VC1, 92 & 115). How can we not 
recall the ti.ti.ti. of Morse code (or the dictionary decoding it, the Larousse), and the Midi, 
her adult refuge? Yet we watch from an English shore as French messages recede like radio 
waves.  
Castration symboligène 
Dolto writes that a second language is a way to “run from yourself” (AI, 140)—just 
as she is reading Katherine Mansfield “to escape” (Ibid). In fact, Dolto was competent in 
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Latin, English and Italian (AI, 119; ATP, 75, 80 & 99; EN, 86; VC1, 322 & 330-331). In 
1931, she also writes of thinking and speaking “in the accent of the Midi” (VC1, 473 & 
478), and in 1934, of reading in Provençal (VC1, 306 & 311). Truth be told, it was a second 
language that had brought that beloved nanny to her home (Ribowski, 2004), always staffed 
with «l’anglaise des petits» [the English girl for the little ones] (EN, 44 & 50). Musing on 
second languages, Dolto relates how a French psychiatrist, a victim of incest, found peace in 
Australia (LF, 54)—for a new language may make the incest taboo redundant, she says 
(SP1, 99). This is its advantage for those “who cannot continue to use the mother tongue 
without finding themselves trapped” (SP1, 21; also APP, 34). And we recall Pappenheim 
here, who while German, was “at her best and most free” in French and Italian (Breuer & 
Freud, 1893/1957, 25)—and who, at the depths of her illness, could only speak in English 
nursery rhymes (Ibid, 39). The «language salvateur» just needs to not conform to the 
mother’s rhythm (TL, 16), Dolto explains, so that even an accent helps, offering security in 
“camouflage” (SP3, 237; TL, 33; VC2, 213). The problem is, however, that the second 
language then “risks breaking filiations” (SP1, 99)—essentially, losing innumerable (but 
never all) tethers to the archaic. Is this not exactly the risk (thus, the grave responsibility) of 
any act of translation, as we try to cross an inexplicable chasm against an «interdit»?  
 This “as-if severing” inhering in a second language takes us to Dolto’s «castrations 
symboligènes» [symboligenic castrations] (SCs), elaborated from 1939. Enjoying wide 
uptake, SCs are aptly described by Grignon as “permitting access to sublimations” (1997, 
21; 2002, 66 & 179); while «symboligène» (e.g., 78-90) is a prime example of her non-
classical terms. Dolto explains that while SCs are ongoing, psychical development hinges on 
three major castrations—umbilical, oral and anal (e.g, IIC, 90-147); and that “Klein is 
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justified” in speaking of oral and anal castrations, while she herself has merely added the 
prior «castration ombilicale» of birth (VC2, 516). An entirely unconscious process is at issue 
in SCs (MA, 11), wherein the frustration of a desire impels the subject to transfer 
investments to subsequent objects, allowing a wider field of exchanges (e.g., D&R, 29; IIC, 
78; SP1, 47-48; SS, 124)—migration from short to longer circuits (IIC, 83). Do castrations, 
then, not serve as a continued elaboration of how the subject substitutes pleasures in 
triangulation? Every trial is a “springboard” that ruptures fixity (De Mezamat, 2008c; JD, 
131; PJE, 46; PS, 37-38; SP1, 16)—and a “drama for the one who lives it” (DW, 70). But 
growth requires risks (ina.fr, 1978), and we are actually «fragilisé par une non-castration» 
(DW, 99)—as play on the «nom» [the (given) name] softly echoes birth. It is, as Britzman 
writes, a use of “aggression as a way to call reality forth” (2004, 263); or, as Dolto notes, a 
“need for aggressive energy to detach oneself from what fascinates”(LF, 307).21 And it is as-
if, I offer, it were a difficult unconscious apprenticeship to the oral active stage. Progressive 
SCs comprise a necessary «processus de mutation» (IIC, 79; JD, 302) that “reinforce desire 
in front of an obstacle” (IIC, 78), yielding a richer symbolic life (D&R, 29; JD, 301; PM, 55; 
PS, 85; TL, 72): symbolic fruit (DW, 71). In brief, “all separations have a narcissizing value 
for the one who survives” (SP2, 161), being «libératrice» (Nobécourt, 2008c), as long as the 
restriction is “partial and compensated” with greater pleasure (DW, 46; JD, 29). Dolto 
compares the process to pruning a tree (LO3, 120) or flower (IIC, 79) for better growth. 
Intended to dovetail Freud, whom she credits (LF, 263; VC2, 516), SCs do seem to elaborate 
his notions about temporary un-pleasure making possible an attainment of greater pleasure 
(1905c, 209-211 & 211f); instinctual demands being forced from direct satisfaction to 
substitutive satisfactions (1915b, 170; 1917c, 349; 1940[1939], 210); libido being in a 
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“complemental series” with frustration (1917c, 347 & 347f); and a “fruitful source of 
disappointment and renunciation…[being a] stimulus to dreaming” (1900/1953a, 130). With 
SCs, Dolto theorizes human survival as hinging on a tension between endogenous castration 
anxiety (JD, 227) and an “a-priori right to self-defense against guilt” (TL, 68):  
The unconscious economic objective (purpose) of these states of powerlessness is the 
neutralization of castration anxiety…. The castration complex is a …success for the 
libidinal dynamic of the subject” (Dolto, 1939/1965, 7; oddly, only in 2nd edition & 
not in MA). 
 
On this view, trauma is simply a “failed castration” (IIC, 345-346), while health requires 
successive «deuils» [bereavements]: of fetal sonority (SP1, 147; SP3, 11); identification 
with one’s mother (JD, 215; SS, 210); childhood (PJE, 42); even the preceding hour (PJE, 
42)—in sum, to “separate from the «soi-même» [oneself] of yesterday to seek the «soi-
même» of tomorrow” (PJE, 46). And somewhere here, I believe something other arrives—
something «interdit,» unsaid, in that «interdit,» castration. For Dolto is narrating human 
suffering in the encounter with time-space, deriving from castration a compassion for our 
sacrifice to the material world—melancholy as the cost of living. Dolto’s emphasis on SCs 
being given in language is well commented: “another human being signif[ies] to him that 
the accomplishment of his desire, in the form he’d like to give it, is prohibited” (Dollander 
& De Tychey, 2004, 258). Thus it is a witness to suffering—a loving other speaks upon an 
existential trial—from which a thickness of paradoxes emerges. For by the witness, what 
prohibits desire serves desire for continuity with the archaic, as in surrendering what we 
love, we keep what we love; by the word, castration offers its own compensation, that 
pleasure of archaic audition, as the non of prohibition is the ouïe [hearing]); and by the 
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witness’s word, that «interdit,» an impasse, is a passage to reality to follow in passivity, as 
“when we speak, we project part of ourselves” (IIC, 28; JP, 29).  
Après-coup 
Dolto’s elaborations emerge from a liquid space where contradictions inhere: it is 
thinking with dream-work. Still explaining Dolto with Dolto, we recall another vendor in 
Deauville who sang about sharpening scissors and knives (EN, 32); and her sewing teacher, 
Suzanne (whose fiancé, a «chasseur alpin» like Oncle Pierre, died the same year), who gave 
her certificates for excellence in cutting (ATP, 55-56; EN, 37, 65 & 77-78). To this, we add 
a somber fact: Jacqueline died of a hematoma 18 months after a bad fall; her leg needed 
amputating, but her mother refused (AI, 83; EN, 108). Published post-humously, the find 
evokes the tragic irony of the dance music on the radio. It also testifies to Dolto’s view of 
the «interdit» (and melancholy) from the intimate grounds of her bereavement, in the 
«après-coup» [archaic: after-cut] of war framing such losses, and the «transfert sans fil» 
offering a balm on her suffering. Dolto’s corpus leaves little doubt that our childhood 
histories of love resound in our later work, leaving an unconscious trace that is always 
readable in our texts. 
In 1932, Pierre visits Deauville, and his infant (Dolto’s godchild) almost gets otitis 
(PF, 38 & 118f)—a “defense against hearing” (SP1, 213)—as the first grandchild encounters 
repressed stories of war, death and departure, and her suffering symbolizes our own. For our 
chapter structure cannot but disturb the reader-hearer, as a non-linear engagement with 
theoretical density defying logical exposition, where echoes begin in a place unseen and 
never end. Dolto’s texts are “a rendez-vous with a voice, words that ressemble nothing that 
we have heard until now” (Halmos, 2008)—“another regime of communication than that 
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which bends to the dominant discourse” (Louka, 2003, 149)—while the “true dimension of 
her word remains largely unknown” (Halmos, 2000, 33). As our habitual means of thought 
are supplanted by binary rhythms of presence and absence, we can’t help wanting to open a 
few paradoxes, to expand into time-space along segues, seeking lures to reality. But 
regression calls for the reverse: for sieving by compressing, as “elements as allow any point 
of contact…are condensed into new unities” (Freud, 1933a, 20), to give audibility, in a 
space without volume, to an experience of the archaic inseparable from the presentification 
of its theory. Co-ordinates without «raison» [reason]—but with «ré-son» [re-sound]—reveal 
the other-ness that is also our selves, as the transference invests associative thinking with an 
archaic legacy: “Non-belonging—textuality itself—intervenes, that is interrupts, right from 
the ‘first’ trace, that already marks itself as duplication, an echo” (Derrida, 1972, 398).  
Pulling back a bit now, I offer that the beauty, subtlety and complexity of the 
transference in Dolto’s texts makes patent the interconnectedness of her ideas, and the 
(counter)signature by which her archaic prehistory is enigmatically made audible. At the 
least, we should value the witness that is the infant: the auditory record by which she attests 
to an infantile history wherein she was, as all infants are, deemed to be barely present at all. 
And contemplating the infant in this way, I cannot but recall the words of Levinas, her peer: 
My reflection on this subject [the joy of what exists, the abundance] starts with 
childhood memories. One sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the 
silence of his bedroom as “rumbling”…. It is something resembling what one hears 
when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness were full, as if the 
silence were a noise…. In the absolute emptiness that one can imagine before 
creation—there is…. It is a noise returning after every negation of this noise. Neither 
nothingness nor being (1982, 48). 
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Perhaps as a bourgeois girl from the 16
th
, with a few grey hairs by the 60s, Dolto seems like 
an unlikely witness to the same ruptures of narrative probed by the next generation, at Tel 
Quel, at the same time and place—even, at the same publisher (Seuil). Yet not only is Dolto 
a powerful witness to the unconscious, as she wished; she also elaborates our understanding 
of the unconscious as an ever-present testifier in each human life. And the unconscious is an 
unlikely witness by definition: “neither hereditary, nor cerebral, nor automatic, nor neural, 
nor cognitive, nor metaphysical, nor meta-psychical, nor symbolic” (Roudinesco, 1999, 70). 
Thus countersigned by the unconscious, the word is inscribed in its prehistory by an 
unending dream that attests to the passive vitality of the primary processes that enduringly 
secure us, by which the edifice of reality is only ever a stor(e)y. 
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Conclusion ~ Chapter Six: Trace & Publication 
Abstract: In this chapter, I elaborate the transference of the autobiographical in the 
theoretical in Dolto’s history of writing, including her correspondence. I find the element of 
suggestion and wild homonymic plays in invested words from her family and early 
landscape, as the unconscious après-coup originating thought. I witness dream-work spilling 
over from her history to her clinic, as I explore biography as co-dreaming. I return three vital 
tools for my thinking—archaic echoes, narrative revolt and trace—as I explore the legacy of 
oral passivity to theorizing literacy. I conclude with reflections on my project, and some 
offers to pedagogy informed by ‘the transference in texts.’ 
 
This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of another 
text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply 
present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces  
(Jacques Derrida, 1972/1987, 26; italics his). 
 
“Sir, I am the little Françoise Marette who wants a doll car, a «tir au père 
fouettard»[game], and a «cantinière» [inn-keeper] costume. I think of you” (AI, 96). Such is 
the letter of our young analyst to Santa in 1910, scribed by an unknown other. By 1913, she 
herself pens what Mlle annotates as her «1
e
 copie»: “The little Françoise asks the good Noël 
to bring her a doll car [still?], a small letter box and a doll cradle. She promises to always be 
«sage» [obedient] (AI, 98 & VC1, 20-21). By 1916, with Pierre dead, she writes to Santa 
unassisted, asking for no toys but only for «sagesse», for the war to end, to please DanMé, 
and to be nicer to Jacqueline (VC1, 84-85). Accompanying a “magic potion” for «sagesse,» 
a «tableau» [board] and stamps, Suzanne composes a reply from Santa warning that if she is 
not tidy, the «tableau» will disappear into the night (VC1, 85). The board evokes Deauville 
and the Maison Verte, though Dolto is mute on this connection, as she cautions simply that a 
Santa who threatens to retake gifts is «pervers» (PJE, 71), and advises caregivers to give 
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only what is asked for, to demonstrate listening (PJE, 74). And in this precious 
correspondence resides not just a history of desire and suffering, but a rare narrative of an 
education in writing—from being scribed, to copying, to authoring—that takes us to what is 
arguably the most beautiful and compelling material in Dolto’s corpus: the enigmas of trace 
and witness that inform a «non-dit» theory of the work of writing in the passive access to 
presentification. For Dolto allows us to theorize writing as a means of arrival for invested 
phonemes; and by the work of the enduring passive pulses, the transference facilitates (as in 
the archaic) an insertion in language in the absence of a sufficient capacity for projection. 
Flash forward to 1962, and the Minister of Posts, Jacques Marette, asks his sister to 
compose a letter from Santa to be received by 5000 children in its inaugural year: 
My beloved child, your nice letter gave me much happiness. I’m sending you my 
portrait. You see, the mail carrier found me, he’s very crafty. I received many orders. 
I don’t know if I’ll be able to bring you what you’ve asked me for. I’ll try, but I’m 
old and sometimes I make mistakes. Forgive me. «Sois sage» [be good], work hard, 
I’m sending you a big kiss. Le Père Noël (Le Point, 2012 & 2014; Notre Famille, 
2015; VC2, 360).  
 
By 2012, following two minor revisions (1965-1980: VC2, 712; 1981-present: VC2, 713), 
as a free service of the Ministry of National Solidarity, Dolto’s message will be delivered to 
1.7 million children in over 120 countries (Chérer, 2008, 34; Wikipédia, 2014i), recalling 
the «Semaine de Suzette» she credits for her own psychical survival. Dolto’s “Santa letters” 
are a paradoxical writing in the name of the father by what many called a «mère rêvée» 
[dream mother] (AI, 236 & 237f; Provence, 1995)—they are contradiction symbolized. And 
in Dolto’s esteem of Santa as a “supportive myth” (VC2, 563; PJE, 74), her theory, at first as 
fine as snowflakes, begins to arrive. For Santa holds archaic value that secures reparation: 
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being without parents, and accepting that the child cannot conform, thus being an adult 
“outside of actual time” on which to “discharge guilt” (PJE, 72-73). Further, Christmas trees 
are timeless, retaining their needles—symbols of «enfance éternelle» (PJE, 78-79). Dolto 
adds that we can all play Santa for each other, offering «irruption du gratuit» (PJE, 59 & 
61): the delivery of joy as surprise. And silently, passivity, and its ardent waiting, returns. 
Script-girl 
Psychobiography is a repeatable technique, and among the primary sources it 
engages—material issuing from the primary processes—is human correspondence. For 
unselfconsciously, we find the writer inscribing his unconscious history, unintentionally 
telling a counter-narrative in the transference. Dolto’s letters to her mother, for example, are 
largely confessional, addressing minutia of daily life, seldom conveying real emotion. 
Suzanne actually begs her daughter not to write so much (MF, 52; VC1, 316)—while the 
daughter, likewise, asks her mother not to write so much (MF, 88 & 96). Dolto also 
overwrites to continue a message, ostensibly to save paper (VC1, 50; also noted by 
Malandrin & Schauder, 2009, 353)—but symbolically, as if to cross it out. It is a 
performance of contra-diction we re-find in 1915, when she writes to her father on the back 
of letters to her mother (VC1, 36 & 38); in 1934, when her writing is so microscopic as to be 
unreadable (noted by Djéribi-Valentin, AI, 138); and in 1938, when a 25-page letter to her 
father about her suffering—written within days of Freud’s passing through Paris (Freud 
Museum London, 1992, 37; Gay, 1988, 629)—was perhaps never sent (PF, 91-115; VC1, 
560-574). Contradiction also returns us to 1913-14, when she wrote «Vava» (or drew cats 
and flowers) on her legs—but never her real name (EN, 24); and to 1925, when the girl 
banned only from Zola—transporter of the muted street, Vineuse—took notes at Lycée 
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Molière in a distinct «alexandrin» style (e.g., AI, 117)—the name of Zola’s wife, who spent 
her own life looking for a lost child and died that very year (Wikipédia, 2015i). Is 
biography, thus history, formed by such enigmatic passages of what is in yet exceeds 
language—through rogue, unconscious correspondences just beneath the horizon of 
coincidence?  
The information gained by this kind of reading—one open to unconscious plays and  
conveyances—is an unintended message that, ironically, the letter’s recipient may not have 
heard at all while years later we, who are not addressed, may hear in the après-coup of 
anachronistic associations we bring to the corpus, following our own libidinal histories. 
Slowly, we become aware in reading that something quite accidental but highly 
significant—elusive yet surprisingly tangible—has somehow happened in writing. 
Suzanne’s careful record of the family correspondence will be invaluable indeed as 
verifiable testimony of her daughter’s childhood history (AI, 17; EN, 60 & 118). But the act 
of writing against and behind the correspondence also alerts us to a presence transiting the 
text—one that struggles for articulation and succeeds, ironically in yet despite the text. More 
deeply attuned, we thus begin to hear the extraordinary unconscious resonances in Dolto’s 
written exchanges not only with her trusted friend, Alain Cuny,
22
 but also with Mme 
Chapdelot (also noted by Grellet & Kruse, 2004, 218 & 283)—an old family friend who 
“heard my hopelessness,” as Dolto puts it (ATP, 209; VC1, 562). Unassumingly, Chapdelot 
writes of continuity with the archaic (VC1, 453 & 456); the need to leave things to arrive 
(VC1, 416); the mystery of refinding (VC2, 342); and our unconscious differences with 
those we seem identified with (VC1, 542). The reader hears the homonym on her name [cat 
of the water] and her fairy-tale nickname, «Milou» [half wolf] (MF, 143; VC1, 381, 416 & 
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454), as Chapdelot’s mail indeed offers a huge “field of nuance,” as she herself calls it 
(VC2, 94), where Dolto’s theory-as-life seems grounded. Even Dolto’s love of owls, and her 
need of eyes (a reader) to witness her writing (Note 22; also owl art, ATP, 215 & 1979c), 
returns us, in 1930, to Milou’s «hiboux amoindris» [diminished owls/sight] (VC1, 378). 
Dolto herself believes letter-writing is “critical for humans” (DQ, 115) as an “expression at a 
distance with those whom one loves” (VC2, 681). Small shifts evoke Freud’s Hans, the first 
analysis by correspondence (1909a); Bernadette, whose letters to her absent mother in 1947 
(scripted by her father) reduced her anxiety (JD, 136); Dolto’s radio subscribers, who 
improved simply by writing; and her casual observation that “treatment continues in letters” 
(SP3, 236).  And in this blur of time, sender, addressee, word, silence and dream-work that 
is the transference, we reinvest in a comment that at first, she herself could not read her 
letters, but others could (AI, 95 & 98), as we start to follow the slow articulation of «le rôle 
de script-girl» which “seems lowly but is, après coup, of great critical interest” (CD, 6).  
Quartier Muet 
 
We slip through time again to Dolto’s first house, where she hid coins and small 
objects to forget them on purpose, for the sheer pleasure of refinding them, or as a surprise 
for others—what she calls «jouer à qui perd gagne» [playing ‘who loses wins’] (AI, 17; EN, 
115-117). Deep within a wild field of nuances, this game offers thoughts as play: the value 
of the lost consciousness of objects—and the accidental passing of objects in the social. By 
this game, we also refind the nanny with the lost name who is, aptly, the «non-dit» rooting 
Dolto’s inimitable inroads into infancy. And on «rue Vineuse»—a near homonym of 
«révineuse» [dreamer]—Dolto comments: “The street was without importance in our 
«quartier» [neighbourhood], yet it awoke in me an interesting climate, without my knowing 
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why” (Ribowski, 2004; also Destombes, 1989, 292). “Was it a «grand chagrin» of love?” the 
interviewer asks. «Absolument,» she replies—and looks sad still (Nobécourt, 2008a). Yet 
while admitting the role of a street in her own life, she unselfconsciously theorizes 50 years 
earlier about a six-year-old boy made «muet» due to “passing along streets rendered taboo 
by phobias” (APP, 38). It is as if Dolto’s theory is engaged in a timeless correspondence 
with her history, receiving wild messages that find their way into her writing. Thus we 
encounter, near her death, this stunning clinical reflection where time and subject are 
entirely porous: 
We discover the root of the illness in a first story that took place, for example, at the 
departure without explanation of the young girl that took care of him until then. No 
one enlightened the child on the strangeness of the lived sensation. Suddenly, he 
found himself without the reference that gave him what he knew himself to 
be...Sometimes it’s not the mother they lost, it’s a person that took care of them 
completely. They even thought their mother was a maternal substitute, a second wife 
of their father (EV, 16 & 52). 
  
Here again are unconscious resonances palpable to the familiar reader, of a silenced story 
that insists on a telling, disregarding the apparent subject. In fact, «rue Vineuse» dates to 
1693 (SHAP, n.d.; Wikipédia, 2013a & 2014r), in Quartier Muet [aptly, ‘mute quarter’], 
which actually begins at 1 rue Benjamin Franklin, marked by his statue. Dolto’s second 
house, at 2 Colonel Bonnet, bore a plaque attesting that it had served as Franklin’s home, 
where “thunder had been” she says (AI, 62; ATP, 45). Thus the house itself is an address for 
odd correspondence around Franklin, a postmaster keen on saving time (Schiff, 2005, 367 & 
413-414, 367; Wikipedia, 2015f). And time is soft indeed in the game of ‘who loses wins’:  
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I remember very well the place where I discovered the ignorance of adults…. It was 
next to the passerelle that crosses «le Chemin de fer de Ceinture,» at the end of rue 
du Ranelagh…. Each time…I hoped a train would pass underneath…to hear this big 
sound that passed and that frightened a bit but not too much. …I always said to 
myself, coming back down, she [my governess] will have to tell me what happens 
after death…. The smoke was perfect because we could not see, only hear (EN 10-
12; also ATP, 70-71). 
 
The passerelle was “before reading,” she adds, among “ancient perceptions that return when 
reality is obscured” (EN, 17). And as a further return in a field without boundaries, Ireland’s 
Ranelagh Road is next to its own Ranelagh Gardens (Wikipedia, 2015e). Did the lost nanny 
speak about Britain? And when she was dismissed, did she not leave Passy by that very 
train, boarding at the «Gare de la Muette»? In this dream-work also arrives Dolto’s paternal 
grandfather, Henri Marette, who died a hero saving five women from a train fire, making her 
father, Henry Marette, an orphan—as the homonymic play loses to speaking what can only 
be re-found in writing, the /y/ and /i/ (AI, 240; ATP, 230-232). So when Dolto says, in a late 
clinical text, that a «passerelle» [under tracks] is a place of strange acoustics (EF, 26-27), 
advising children, “if you want to play there, you can” (Ibid)—or that the bridge between 
beings is made by language (TL, 167)—she is actually evoking the archaic echoes of a 
distant past, and the wild transit of audition through the mediation of words by which 
unconscious associations are awakened unpredictably. We further learn that “the passerelle 
made her feel called” (EN, 17; also, ATP, 70-71; EN, 10-12). And if we let ourselves drift 
almost to the point of sleep, letting go all of our bearings, we will hear Dominique, in 1963, 
telling Dolto about a good man who died saving another from a fire (CD, 158-159); it is the 
same session wherein he speaks of a man with a lung entirely eaten by microbes—the 
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symptom that almost kills Dolto as an infant, and decades later does. Thus, it seems there is 
new understanding securable through the transference simply through haphazard incidences 
in the social, as words move between us in a fluid, rogue network of correspondences. 
Through the transference, we come across enigmatic echoes—familiar, yet somehow 
othered—of our idiosyncratic archaic auditory pre-histories, an offer of what is neither 
consciously intended nor sought. In effect, then, we all play ‘who loses wins,’ continually, 
unconsciously, as our means of securitizing, as we slowly give up the dream for reality. It is 
the game at the origin of thought. Thus, any thought is necessarily the après-coup of a 
forgotten dream of love and safety engaged in a correspondence of its own, in a wildly 
associative translation from latent to manifest, across a challenging gap of space-time.  
Rue Saint-Jacques 
 
Walking distance from the plaque about Franklin is another on rue Kleiber about the 
Frères Marette, for Henri and his sibling were architects for Queen Isabella II (AI, 240), and 
designers of «Place des États-Unis» (ATP, 230). In 1929, the place name would ironically 
draw the son, Henry, to New York, to convince the Americans to join WWII (EN, 56; PF, 
22; VC1, 26). Dolto remembers believing the US was celebratory because her father brought 
back «Ô Solé Mio,» which he sang daily (EN, 56). “I dreamed of it [the US],” Dolto 
volunteers (EN, 57)—and we will follow this dream soon. For now, we muse only on the 
coincidence of the American «Maison Blanche» and the one near her home—and how her 
father purchased there a stainless knife that cut badly and could not be sharpened (EN, 55), 
so goods were not «coupable» [cuttable; also, ‘guilty’], enigmatically evoking symbolic 
castrations. It is intriguing play, but we must let go because the material calls otherwise 
through the other (maternal) side, her great-grandfather, Auguste Demmler. This officer of 
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the Wurtemberg Court, who fought in 1870 with the French (AI, 243; ATP, 87), left odd 
correspondence addressed to himself, in a game of names, encouraging his descendants to 
seek their ancestors as «points de repères» (AI, 236). Yet again, theories familiar by now 
seem invested by archaic terms—continuous and tethered along enigmatic word plays.  
Some distance from Kleiber, in the «5
e
,» we come upon rue Saint-Jacques, where 
Dolto lived from 1942 to her death. Walking there, we will pass, in the «15
e
,» a plaque 
commemorating the late senator, Jacques Marette, our other postmaster, and that other 
family recipient of the Military Cross (Wikipédia, 2015h & 2014m). Dolto helps raise 
Jacques when Suzanne rejects her replacement child for Jacqueline for being a boy. She 
recounts being part of a tag team with Mlle for his care (EN, 113; MF, 38), and how with 
Jacques, whom she loved dearly, she discovered the intelligence of a child, as she read to 
answer his questions about statues and tried to understand his suffering (EN, 109-111). 
There is strange name play here, too, as Dolto, Jacques’ godmother, ‘fiancé’ of deceased 
Pierre, walked baby Jacques with her older brother, Pierre—like a family of revenants—and 
how Jacques himself married a Jacqueline (VC1,427f). An astute researcher notes that the 
“consequences of the death of Jacqueline are multiple and durables…re the «signifiant 
Jacques»” (De Sauvernac, 1993, 67). In this repetition, and the human history written on 
land—streets, plaques and statues—we find not only a relation of the transference to place, 
but a circulation of stories in that other human displacement, walking. We recall here the 
arrival of the transference, for Freud, at the Acropolis (1936; E. Freud et al, 1978, 184)—
and his passion for “My Italian Moses…that love child,” the statue he contemplated for 
weeks [1912, 412f; also, E. Freud, 1961, 412; Freud, 1914a). For in these inscriptions of 
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words upon geography, and in our random reading as we move about, we meet a question 
we cannot ignore: are we addressed by the address?  
Over the years, Dolto travels a long way to another plaque in the mountains of 
Alsace, at «Sphinx de la Tête des Faux» (VC1, 60f; see e.g., Lieux Insolites, 2010)
23—a 
name with its own Oedipal echoes across slippery time—where Pierre was mortally 
wounded in 1916 (AI, 76-77, 79 & 207-211; VC1, 391). In 1928, she paints the scene and 
writes to six-year-old Jacques, back home, about Pierre’s death (VC1, 205 & 209), calling it 
the trip that opened her eyes (VC1, 210; also AI, 208). Ahead to 1941, in a waking dream, 
Dolto sees a “young man of pain” who says she “must go further” (AI, 155)—while our 
«chasseur alpin» leads to rich plays of his own: «chasse heure» [chase hour]; «chat soeur» 
[sister cat]; and inverting, «lapin» [rabbit]. Then without any personal reference, in 1980, 
she gives this clinical advice: “Why…do you make a mountain thinking of the past? You 
need to go further” (EM, 237). Poignantly, Dolto asks, “This lived trajectory that, in my 
solitude, I apprehend as my history, am I its object or its subject?” (PS, 61). Her question, 
recalling the fusional dream-work of our archaic origins, is also the query posed of any 
biographic project, as the transference becomes an odd correspondence between the texts 
one reads and writes, and one experiences a kind of suggestion in the suggested readings. 
Thus, much like Didier, age 10, we too “learn to read with Mme Dolto” (D’Ortoli & Amran, 
1990, 53). But it is a different kind of reading that reading Dolto teaches: one open to the 
transference—a fluid passage that escapes the constraints of direction, subject and time to 
convey what transits but exceeds the text—hearable precisely because it is other yet 
strangely recognizable. Thus the game of ‘who loses wins’ is a trope for the uncanny, that 
“return of what is familiar but repressed” (Freud, 1919b, 241 & 247) embedding an 
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indescribable sense of place, “homesickness” (Ibid, 245). Here, the game yields an 
unexpected gain: that the key function of the repression ‘barrier’ is ensuring the 
disremembering of the archaic, a becoming unconscious, so echoes feel as if they arrive 
from elsewhere, like our dreams on sound first did. Coming to reality, it seems, 
contradictorily requires tethers from the latent to the manifest to be unbroken yet forgotten. 
And the powerful theorization Dolto enables oddly presages Hanna Segal’s symbolic 
equations (1957/1981, 53), in another confluence of autobiography and history
24
:  
I had a very traumatic childhood. I think that if I had turned out to be schizophrenic, 
people would have said, ‘No wonder, with that childhood’…. The loss of the breast 
was combined with the loss of the person.... Some of my bloody governesses were 
French…. What kind of girl would go to Poland to be a nanny? (Segal in Quinodoz, 
2008, 1-6). 
 
Thus we learn with Dolto that the passive operation of the transference depends on the 
necessary surprise of refinding archaically invested phonemes—unconscious echoes across 
an enigmatic gap, recalling our originary dreams of discourse in utero, that call-and-
response with an indissociable other, the «père pré-symbolique», our first semblable, who 
first secures the enduring experience of a witness. Our earliest phantasies upon sound in-
form archaic terrains that help us be lured along associative paths—scaffolding that lets us 
translate our dreams into thoughts. And any real other with whom we exchange words—
even in texts—returns to us a letter whose transport he was not aware of effecting. For the 
transference paradoxically retains an absolute unchartability by which we will locate it—a 
trace, as our other Jacques of rue Saint-Jacques called it, “the subsistent presence of a 
«reste»” [remainder, everything else, ‘Stay.’] (Derrida, 1986c, 62). 
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Secrétan 
Dolto’s language reaches its arc in the “unconscious image of the body” (UIB), what 
many consider to be her “most important theoretical work” (Canu, 2009, 144), and for which 
she is widely known (Wikipedia, 2015a). Like art, the image is but a «médiation pour les 
dires» [sayings] (IIC, 16), a “game of words” (Grignon, 1997, 19): /i/ for identité; /ma/ for 
maman; and /ge/ for je [I] (Dolto & Nasio, 1987, 13). But unlike its simple name, the UIB, 
“mediatized by language” (Esterle, 2011, 16; also Paquis, 2008, 6), is “almost unintelligible 
in a theoretical register” (De Sauvernac, 1993, 245), thus best engaged passively: “We 
understand nothing  at all and then, we let ourselves go «dans le libre» and end up receiving 
it in a quite curious manner” (Petit in Grignon, 1997, 31). While taken up by some 
Lacanians (e.g., Guillerault), the UIB marks a “real divergence with Lacan” (Yannick, 
1999b, 398; also Gerrardyn & Walleghem, 2005, 299; Wikipédia, 2015d), being “the 
articulation of a subject who is neither temporal nor spatial…a subject of desire in terms of 
not only a witness, but an actor in his own history by the intermediary of the body” (IIC, 
370). I submit that the UIB actually offers a boldly original narration of primary narcissism 
with reference to the passive pulses that continually inform an unconscious self-as-otherness 
woven from phonemes: 
This «pregnance des phonèmes les plus archaiques»…shows that the unconscious 
image of the body is the structural trace of the emotional history of a human being. It 
is the unconscious «lieu» (and present where?) from where is elaborated all the 
expression of the subject: «lieu» of emission and of reception of interhuman 
languaged affects (IIC, 48). 
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At a «colloque» in 1958 (Archives Françoise Dolto, 2001c; see JD, 60-95), Dolto first 
suggests the UIB as the «médiateur de présentifications» (ironically) outside space and time 
(JD, 72-73). This tension of presence and absence alerts us to 1957: Mlle died; Dolto went 
to Egypt (Babouches?) and Vienna (AI, 97; VC1, 23; VC2, 262-263, 267 & 508); and she 
wrote key papers on art (APP) and regression (SS). And in 1958, Catherine (b. 1946) turned 
12, her own age when Jacqueline died. At another «colloque» (1985), Dolto states that, 
“what someone lived at a certain age will play on his child of the same gender at the same 
age” (1985/1989b, 123). Thus does the UIB carry the traces of its re-sourcing in the archaic. 
In fact, the death of loved ones severs a key source of invested phonemes. Dolto 
notes mutes lack semiotic elements for their alimentation (VC2, 701), and sudden weaning 
(lost sources of affect) causes mutism (IIC, 215), as does suffering (PF, 47;SS, 216). In other 
words, one’s own (fear of) near-death is a regressing ‘event.’ The mutism entailed offers a 
passive defense (CE, 21), metamorphosis to passivity (JD, 144), as we continue with another 
to exist (SP2, 149; SS, 24-25) in a «rêve d’exister» (IIC, 222)—a subtle link beyond space 
and time (PS, 53), refuge in “our mute sayings in the silences that scan them” (PS, 92-93): 
[Re symbolization] It follows that pre-language verbal phonemes have something of 
the paranormal…at once a perennial thing and language confounded with the relation 
child-mother or child-father: materialized language, phantom of unspeakable words, 
unconsciously conjugated with a sensory having-ness that seems to answer from a 
being-ness in a passive state that would passively conduct to the subject-being (IIC, 
64). 
 
Barely translatable, Dolto’s genius speaks at the nebulous edge of understandability,25 as 
writing laboriously relays archaic material—offering, like art, “demutization by graphic 
expression” (AI,217; also APP,38). Valuing art, Dolto saw 2-25 children daily, millions of 
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drawings (Nobécourt & Simonetta, 1978), and her legacy to art in analysis endures (e.g., 
François, 1999b). Yet she always sought the auditory in the visual: «ce qui est dit en dessin» 
[what is said in drawing] (D&R, 37; also Dolto & Nasio, 1987, 14; SP1, 26; SP2, 207). She 
herself joined art classes and contests as a child (AI, 119-121; EN, 79; PF, 26; VC1, 192 & 
238), producing self-portraits when she didn’t know «quoi prendre» [what to take (up)] (AI,  
101; ATP, 213), and 50 of her lovely pieces are in her corpus. We learn the nanny, too, was 
«artiste» (EN, 65). But the making of art itself is never what matters; rather, “what is needed 
is a witness” (VC2, 467; APP, 38), a “putting into resonance of affect by a witnessing” (AI, 
192; APP, 27), as true art is private (APP, 30 & 38). Thus graphic expression calls for a 
witness who looks only to hear. Does it call for a reader, then?  
Feeling our way to the archaic along symbolic filiations, we locate DanMé’s father, 
Pierre-Eugène Secrétan [‘sacred time’], a socialist-leaning industrialist whose telegraph 
address was «Tansecré» [‘sacred time’] (AI, 238). His factory (near Deauville) made the 
Statue of Liberty, so at his death in 1899, NYC gave Paris the replica now beneath the «Pont 
de Grenelle» and DanMé donated the copper casts to the Louvre; and when Jacques died, his 
widow gave the artist’s model to Paris City Hall (AI,245-248). Secrétan’s letterhead was 
«Toujours tout droit» [always straight ahead] (AI, 238), and his art collection included the 
«Angelus,» which was sold in 1889 to a US buyer when copper markets sank; it returned to 
the Louvre in 1909, oddly enough the year Dolto almost died (AI, 248; also, Note 10 & 20). 
A worker wrote a grand funeral hymn for him to «La Marseillaise,» for Secrétan had saved 
his company with the French patent for electrolysis: «le procès Elmore» [‘she dies’] 
(AI,246; Western & Co., 1892; Wikipédia, 2014h). Dominique curiously utters «Elmoru» 
five times in 1963 (CD, 109-100 & 156), as Dolto muses unselfconsciously: Is it a country? 
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The problem of the mother? (CD, 156). Dominique insists it is a «rivière invisible» and 
«secret» (CD, 109). We also learn the “sense of the sacred” is inherent (CE, 299), so a child 
“can identify with another who keeps secrets” (SP1, 88; SP2, 91), as a field of nuances 
paradoxically invokes repression, that secret history in which every child invests. Further, 
children should be told about family deaths, which provoke regression (JD, 226 & 252-53; 
1976,81), for the notion of death is what gives life meaning (CE, 202-204; LF, 233; SS, 124; 
VO, 49 & 102). Thus, cemeteries offer peace (PS, 100), even maternal security (SP2, 232). 
And finding one in Passy (Landru, 2008), just one block from Vineuse, it occurs to me only 
now that the nanny (who stole the «rivière de diamants») was likely said to have died. Then, 
in a handful of pages shifting quickly between death, Assisi, Santa and the «gratuit,» Dolto 
states the «sacré» [‘the unconscious creates’] exists “by the sheer fact we can pronounce it” 
(PJE, 66). Digressions thus mark the experience of reading Dolto, like visiting the Louvre— 
while correspondence from Secrétan moves straight ahead in her texts. Yet her astounding 
examples of the transference open a wide theoretical inroad: that in open circulation, where 
reversibility and multidirectionality inhere, any strict notion of countertransference is moot.  
Blue 
In March 1911, Maeterlinck’s grand fairy tale, «L’Oiseau bleu» debuted in Paris 
(ATP, 259; Albert-Buisson, 1965, 264). Its ‘blue bird’ could not but affect a two-year old 
who had just been a ‘blue angel,’ and the tale itself is full of phonemic play: Myltyl (a girl), 
her brother Tyltyl, Mother Tyl, Father Tyl, Tylô the dog and Tylette the cat. In her 20s, in 
Deauville, Dolto read Maeterlinck’s (1919), «Les sentiers [trails] dans la montagne» (VC1, 
176); while in her 70s, she describes Grandfather Demmler being like the one in «L’Oiseau 
Bleu» (ATP, 69). Riding the «train bleu» (to the Méditerranean) (EN, 26)—a play on «mes 
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dits»[my sayings], Midi, even Mititi—we meet a stunning ‘phantasy-as-fact’: Dolto insists 
on having «origines amérindiennes» in a «rêverie généalogique» of which she is “intimately 
convinced” (Potin in AI, 238-243). True, DanMé’s mother, Cécile Secrétan, did go to 
America to marry an Overnay, Irish-born (EN, 57), a name akin to another ancestor, 
Duvernoy [both homonyms for ‘of green born’] (AI, 236; VC2, 1014-1017; Provence, 1995, 
30-38). Dolto reports telling her dentist (in the early 60s), “Look, I have a hematoma!”—and 
the reply, “You have an Amerindian stain in your mouth…a blue stain” (AI, 239; ATP, 247; 
EN, 25 & 57). In 1963, Dominique (speaking of «Elmoru» and a train) describes a man 
sickened by a «piqûre au bleu» [blue needle/sting] («Club des Piqués»?), as she annotates: Is 
it a souvenir of a «hématome»…Or of the «maladie bleu» of the little dead cousin when 
Dominique was eight? (CD, 156). Thus the transference teaches that words, as inheritors of 
invested phonemes, inhabit an uncanny gap between the literal and symbolic across which 
our indelible dream histories, ostensibly ‘forgotten,’ inevitably find their way into thought. 
Like the UIB, the transference in texts is encountered passively: not by thinking, but 
by floating attention while reading. As Halmos counsels, Dolto’s is an “oeuvre in need of 
«passeurs»” (2000, 35): “How do you read her? Without method and haphazardly” (2008). 
So doing, thoughts seem given, arriving in the «résonance émotionelle» that is the 
“operational fact of the transference” (SS, 79). Thus, language effects a continuous 
“transference of things past, archaic things” (LF, 304; also SP1, 31) “through the words 
proferred by him and the emotion «éprouvée» by me” (Dolto & Nasio, 1987, 63), as 
“originary events reappear in the «après-coup d’un dire transférentiel»” (Dolto & Nasio, 
1987, 66; 1985c, 197). “Each time I speak with people, there is always a transference, and 
the other does half the road,” Dolto notes (in Destombes, 1989, 296); and as if anticipating 
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our work, “I transmit clinical documents concerning the transference, that of patients and my 
own…with hidden meaning I myself have not seen” (AI, 217; also VC2, 796-797). Thus, by 
signposts barely audible at first, personal shibboleth, correspondence arrives on unexpected 
roads. For example, Dolto’s note that Yvette Guilbert sang for Pierre’s 21st (in 1924; ATP, 
212) gains my attention as Freud befriends Guilbert from 1929 (Douville, 2009, 179; Freud 
Museum London, 1992; Wikipedia, 2015g). Following the trail by reading Guilbert
26—a 
«dame rousse» in «satin vert» featured at the «Chat Noir»—I find her song about a «nurse 
anglaise» (1927, 59, 75 & 221). Thus the ‘party’ offers a counter-narrative of deep losses: 
nanny, Jacqueline and Pierre. And Freud’s own interest in DaVinci’s vu lture returns his 
anxiety dream (1863-64), of he and his mother “carried…by two (or three) persons with 
birds’ beaks” (1900b, 583); its quanta increases when Emmy von M. (1888) dreams of a 
monster with a vulture’s beak (Breuer & Freud, 1893a, 62). For the transference in texts 
releases potent affects as we suddenly see only because we hear again—and «déja-vu» seem 
born of «déja-entendre.» 
Linotte 
We can follow trails of archaic material in texts simply because passivity is a mode 
of operation in its own right, one evoking Derrida’s “interpretation of the Freudian 
unconscious in terms of trace” (Roudinesco, 1986, 395). For as dream-work prescribes an 
itinerary of transference, writing serves the “duty of testimony” (VO, 193) as “the act of 
leaving a trace” (SP1, 46; also PS, 101). I recall Freud’s ardent desire for a plaque marking 
the secret of dreams (1896/1954e, 322; 1900a, 121). And Dolto, too, is keen to publish (AI, 
218; VC2, 796-797), even self-publishing the book that “started psychoanalysis in France” 
(Roudinesco in Coronel & De Mezamat, 1997a). She observes: “Some are capable of going 
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back in relation to their time, as a result of their history or a belated understanding of their 
history” (DW, 140); and “by the mediation of psychoanalysts who expose their work, 
successful or not…patients…come to the help of future analysands and practicing analysts”  
(AI, 217; VC2, 796-797). In fact, a child is written from the first, “inscribed in the civic 
record” (IIC, 94; SP3, 147), like little Jacques. Dolto’s childhood art was often printed in 
L’Écho de Paris (EN, 73; VC1, 110-111); even with Boris, “I was first a person who had 
written an interesting book” (D&R, 22). Yet ironically, an unfinished autobiography (1979-
80; in AI) set against a flurry of prefaces (1965, 1967, 1977b, 1979b, 1979c, 1985d, 1985e 
& 1989c)—and a stunning biography of Dolto for children (Farkas and Ratier, 2011) crafted 
only from line drawings and sparse text—deliver her most vital message: the «non-dit» 
always exceeds the said. Thus the human constructed in symbolic relations necessarily 
harbours an otherness he can never contain: “This other, that is myself, I love him too,” says 
Dolto (VC2, 14). Further, as an indelible countersignature, the transference testifies to 
authorship—just as Freud said of St. Anne with Two Others: “After…some time, it suddenly 
dawns on us that only Leonardo could have painted it…the picture contains the synthesis of 
the history of his childhood (1910b, 112). Indeed, Dolto’s testimony offers rare “proof that 
we are dealing with the impressions from childhood” (Freud, 1900a, 189), and Dolto’s 
corpus confirms the radical truth of her theories: the infant has a vibrant unconscious life. 
But we readjust our hearing a little now to listen to her raw dream material, «4 rêves sur 
Laforgue,» written on the back of a wedding invitation in 1934, and cross-matched with her 
diary:  
Diary entry, 27 February: Phone Milou. Lunch at Pierre’s with Philippe and Marc. 
Good [italics hers]. Dreams 27-28 February: One, a young woman predicts that all 
175 
 
marked with a symbol is “good,” and her tea service is so marked. After a man takes 
her, she escapes into Two, a salon full of dancing people, including a thin, nebulous 
female [Dolto sketches her in a long dress and cape]. Four people stop laughing as 
Philippe arrives, angry, with an older man who “wants to be a doctor.” The doctor has 
ugly, sinking eyelids but shows that her own eyes are not properly opened—her ‘dead 
eyes.’ “So I am ashamed and say, ‘This man is strong who has guessed my life from 
this «mois»[month/me].’But I laugh to hide from him that I am «piquée au 
vif»[deeply].The doctor tells Philippe,“She laughs, but we have understood each 
other…we will go progressively.” Three:“Father at Deauville...me at L[aforgue’s]. 
Father and Mother.” Four:“A narrow boat leaves for England.” (AI, 140-143)  
 
Here are remnants of the day in use by the dream, as the lost nanny and analyst are brought 
together in phantasy on the (real) occasion of a wedding, at the hotel where love and 
suffering continue to reside—and there is a curious marking in English at orality (the tea 
set), as-if literalizing a trace. Dolto’s rush to write it on a pre-used, discarded surface (rather 
than in her journal) symbolizes what is, and is not, inscribed in biography. Daydreaming, we 
find 28 July 1988, when Dolto says she was «mort pour de rire» [dead for a joke], i.e., in a 
coma (D’Ortoli & Amran, 1990, 253). Waking after three days, she hurriedly writes to a 
colleague, for while dreaming, “the thought of you and of your request, refused by me, came 
back…I authorize you to use my name Françoise Dolto to «parrainer» your social 
realizations” (VC2, XXIX; VC2, 899 & 899f). So it was that Philippe Béague, a Flemish 
educator and analyst (e.g., 2009, 2010), became the conduit by which the right to Dolto’s 
sponsorship passed to HRH Queen Mathilde of Belgium, who currently endorses a parallel 
«Association Françoise Dolto» (1989). In turn, this question of the name, Dolto, as the 
«nom-dit» passed between these two nations is a most uncanny actualization of a statue on 
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«avenue Montaigne» honouring the «Guerre de 14-18,» with two women as France and 
Belgium, holding hands, harbouring children between them (Wikipédia, n.d.). 
Dolto’s corpus conveys palpably the unbreakable tether of text to dream, and the 
radical unforeseenness of the transference. Thus, she takes care to scribe in the clinic almost 
word-for-word (CD, 6 & 218; IIC, 303): “When you heal, which I hope, we will understand 
the road you followed” (D&R, 18)—“It was a method I applied, that is all” (Ibid). For “it is 
that, to be a psychoanalyst, to note the most possible” (AI, 8). Thus, she is with Dominique, 
“the one who writes what you say” (CD, 110), not unlike Sammy telling McDougall (1969, 
1),“Write what I dictate.” In fact, writing helps not only the patient: “What I received…it 
was not at that moment that I made the connection. I made the connection writing my thesis” 
(EN, 119). And a rich homonymic return takes us to 1938 and Jeanne, 13, derided as a 
«linotte» [linnet; i.e., dodo]. “It[‘s]…a little bird,” Dolto explains, “[But] a «linotte» [‘read 
note’] is very nice and knows enough to make its nest, cover its eggs and take care of its 
young” (MA, 251). Thus, by scribing the “representative signs of phonemes” (IIC, 75), we 
too “arrive at thoughts that surprise [us]” (Freud, 1901a, 672). Further, the “writing…by 
which the intensity of self-observation may be increased varies considerably according to 
the subject-matter” (Freud, 1900a, 103). Young-Bruehl, for example, experienced the 
transference while writing on Arendt  (1982) and A. Freud (1988), and she believes 
“biographers sometimes have a crucial dream in which their subject appears” (1998b, 3), as 
the “biographer relates in the medium of fantasy to the subject’s fantasy (Ibid); her 
approach—as “a celebration of the subjectivity of biographers” (Ibid, 44)—richly endorses 
the notion that something important is learnable from the transference in texts.
27
 And as “it 
is a common event for a dream to give evidence of knowledge…the waking subject is 
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unaware of possessing”(Freud, 1900a, 14), I offer two from my research trip to Paris in 
2014:  
15-16 July: Dolto, about three years old, appears to me and says, sadly [and 
bilingually]: “I ask every day, «mais où est le collier» [but where is the necklace?], 
and no one ever says, ‘that’s right, that’s a big problem.’”17-18 July: I awaken in the 
night with a jolt, and I hear loudly, slowly, in an odd voice as-if from inside my 
bones: “It was crucial for patients to have their own words read back to them, this 
script-girl function, making biographies.” 
 
And from this transference of dream-work between subject and object—enigma textured 
with confirmation—I can begin to end this psychobiography of Dolto in four final notes.  
Archaic echoes 
By reading, Dolto states, “two beings communicate” (in Severin, 1978, 164), through 
 a “mediator [who] permits us…to have…by his words some thoughts that are its inheritors” 
(PM, 56). Again, she presages our project, as we seek by her texts to inherit her thoughts, 
and mingling our words with hers, we write what Derrida calls, an “interlacing of «voix»  
[voice(s); homonym: ‘lane’] and «envois» [dispatches; homonym, ‘in voice’] in writing” 
(1982, 76)—his fine play lost, like much of Dolto’s, in translation. And as unconscious 
resonances in writing suddenly become hearable through our availability while reading—
attention to the barely audible—archaic echoes return, like après-coup, to “disrupt, disturb, 
entangle forever the reassuring distinction between…past and future” (Derrida, 1995a, 80). 
On (in) the gap across which they return, we re-find a ‘simple’ comment, easily overlooked: 
“I accord much importance to the thought of neutral «lieux»” [sites; homonym: ‘read them’; 
‘link (to) them’] (QS, 64). For in a small note on safe spaces, unconscious play offers text as 
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materia (space) for the othering of the archaic and its return, as our other Jacques continues 
to interpret: “Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and becoming-unconscious of the 
subject” (Derrida, 1967b, 100). Dolto remarks how “a fruitful encounter is produced only 
when both give and neither takes the given he received from the other” (VC2, 370), in a 
“giving to the other what one never possessed” (PS, 92)—i.e., the non-ownership of the 
transference inscribed by reversibility—as “they give of themselves in a presence that is 
ignored, rich with this life that inhabits them…that «ruisselle» [trickles] from themselves” 
(PS, 61). And as thought is passively displaced, without intention, in the transference, 
psychical energy is released in the après-coup of words—ergo, phonemes retain the potential 
energy of a displacement. After all, Dolto says, the unconscious is designed to show effects 
much later (QS, 58). Iterativity and anachronism are inherent in unconscious inscription. 
And in this liquid space of Dolto’s texts, wherein the archaic interrupts, insists and 
enriches, we meet Jean Rostand, a famous biologist fascinated by life in utero (e.g., 1953; 
VC2, 186; Wikipédia, 2015f). ‘Eight days’ after her dissertation, Rostand wrote her that it 
was his most interesting reading since Freud (D&R, 16; SF, 38; VC, 18 & 37). During 
regular visits, he prodded her, What did you see? “It made me work,” she says (D&R, 22); 
and Sundays, she attended his salons for “biologists, writers, theatre people” (Ibid). Rostand 
helped publish the 2
nd
 edition (1939/1965, 6), wrote an homage to Laforgue (1964), and 
named his only son François. Oddly enough, in 1939, she proposes a delayed, “larval” 
Oedipus Complex (MA, 93) as potential energy in the unconscious. But things neither end 
nor begin here. For Bonaparte’s secretary, Anne Berman (an analyst and translator of 
Freud), wrote her dissertation on «La famille des borraginacées (BNF, 2015):  forget-me-
nots. Oddly near is Gauthier, 85 in 1995(!), formerly a mycologist (Bessey, 1950, 178; 
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Gallica, 1937)—as the larvae, fungi and plants arriving out of nowhere also return Freud’s 
dream, the “Botanical Monograph” (1900a, 169 & 191). Born of the après-coup of archaic 
transferences, do we simply seek witnessing in archaic life? In fact, continuity with the 
archaic is the aim of passive pulses, as Dolto elaborates throughout her project. Thus we 
need the echo of an address, a «repère», to console our slow (never complete) passage to 
reality: “To perceive…is to perceive the self-other that makes the unity of the subject” 
(Dolto & Hamad, 1984/1995, 68), to “refind familiar affect” (in Malandrin & Schauder, 
2009, 215):  
On the «voie de l’hypothèse de regression» of the affect of the subject…an archaic 
image of the body without doubt resurges on the occasion of a trial of his history to 
which the subject cannot renounce without «du même coup» [at once] losing the 
notion of «sa continuité, sa sécurité d’exister.» So he can neither accept himself, nor 
accept to communicate with others, in the conditions of his actual reality that do not 
permit him to recognize ‘the other’ sufficiently «semblable» to himself to be in 
security with him (SS, 24). 
 
By the transference, encounters “produce resonances in the unconscious of one and the 
other” (SP3, 14), offers of «secours indispensable» to his «reconnaissance» (VC2, 219; also 
SF, 209). Thus, the phoneme is vital: “the word is an «object transitionnel» the child 
acquires to never be separated from it” (Dolto & Nasio, 1987, 24). For it is through the 
phoneme that we transfer our attention to words, porting libidinal investments, as «la 
parole» “demands to be awakened” (SP3, 129); conversely, the subject experiencing dis-
continuity in reality, “exhaust[s] himself from not having any «rencontre faisant écho» 
[echoing encounter]…to give him coherence”(Ibid). As Dolto puts it plainly: “Nothing is to 
repair, nor replace. It is to effect a relay all along” (in Malandrin & Schauder, 2009, 252). 
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Perception thus dissembles a melancholy born of our debt to an enigmatic archaic witness, 
an incalculable culpability, whereby the human condition is marked by ontological 
suffering. And so, the remainder of life is a narrativisation of the way we can live in, and 
with, forgetting: the impossibility of pardon and its necessity. Our gift of survival is 
something we must understand without and beneath words, for it is a profound challenge to 
our conscious comprehension—unthinkable.  
Narrative revolt 
 
Not only does the transference guarantee a narrative revolt, but it predicts that what 
arrives must surprise by a mismatch between intention and conveyance. Here we take as 
examples Lacan’s terms, such as «parlêtre» (1979; e.g. LF, 277); and «lituraterre» (1975; 
e.g., Soler, 2008), etc. His “game of calculated disorthography,” as Soler (2008) calls it—or, 
what Roudinesco calls “a game of words, calculated lapsus, or mockeries” (2011, 75)—is a 
deep provocation to thought. But it is not unconscious play. Who knows how inevitable 
unconscious relations with Dolto may have affected famous French writers of her time, like 
Lacan, her colleague—or former patients, like the playright, Jacques Audiberti (VC2, 123, 
129, 139 & 139f; Wikipédia, 2015e), and the novelist, George Perec (Wikipédia, 2014j). But 
the transference changes how we listen. Thus the Dolto reader cannot help but pause on 
learning that Lacan’s reportedly contentious «L’expérience de la Passe» (1978; Wikipedia, 
2015c), with its «passeurs» and «passants,» was read at Deauville, where war had already 
been declared—and Secrétan, the beloved Irish nanny and Babouches all passed into history.   
Dolto’s texts overturn traditional theory, as asides hold significance, what arrives 
passively is the most valuable, and there is an “enormous animation of silence” (TL, 154). 
Dolto teaches us to listen to the “investment behind words” (DW, 22)—the “force that filters 
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through words” (SP1, 136). Further, as Dolto elaborates a backward narrative, regression to 
autism, she reveals autism as regression. And since the transference does exit us from 
infantile regression, Dolto is optimistic about recovery from autism: “all that is living is still 
living in language” (TL, 77) as, poignantly, the observant child “refinds roads and retains 
names” (SP2, 68). In fact, Dolto finds so many inroads in theory that a new continent is 
discovered: the archaic. If this is not genius, what is?  Canu sums it up perfectly: Dolto “went 
forward in a region she called “the archaic” (2009, 161). Thus Dolto underwrites the story of 
birth with a living source in the unconscious and a securitization of reality that permits our 
survival by «voies d’accès» of language via the transference traversing words, mediating 
objects transporting and ensuring continuity with fetal audition in echo—memorials of 
witnessing in a past that is ever-present. And while biographers rarely consider their subject’s 
first two years, Dolto’s corpus shows convincingly that adult achievements are undeniably 
linked to infancy (also noted by Grignon, 1997, 25). Thus, what Dolto proposes contradicts 
the human narrative by giving a «place de sujet à l’enfant» (Halmos, 2000, 33-35), as a 
complex being engaged in a vibrant archaic history: “one who has already unconsciously 
thought about his life without living it is very powerful…this is case with babies…theirs is a 
«souffrance du livre» [book; also, being delivered/born] (Ribowski, 2004). Dolto evokes here 
not only what life writes upon us, but narrativization itself as the work of infancy, of all “until 
the confirmed conquest of mobility, that is, all that precedes «l’oédipe» and that is inscribed 
in the unconscious, that the body assumes in lieu of being able to become conscious of it” 
(VC2, 640). In turn, it is the loss of “the right to know what he knows” that “prevents the 
development of mental life” (CE, 265)—losing the right to one’s story. And while Dolto’s 
brilliance stuns, she always defers to patients: “Theory without examples serves nothing, 
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whereas an example without theory can still serve” (SP3, 8)—asking, “Is there any other 
pedagogy but that of the example?” (VC2, 540). With Dolto, then, we observe theory as the 
site of accidental autobiography—and conversely, how archaic histories of love and suffering 
construct theory in après-coup. And of this transference of the autobiographical in the 
theoretical in Dolto, as Freud made clear (with himself as example, nowhere more than in his 
dream book), “the fact a theory is psychologically determined does not…invalidate its truth”  
(1913/1953, 179). In a burst after her coma (1988), as otherness nears, I believe Dolto offers 
the key to her entire project: «L’acceuillant» [welcome] is in availability and «non-savoir» 
[not knowing;underline hers] (VC2, XXIX; VC2, 899]. Her obituary, three weeks later, 
honours her “simplicity and warmth,” and her “oeuvre of listening” (Ina.fr., 1988). And 
listening to Dolto, we find just what Freud predicts: “wish fulfilment is in the chain of 
intelligible waking mental acts” (1900a, 122), as “the secondary elaboration of dream-content 
is identified with the work of waking thought” (1900b, 499). We also observe what Freud 
said of himself: “There runs through my thoughts a continuous current of personal reference” 
(1901b, 24). Thus Dolto teaches us to ask a new question of any theory: what is 
autobiographical about it?  
Trace 
Thinking with Dolto, we can narrate the trace as a valuable «repère» to repair 
continuity—a relay to the father’s library (a «récupération»?) we might say, circulation on a 
phantasy of a common interest in the word. The recovery of continuity through the 
transference in texts is possible simply because reversibility and inseparability inhere in the 
archaic, so the animated silence of reading effects, unconsciously, I hear/I am heard. Thus 
the trace offers proof of life, confirmation of/by the «père pré-symbolique.» Without that 
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(«ça»), we wait continually, exhausted, Dolto says—whereas “the desire to die is greatly 
reduced if someone hears” (SP3, 10). The trace delivers a letter of love in après-coup, 
“communication beyond space-time” (PS, 33), whose “message can cover many centuries 
before meeting an other” (TL, 78). And (while talking of tadpoles) Dolto notes a “putting 
into resonance of his affectivity, by a similitude of being, of the affect or thought evoked in 
him by this witnessing of the author” (AI, 192). From 1939, Dolto finds “traces of the 
complex of castration” (MA, 9), for we “keep a trace of the first «lien perdu» [lost link; 
homonym: ‘father owed’] (SS, 113; also DV, 51)—i.e., our ontological debt. Thus, in 
“speech and hearing [a] trace of archaic security remains” (SS, 26), compellingly 
implicating literacy: 
Hic et nunc…communication can also be deposited in traces on paper…as differed 
and diffracted portions in effects parallel to verbal language, or substituted for it, that 
need to be ‘heard.’ Psychoanalysis aims for the study and the deciphering of this 
unconscious language «sous-jacent» consciously communicated language hic et nunc 
(CD, 195-196; italics hers). 
 
Literally suspended between here and now, Dolto exposes a fine tension where not only do 
traces mark writing, but traces mark the subject. She elaborates: “His [the infant’s] most 
subtle functioning is marked by/of writing, we could say, like a network of lines of force, of 
traces, left by inter-relational language” (SF, 207). And as the archaic is moot for space-
time, texts “keep bearing fruit…even if you are long dead” (TL, 76). Thus, Dolto listens for: 
Hidden truth transmitted by the «fil» [thread] of associations in spoken language… 
unconscious meaning…truthful foundation of this ‘subject,’for which conscious 
discourse… is the carrier of his irreducible authenticity…Concomittant 
phantasms…«transparaissent» [transpire; appear in transit] in silences, in jumps of 
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theme, in lapsus, in brief, in «les failles»[failings, ruptures] of conscious discourse. 
It is these phantasms that «décèlent» [detect, reveal] the actual dynamic, 
unconscious, of desire (CD, 196-197; italics mine). 
 
Simply put, “writing leaves traces” (SP3, 236)—while homonyms are portentously mute in 
Dolto’s list. Klein herself suggests “strokes, dots, etc. of the present script…are the result of 
condensation [and] displacement” (1923/1998, 66f)—dream-work—while Freud discusses 
an “unconscious psychical trace” (1896d, 154), and how “phantasy carries traces of its 
origin” (1908a, 149). As Dolto explains, the «tissu langagier» (SO, 531) of a text is a 
“witness to suffering or joy…as proofs of the [author’s] affect…making us feel a 
«semblable constitution emotionelle»” (SF, 209). Thus there follows both a duty to leave 
testimony and the inevitability of doing so—in a return of Pierre the reader cannot miss:  
The very fact of writing is for leaving a witnessing. The one who has written or has 
created, to witness his passage, does so for others. These are witnessings that we 
gather like blades of grass, everywhere! For example, someone goes to the high 
mountains, to repair a shelter demolished by a storm…It’s «ça», the human being!  
His behaviour is always with rapport to an «oeuvre commune» that, even if it is not 
in the same moment, is an oeuvre in time. Alpinists will return the next season, they 
will find sugar, oil, because the conquest of the mountain is an «oeuvre 
commune»…an oeuvre in time (VO, 193-194). 
 
The revolt the unconscious promises is inevitable because reality causes “contradiction 
[that] leaves traces in the libidinal economy” (IIC, 325), as “the archaic affect of the fetal 
epoch leaves its living traces in narcissistic organo-emotional representative associations” 
(LF, 90). Thus we “each have a «rapport narcissisé (traversé de narcissisme)» to sensory 
elements in resonance with vocabulary words” (IIC, 44), and concomittant “hearing 
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available to all significant traces” (CD, 193f). Fittingly, then, just after «Tout est langage» 
(1987), Dolto states, “Now I feel I have finished writing” (VC2, 858).28 And querying with 
Dolto just how ‘all is language,’ we come upon the libidinal story of ideas in powerful 
evidence that since “the unconscious is a fact of the human species” (VO, 34), the word is a 
testament to discursive forces from somewhere entirely other. Language is neither fully real 
nor fully rational—outside the traditional jurisdiction of teaching and learning. And via the 
trace, the surprisingly nuanced «rôle de script-girl» (imbibed with humble service, and 
counter-signed in the nanny’s tongue) indeed acquires staggering value in après-coup, as a 
recollection of our young analyst pre-1913 returns with the cadence of theory. For she notes 
that when she first wrote, another could read what she herself could not. Related, Dolto’s 
pivotal observation is that scribing a patient’s words (spoken in the presence of a witness), 
then rereading these notes to him at a later date, secures the transference for him, thus 
enabling his presentification. Reciprocally, annotating a patient’s words, and privately 
rereading these notes to herself at a later date, secures the transference for her, thus enabling 
her intervention. Can we say, then, that rereading analytic notes can secure the trace for the 
writer and reader? We also recall that the defining quality of the archaic transference 
situation (original bio-graphy, writing-by-two) is its utter fluidity: a timeless, spaceless, 
reversible, indissociable, unconscious subject-witness—(reader-writer?)—when phonemes 
of common interest in dream-work become mediating objects that lure to reality. But don’t 
archaic echoes naturally occur (ergo, arrive) in one’s own texts? So doesn’t rereading 
biographical fragments offer archaic-systonic play: an anachronous, randomized, passive 
encounter with invested phonemes? Can archaic continuity be restored through the 
transference in texts securable by the sufficient othering of one’s words (to surprise): by 
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time (forgetting, non-chronology); space (publishing, re-arranging); or an other (inscribing, 
translating)? Thus, our script-girl enlists trace in a startling provocation of pedagogy: can 
key literacy practices be curative? So Dolto fuels our curiosity even as we depart, as we 
realize the finest correspondence retrievable from the archaic is not knowledge per se, but 
the desire to know heralding the «désir de vivre.» In turn, we come to understand Dolto’s 
genius, and the transference, through word plays—most notably, homonymic transfers—that 
arrive in such quanta in her texts as to defy coincidence, and that become readable in our 
anachronological approach: our treating her writing like notes, condensing dispersed 
material around indexical phonemes that repeat haphazardly in the après-coup of her archaic 
history. So we secure meaning by translation, as we enter into a kind of co-writing, a chain 
of custody, with her. Then again, is this not how narcissism, as biography, always starts? 
A passive education 
Dolto once told her daughter, “a good mother is one you can leave” (AI, 12). Thus I 
end my psychobiographic study of Françoise Dolto, whose evidence, at least as convincing 
as DaVinci’s, enables us to “find meaning in the forgotten word…[so] stray thoughts can be 
linked to a forgotten history and narrated anew” (Britzman, 2011, 47). With Dolto, we 
uncover the infant’s crucial testimony that “we creatures of impression are affected by what 
is not known, so learn before we can understand” (Ibid). Montaigne is right: our principal 
government is in the hands of «nourrices» [wetnurses, infant carers] (1580/1958a, 114). For 
childhood experiences have a determining influence for the whole of later life (Freud, 
1901b, 46; 1905c, 239; 1909b, 36), the earliest legating the most (Freud, 1896a, 214). Dolto 
affirms that as infants [infans], we are fully alive unconsciously: hearing, being written upon 
by life—even writing a little story of our own in dreams where we are never alone. From 
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here, “past, present and future are strung together… on the thread of the wish that runs 
through them” (Freud, 1908a, 148; also 1900b, 621; 1900a, 184). And by putting 
psychoanalysis at the service of biography (Freud, 1930, 212) as I hope I have, we “obtain 
information that could not be arrived at by other means” (Ibid). Learning in the transference 
with Dolto and the children who teach us so much—Bernadette, Dominique, and many 
others—is a passive education proffering decisive evidence that phonemes hold a potential 
for displacement, as “oral libido continues lifelong… slowly integrating other modes” (SS, 
269). While the animated silence of the archaic—the “origin of language as protective 
isolation” (CD, 192)—makes deeply ironic the mother tongue, in the bittersweet game of 
reality that calls for our learning to speak and to self-mute: 
[From, “In the game of desire, the dice are loaded and the cards are rigged”:] In this 
phenomenon of the cry, incompatible with attention…is inscribed an endogenic 
necessity to repress for (to obtain) a certain pleasure. The pre-subject himself 
represses a pulsion of passive expression…to focus his energy on an active pulsion, 
the cry (JD, 284). 
 
Thus, keeping silent in same stream by which we speak, we are all like Dolto’s favourite 
statue, «La Marseillaise de Rude,» “mute and wailing” (EN, 37).With Dolto, 
“psychoanalysis has taught us that desire can manifest by active pulses, but also by passive 
pulses” (ES, 14). But despite all we learn, the unknowable inhabits Dolto’s corpus. Dubois 
(1994) notes the “strange strangeness of meeting her,” and the English reader new to Dolto 
may well experience that strangeness. Yet the problem with Dolto is precisely what makes 
her so important: her opening onto the archaic. And it is by archaic means that she conveys 
the infant’s ‘reality’: a non-time, non-space of inseparability, reversibility and passivity 
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where we only hear ‘with, as-if, through’ an ‘other.’ Dolto reveals an intimate 
correspondence whereby presentification via a mediating object makes preconscious the 
transference therein, and we survive just because we never leave the source of life, our oral 
passive origins, wherein we are receptive, in receipt of a bequest and a debt without whose 
reconnaissance life has no sense. So narrating the archaic, we too encounter the big question 
of our little analyst, as the dilemma of existence is posed not only in, but of, childhood: we 
spend our lives in service of a gift that can’t be understood, or repaid, or forgotten, or 
remembered. 
Françoise Dolto’s breathtaking oeuvre delivers unprecedented proof of the archaic 
origin of language, the precocity of the emotional world, the pre-symbolic witnessing 
underwriting survival, and the living legacy of the unconscious to human achievement. And 
what the present work attempts, in trying to gather some of the après-coup of Dolto’s texts 
into a given space and time, I again leave to Montaigne to explain: “I do not portray the 
being, I portray passing” (1580/1958b, 18). For the vital fact we learn, with her, is that the 
‘time of the dream’ is actually never over. Thus, it isn’t that we can’t live without the 
transference, but simply that we do not.  
Conclusion 
Arriving at the point of departure, and reflecting on my work as a whole, Derrida’s 
question frames my thoughts: “What, then, are the chances of the readability of such a 
discourse against its unreadability?” (1998, 72). For a survey reveals the oddity of a vast 
textual terrain imbibed with homonymic word plays and echoes in wild transits, and the 
absolute illogic of the transference in texts. Seeking perspective, I refind Dolto’s advice: 
“Let us begin again from Freud’s discovery that libido is linked to the principle of pleasure” 
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(Dolto-Marette, 1947, 795; JD, 122). Beginning anew with Freud, “libido is an expression 
taken from the theory of emotions” (1921, 90); and by elaborating thought as the derivative 
of dream-work, Dolto’s corpus reveals that the intellectual world is beholden to the 
emotional world. Also back to Freud, “the high valuation of the word seems to contain the 
meaning that perceptions can become conscious only by being given a name” (1907/1962, 
150); and by manifesting the lifelong resonance of archaic echoes, Dolto shows how the 
phoneme is vital to presentification. I offer that even the word for an infant—«nourisson» 
[«nouris son», ‘fed sound’]—seems like a «jeu de forces», as he makes of words his 
alimentation, ‘digesting’ phonemes in his archaic emotional world. What of early ‘reading’ 
then—stories heard while ‘falling’ asleep? Is there any practical difference if words come 
from life or a book? And with the young child’s nascent (impartial) investment in 
consciousness, are words regularly delivered (correspondence, subscriptions) as-if punctual 
milk sustaining early survival—reliable provision somewhere between reality and phantasy? 
And if a word is a feeding, what is literature? Of the dream-work of words, then, I believe it 
is as Freud once put it, “we have acquired no new fact, but only a more comprehensive 
view” (1914c, 151). Of course, Freud is widely recognized for contributing to literary 
studies (e.g., Ciabattari, 2014). Yet psychoanalysis is oddly absent where we might expect it, 
as in the «théorie de la réception» by Jauss (1967), with “horizons of waiting,” and catharsis 
by identification contingent on prior reading (Leblanc, 2005; Marzloff, n.d.; Starobinski, 
1978). After all, “wishful activation will produce the same thing as a perception” (Freud, 
1895, 319); and with Dolto, we understand identification inherits from fusion—that passive 
co-living circulating affect, the archaic transference situation. As we develop, we just 
migrate our investments (by substitutions, as new editions)—like finding bigger shells. For 
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example, as a young man, Freud signed ‘Cipión’ writing to Silberstein (‘Berganza’) for 10 
years, identifying with the psychological “Dialogue of the Dogs” (1613) by Cervantes 
(Boehlich, 1990; Riley, 1994). And Lucy Maud Montgomery’s journals detail her changing 
identifications over a lifetime of reading (Woster, 2015).  
Enigmatically, Freud once said, “reading is a terrible infliction imposed upon all who 
write” (1896/1954c, 270). Drive theory predicts, in fact, that we will resist abandoning a 
libidinal position. Yet it is also true that, “the universal and indispensable attribute of all 
instincts…[is] their capacity for initiating movement (1909a, 140-141)—in other words, 
there is a “need of the unconscious for liberation” (1907/1962, 102).  This tension between  
inertia and circulation marks psychical life as an economic response to environmental 
impingements, ergo the necessity to vent affect. This need is so essential to survival that a 
mechanism ensures it lifelong, passively, unconsciously. We recall that dreams follow old 
facilitations (1895, 340)—and we add now that in an affective state, facilitation prevails 
(Ibid, 357). For economic reasons, then, we port investments using well-worn pathways 
proliferating since our prehistory; thus, we are naturally lured by unconscious identifications 
continuous with those facilitations. Is this not Dolto’s symbolic filiation? Eventually, 
migrations of investment move us towards reality: “conscious systems of thought…are 
merely projections…translations… from the unknown, unconscious” (Freud, 1907/1962, 
150). So we now formulate a new theory of reading wherein the transference in texts serves 
identification. For “identification is the original form of emotional tie with the object…[that] 
may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared…the more important this 
common quality is, the more successful may this partial identification become” (Freud,  
1921, 107-108). And, I offer, this is why the phoneme’s archaic investments are so crucial: 
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they open site-means of ‘partial identification’ in continuity (filiation, facilitation). Freud 
cites a patient:“‘If anyone speaks, it gets light.’ Thus what he was afraid of was not the dark, 
but the absence of someone he loved; and he could feel sure of being soothed as soon as he 
had evidence of that person’s presence” (1905c, 224f). Recalling that wishful activation 
produces the same result as a perception, echoes of invested phonemes serve unconscious 
identifications to relieve that most primal anxiety: ‘no one comes.’ Further, in fusion, an 
indissociable «semblable» [like-me] is securitizing; so we also tease out the origins of 
projection as a means, in phantasy, of making another ‘like-me.’ As it is governed by the 
principle of pleasure, the primitive ‘learning’ of projection seems to stall if there is 
precocious severing—i.e., as suffering and the loss of the ‘like-me’ enabling progression; 
the sequelae provokes regression (even fixation) to a prior, more passive libidinal position. 
Yet as wishful activation is securable along facilitations, the phoneme retains the capacity to 
return affect (archaic love). In sum, the transference in texts enables a kind of ersatz 
projection. Further, given that diffusion and diffraction open associative pathways for the 
transference, I believe we can infer something about the viability of identifications. For 
pathways most likely to be replete with archaic echoes prevail in the corpus of a beloved 
author (following his facilitations); in a beloved story retold in versions through history 
(filiations on names); ergo, also, in our own disremembered scripts. Of course, the closer to 
one’s actual reality, the shorter the road to sublimations. It is an understatement that reading 
influences structuration. 
The unconscious affect securable by the transference is only a later edition of the 
archaic transference situation—the dreams of our primary narcissistic state—thus, it returns 
a phantasy of provision. And any ‘other’ invested by the mother is a site-means for 
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investment along resonant associations: echoes. Such is the construction of the ‘father’ and 
access to language: it is indeed the ‘father’s library’ where, browsing passively, we find 
landmarks as precocious symbolization leaves us susceptible to unconscious authoring.  
Here, I offer a late arrival as I reread my notes: «page»—homonym, «pas je» [not I]. In fact, 
any page of mine is, yet is not, ‘me.’ This is the special relation of writing to dream-work: it 
disseminates libidinal investments, providing a context facilitating retrieval and elucidation: 
psychical self-sustenance. Writing transports invested phonemes as an unconscious act, so 
we inevitably leave (weave) a trace in our texts: there is always transference of the 
autobiographical. Yet we cannot manipulate or describe it ourselves—I can say nothing 
about the trace in my work. Only another can, for writing calls for a witness, and there is 
always an otherness to my writing that eludes and exceeds ‘me.’ Thus the transference in 
texts surprises us with what is living in us that we cannot know: it is a silent witnessing of 
the unconscious via unintentional writing, and unintentional reading. Our texts must simply 
be forgotten, dealigned or translated (transformed) to be unrecognizable to immediate 
perception. So Dolto’s ‘script-girl’ presents a new theory of writing as ‘inter-scripting’—co-
writing on the same ‘page’ across a gap of time-space. It is biography as interruption: “The 
most authentic drawings are drawn on a surface already valorized by «du vécu» [some lived] 
(1956, 31). Dolto thus reveals writing to be a sponsor of dream-work that uses remains of 
the day (reading) to make offers to the present, stratifying life on the already lived—while 
offering the most intimate identification (closest to the ‘knot’ [not?] of symbolic filiation) 
with ‘that’ [«ca»] inscribing upon us in a cadence of dreaming: the first witness, the ‘other’ 
of primitive life, the ‘writing before the phoneme.’ Akin to a pen by the bed, it induces the 
transference by paradoxical availability and non-intention—ardent waiting, oral passivity. 
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Like writing out dreams, inter-scripting makes dream-work preconscious on a terrain for 
exchange—‘passage for discharge’ (Freud, 1895)—as the transference is called upon, 
investing words as objects for thought. So the ‘write to think’ returns the ‘right to think.’  
And it is radically curative because witnessing archaic echoes makes reality feel safe: by the 
transference,“our cures are cures of love”(Freud, 1907/1962, 101); and “if the child finds the 
‘love’ in himself, he does not need the love of parents and teachers”(Ibid,35). Thus, we are 
all subject to dreaming on words. And with only hours left in three years of work, as I muse 
on being «civilisé» (from primitivity), I suddenly hear its homonym: «si vie lisez»[if life 
read]. What of that thought is new to me? What has been with me forever? I have no idea. 
Dolto’s project compels us to grasp that the word not only escapes the formal story 
but precedes it, entering into its own free associations. Reality is only ever a later edition of 
time-space where forgotten objects arrive unpredictably, in an uncanny circularity wherein 
object relations are always shored up by unconscious affects in continuity with the archaic. 
There is also an inevitability of the return of lost objects to which we remain resonant 
lifelong, as the articulation of subjectivity ‘with, as-if, through’ others in the social. Such is 
the bequest of oral passivity to language—our humanization through symbolic filiation. 
There is no absolute exit of objects from the field either, in an enigmatic retention of dream-
work as potential energy, as-if signed by the pulses of conservation. Thus, education inherits 
a peculiar complication, in that every moment of learning is incalculable, and it requires 
randomity, interruption, silence and revolts of ongoing narratives. Further, the social seems 
strikingly collapsible—a dilemma of meaning-making from unnarratable psychical activities 
that introduce hazards and gains we never register consciously, yet that impact our 
possibilities for living ‘economically,’ venting rather than suffering. For learning bypasses 
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and subverts conscious programs, while unconscious resonances make our accidents into 
meaning, and vice-versa. Dolto challenges our views of the pedagogical relation by a 
provocative narration continually sourced in the unconscious. And thus, arriving from 
elsewhere—affecting the futurity of meaning—a word can change a life. Here, Oedipus 
makes a last return upon his riddle—symbolic of the unsaid and unspeakable of human 
history—as the question of origins becomes a problem of translation between the 
neighbouring lands we all traverse: reality and phantasy. Through the transference in texts in 
Dolto’s corpus, I believe we reinvest literacy as vital psychical work, with staggering 
implications for education, linguistics and biography. Indeed, a thousand questions awaken 
in the après-coup of Dolto, but a deceptively simple one has me by the throat: ‘Are not 
libraries the most vital human institution safeguarding liberty?’ Thus, my hope for the reader 
of this psychobiographic study of Dolto is only as Levinas once wished—elsewhere, out of 
(apparent) context—that it be “not just that one learns words from it, but in it one lives ‘the 
true life which is absent’”(1982, 21).  ₪  
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Notes 
 
Chapter One: Introduction ~ Witness & Filiation 
  
1. Like Dolto, I believe a biographer should share her autobiography, as learning 
requires trust: “We are but human and we hold onto one another but by our word” 
(Montaigne, 1580/1958a, 33). Exploring bilingualism in my traumatic infancy (Saint-Onge, 
2013), I found the most difficult excavations concerned my early reading: fairy tales, 
National Geographic (covers), Beatrix Potter, Dr. Seuss and Alice (in Wonderland). Dolto’s 
desire to be doctor of education overlaps my own, as do some thoughts: e.g., “Am I the 
subject or the object of this weird art that is my body, my life?” (Ibid, 209, but written in 
2010, before meeting Dolto); and, “This lived trajectory that, in my solitude, I apprehend as 
my history, am I its object or its subject?”(PS, 61). Dolto, as a research topic, was kindly 
suggested to me by Deborah Britzman, when I had almost lost my ability to think and write. 
Ironically, I had been warned by a well-meaning mentor that psychoanalysis would take me 
away from language. In fact, it moved my sociocultural inquiry, as both a language teacher 
and linguist, “Why did I leave my mother tongue?”  to the question underpinning 
(undermining?) linguistics: “What is a word?” 
 
2. Lacan and Dolto are captured in an iconic photograph in 1963 that implies a 
parallel view (photo: VC2, 389). Yet I believe writers err when they consider them a 
theoretical couple (e.g., direct or implied reference in Hivernel, 2013; Golder, 2002a; 
Guillerault, 2003 & 2005; Roudinesco, 1986, 274, 519 & 649; etc.)—however prestigious. 
In fact, their views are far apart, and Dolto is unafraid to resist Lacan: «Je dis que lorsque 
Lacan croit que l’enfant…se réjouit de voir l’image de lui-même dans le miroir, et que cela 
le structure dans son unité, il se trompe. Cette expérience est une surprise toujours à effet 
d’étrangeté, parfois phobisante, morcelante» [I say that when Lacan thinks that the child…is 
pleased to see his own image in the mirror, and that this structures his unitariness, he is 
wrong. This experience is a surprise, always with the effect of an estrangement, sometimes 
inducing phobia, splitting] (SS, 225; VC2, 751). Their relation is best understood through 
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three interviews within two years of Dolto’s death (LF, 281-307; DW, 1986; D&R), and 
their correspondence. Dolto states often that she did not understand what Lacan said (e.g., 
DW, 65-67 & 70; LF, 281 & 282). She says he and Lagache often talked rudely through 
conferences (DW, 68), and she thought his short sessions caused suffering (DW, 81; LF, 
282), but she believed he used his seminars well to make up for them (DW, 81). In fact, 
Dolto attended Lacan’s seminars for years, finding “one or two pearls,” she declares (DW, 
69; LF, 290)—though she likens the remainder, tongue-in-cheek, to “a musical climate, 
perhaps in la minor” (DW, 69). She describes him as a “wounded maternal type” who 
sought disciples “like a wet nurse wants babies” (LF, 276), until no student could think for 
himself (LF, 286 & 299), as he tolerated no dissension (LF, 276-277 & 307). Yet she 
appreciates Lacan’s efforts to dissolve linguistic rules, since before him, no one gave enough 
value “to words and their meaning for the child’s unconscious prior to reading and writing” 
(LF, 276). Dolto credits Lacan’s capacity for «un régistre d’abstraction» (LF, 276 & 287), 
and for generating interest in psychoanalysis (LF, 295). But she bemoans that he did not 
sufficiently appreciate silence or resistance, causing him to «conscientisait» [make 
everything about consciousness], so that even his followers falsely believe that to speak of 
psychoanalysis is to speak of the intellect (LF, 282-284). Dolto and Lacan had arguments, 
mostly about publications and the EFP (LF, 302-304; VC2, 224-225 & 667-672; Wikipédia, 
2014g). They used the informal pronoun, «tu» (not without interest, a homonym of ‘kill’), 
because this was the code of the SPP (Wikipédia, 2014s), but they were never friends, she 
will say in retrospect (ATP, 148; D&R, 23; LF, 301). And Dolto opposed his efforts to close 
the EFP, when he issued a mock public notice on behalf of «l’objet a» announcing the 
«décès de l’inconscient» [death of the unconscious] (see notice: VC2, 667). Yet their 
correspondence is otherwise supportive and includes frequent thanks for her gifts (VC2, 
422; 462; 554; 602; etc.). And he apparently even sent her a few of his difficult cases 
(Coronel & De Mezamat, 1997a). Summatively, Dolto draws Lacan as a paradoxical image: 
he had value in elucidating suffering, but not for his patients (LF, 296); he did not 
understand the precocious stages, but at least he was without derision (DW, 81); he was 
ambitious, but not opposed to the ambition of others (VC2, 229); he experienced the wild 
transference of his students (CE, 342), yet suffered in solitude (LF, 277); if you stayed 
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yourself, he respected you (LF, 301)—but threw a chair when she would not take his side 
against Aulagnier (LF, 303); he was both a vibrant “cultural event” (DW, 69), a “dandy” 
(1962/1999, 32), and a “tragic artist-cleric” (LF, 297). Further, Dolto intuits (but cannot 
confirm) he lost his mother very young (LF, 286), believing, «Je suis désolée qu’on ait pas 
l’histoire de la vie de Lacan. Je trouve que là, il a manqué son devoir de psychanalyste» [I 
regret that we do not have a life history of Lacan. I find that in this, he failed in his duty as 
psychoanalyst] (ATP, 15). However, she trusted Lacan’s students as good listeners of 
children (ATP, 149; DW, 79; D&R, 25; Roudinesco, 1986, 353) who appreciated «les plans 
archaïques» (LF, 283), and she believed only his analysands could understand “what was 
anterior to Oedipus” (D&R, 1986/1988, 25). Thus she addresses Lacanians directly—but 
around the phoneme, not the mirror: “I think those among you who understand Lacan’s 
formulations on the Name-of-the-Father will find in it what I have said about the archaic 
prior to phonemization and writing” (SP2, 132). And it seems far more sensitive to their 
complex relation to consider the pair widely known as «petit et grand dragon» (Ibid, 277) as, 
instead, what Catherine Dolto calls them, «compagnons de route» (Pernicone & Dolto, 
2002). Thus, we allow for the possibility that some Lacanians may well locate a «non-dit» 
debt to Françoise Dolto, who for decades was indeed «l’interlocutrice de Jacques Lacan» 
(DeSauvernac, 1993, 67). And in playing as thinking—rather than trying to engage Dolto 
through Lacan, as history has sometimes been prone to do—perhaps we might consider 
doing precisely the reverse. We begin with his name, homonymically, «là? quand?» [there? 
when?]. In fact, Lacan and Lagache were sometimes called «l’Aga Khan» (LF, 293), both 
homonym and fusion, and Lacan enjoyed punning on his own name, as in his reference to 
speaking «à la cantonade» [from the side] (Lacan, 1964/1977, 208f). We further observe an 
odd movement in his «petit a,» effectively a phonemic inversion of «apetit» [appetite]—its 
single “p” over the modern “pp” being a signature spelling of archaic French (Greimas, 
1969, 35), when the word meant, “that which gives desire” (Ibid). Here are Dolto’s key 
notions—the archaic, fusion, the phoneme, oral passivity and desire—all in the transference 
on his own “Name-of-the-father,” through the unconscious conveyance of a reversal at the 
thin interface of reality, where place («là») and time («quand») elude. Thinking with Dolto, 
then, we can follow his libidinal history through his archaic phonemes, dream-work and the 
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transference in texts, to arrive at his theoretical notions of the mirror and the «Nom-du-
père»—and we also source the origin of his «petit a.» Thus I offer that we may find in Lacan 
another suitable example of the trace in psychobiography.  
To be honest, I have to admit that I appreciate Lacan more now than before I met 
Dolto. Their letters (their last years excepted) are warm and friendly, and I find it endearing 
that a man destined to be a humble mustard seller (Roudinesco, 2011, 22-24) instead became 
the “adventurer of his century” (Ibid,23). Lacan largely elaborated his thought between 1953 
and 1963 (Ibid, 77)—a time through which Dolto was “Lacan’s greatest friend” (Ibid, 97). 
Like Dolto, Lacan shared a “veritable vocation for public medecine” (Ibid, 21), practising at 
Saint-Anne’s for decades—an auspicious name indeed, in the context of DaVinci where my 
study begins. But we return to his idea of the «Nom-du-père», first uttered in 1953 and 
«fixée» in 1956 (Ibid, 48). As I understand it from Roudinesco (Ibid, 48-49), the father 
intervenes as a «privateur» of the mother, and through this, the child acquires a separate 
identity through the primacy of language; in 1957, Lacan also speaks out on castration, the 
interdiction against incest, and the dialectic of desire (2011, 80). How can we not hear Dolto 
in his work? Even he often told Dolto, “You don’t need to understand what I am telling,  
because without theorizing, you say the same thing as me” (Ibid, 97). I submit that it is only 
a strong affection for Dolto that can explain Lacan’s words, for there are actually substantial 
differences between them, none more evident than in his belief that algorithms can explicate 
the transference (or vice-versa?): “the transference—I hope to approach it next time—will 
introduce us directly to the algorithms that I thought necessary to set out in practice” (Lacan, 
1964/1977, 19), part of his larger belief that “the unconscious is structured like a language”  
(Ibid, 149). For Dolto’s project in its entirety exemplifies precisely the opposite: the 
unconscious defies structure. 
 
3. Reading Dolto, one gets used to the quirkiness of some remarks. Winnicott shared 
with Dolto a serious approach to babies, audiences of not only professionals, and a tendency 
to speak without references, as Winnicott puts it: “I shall not first give a historical survey 
and show the development of my ideas from the theories of others, because my mind does 
not work that way” (1945, 137). Dolto’s mind did not work that way either. So we quickly 
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reach a quagmire of overlapping concepts, none deeper than “continuity.”  In 1957, Dolto 
makes multiple references to «continuité» (SS, 277, 285 & 288) and an «allant-devenant 
continue» (SS, 267 & 286; also APP, 28 & SS, 291), as «la continuation de l’intégrité 
biologique» (SS, 260), and to “continuity” as the «sécurité d’exister» (SS, 265). Of course, 
the expression evokes Winnicott’s “going on becoming” (e.g., 1956/1992b, 303). In 1949, 
we first find Winnicott’s “continuity” (Ibid, 184, 189 & 191), “going along” (Ibid, 183) or, 
“going on being” (Ibid, 188)—a concept explored in his string game (1953, 19), and 
equivalent to his later “continuity of being” (1956, 387; 1960, 591-595). In fact, Dolto’s 
«allant-devenant» does appear in 1947 (JD, 124, 125 & 130), but it was likely added in a re-
edition, when she happily helped herself to his helpful term but—and this is crucial—not to 
his idea. For Dolto had come to the notion of continuity in 1939, on her own, re the 
«acquisitions nécessaires à la continuation normale du développement psycho-affectif» 
(MA, 69). And in 1949—at the 16th International Congress in Zurich—while discussing cut 
flowers in children’s drawings, she describes «la solution de la continuité» (JP, 24). At the 
risk of straining the argument for her originality, I suggest there is also a subtle difference, 
whereby we feel with Winnicott the infant’s trajectory towards consciousness, whereas what 
is very palpable in Dolto is the trajectory from the unconscious. Something of this nuance of 
stances also pervades Guillerault’s analysis, as he explains it is as-if Dolto and Winnicott do 
not ask the same question: he asks, “How does the infant use objects?”—while she asks, 
“How does the infant arrive at subjectivity?” (2003, 50).Thus, too, the ‘transitional object’ 
means something different for both of them: in Winnicott, we are talking about an actual 
object, albeit one that inhabits an intermediate zone between reality and phantasy (1971, 1); 
whereas with Dolto, the word is a transitional object (see also Guillerault, 2003, 56). 
Particularly useful is Farley’s statement that Winnicott puts emphasis on the “visual realm” 
(2011, 11), as it enables a contrast with Dolto’s strong focus on the auditory realm. Yet what 
they arrive at by complimentary approaches seems especially significant—and ‘continuity’ 
is just such a construct. 
 
4. For two weeks in July of 2014, I walked through Paris in Dolto’s footsteps. My 
best guide was an autobiographical work, Enfances (1986)—an interview that feels more 
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like a journal. In an earlier edition the same year, Dolto muses that the desire for a 
retrospective had, perhaps, something to do with «la magie des soixante-dix ans» [the magic 
of 70 years] (1986b, 78-79). It is a mute play offered elliptically, in parenthesis—for this 
age, 70, is homonymically ‘be without speaking.’ The line appears in a stunning two-page 
essay, arguably the most beautiful of her corpus, that is, ironically, the only text removed 
from the second edition (1986c). In fact, this flickering sense of ‘here and gone,’ like little 
Ernst Freud’s toy (Freud, 1920, 14-15), pervades the study of Dolto. So it was that, alone, 
without a laptop or reliable cell phone, I became unhooked from Canada as I followed her 
through eight decades of love, suffering and work. I placed roses on her grave at Bourg-la-
Reine, at a family monument that includes her son, Carlos, a popular singer (Wikipédia, 
2015e), that is covered with flowers, pebbles, and tiny animal statues.Then, on an evening 
when the heat soared, as if suspending time, I sat on the patio of «Le Franklin» on rue 
Vineuse (Wikipédia, 2014r)—an innocuous-looking little hotel where the infant Françoise’s 
history was forever altered. Only days earlier, I had walked along rue Sigmund Freud, 
located along the exterior of the massive defensive wall around Paris, the ancient «Enceinte 
de Thiers» [homonym: ‘pregnant of thirds’]. As ever, metaphors arrived with the force of 
the repressed, as if Freud offered protection, but from the outside. Yet of all I experienced in 
Paris, no place touched me more than l’Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière. I went three times, each 
time sensing the ineffable as palpable. Situated on the Seine, the Salpêtrière is designed like 
a castle commune Freud felt “vividly recalls the General Hospital of Vienna” (1893c, 17; 
1886, 6). And though it is in the heart of the city, near one of the busiest train stations in 
Europe, its grounds are remarkably still, as if holding in reserve faint whispers of 400 years 
of humans moving between loss and hope. Its use as an arsenal, then as a hospice for the 
disenfranchised—the homeless, old,  mad and women—resonates in its stone walls, the 
hauntingly sparse «Chapelle Saint-Louis,» and faint vestiges of former gardens (Wikipedia, 
2014h) once well-nourished by an ancient river, the Bièvre, whose winding path through 
Paris is almost forgotten (Vessier, 1999, 24). Wide billboards dot its walks with images of 
periodic destruction and reconstruction (Ibid), while lab coats scurry between buildings, 
returning the present.  
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I believe the Salpêtrière is Paris’s most enigmatic treasure, in a city with no shortage 
of wildly impressive buildings and a historical record that is abundantly archaic. For at the 
Salpêtrière, one locates the beginnings of psychoanalysis: the radical suggestion that 
psychical suffering can be healed by talking, and by a certain kind of listening. Ironically, a 
century later, Pitié-Salpêtrière will still be a place of dreams, enlisting subjects in modern 
‘scientific research’ under the pop label of ‘neurology and pathologies of sleep’—where, 
using the most advanced technological methods imaginable, conclusions will amuse for their 
paradoxically anecdotal character: for example, that writing out or drawing nightmares, then 
rereading them, reduces fear (Arnulf, 151 & 207). So on my last day, I made my way there 
as I thought Freud might have in his days with Charcot in 1885-86 (Freud, 1886; Gay, 1988, 
47-51; Wikipédia, 2014o). I found the two homes where Freud lived in Paris thanks to Marie 
Bonaparte’s report on a lesser-known second location on Impasse Royer-Collard, a block up 
from the first at 10 rue le Goff (Bonaparte, 1938). Both addresses are within earshot of rue 
Saint-Jacques, the oldest street in Paris, unmoved since at least the first century (Wikipédia, 
2014q), where Dolto lived and worked from 1942 on. Dolto’s mother even belonged to a 
metaphysical society for which Charcot was responsible for a time (ATP, 74). A slow path 
takes the journeyer along a hilly stretch towards the soft green river, past broad trees whose 
stoic witnessing of each revolution seems recorded indelibly. I believe something happens to 
a solitary walker in Paris, to the hearer open to its sounds and ellipses. And in another 
return, in the same cemetery outside of Paris, on a «rue Bièvre,» right where Françoise 
Dolto lies buried lies Pierre Janet, who inherited responsibility for the «Pitié» from Charcot 
(Wikipédia, 2014p). 
 
Chapter Two: Family & Transmission 
 
5. We locate in Tustin (1981) a number of other concordances with Dolto: the notion 
of precocious symbolization, “much earlier than thought possible, even at 30 days old”  
(Ibid,132); of regression on encounters with reality, in that “trauma before or after birth” 
provokes “inhibitory recoil” (Ibid,169); in “fusion” (Ibid, 170 & 199); in coming to reality 
as a “slow alignment with outside-occuring regularities”(Ibid, 21); in associations on 
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phonemes, wherein “words which sound alike must be connected” (Ibid, 228); and crucially, 
in how in “infantile transference, transference and counter-transference cannot be clearly 
delineated” (Ibid, 170). I am no expert on Tustin, and perhaps Tustin would disagree that 
autism is “proof of the symbolic function in humans,” or that “infantile autism” is a 
normative primary state. But there is strong agreement in the field that autism is a protective 
response to separation. Dolto concurs, but she is also clear that coming to reality in itself can 
be traumatic if there is a loss of unconscious continuity. At stake in Dolto’s narration is that 
our first separation is a slow movement from a dream-scape—dream-work on nascent 
perceptions (primarily, sound). We recall that symbolization—by Tustin’s own admission—
begins precociously, i.e., when the infant is largely unconscious. Ergo, the fact that the 
infant is capable of what we might call an ‘autistic response’ to reality is, Dolto argues, 
precisely because of this precocious capacity for symbolization by which, unconsciously, he 
is capable of a reconaissance of his archaic symbolic filiation in reality, his «repères» (as 
security, enabling progression)—or of the lack thereof (as absence of security, provoking 
regression). Furthermore, we need to keep in mind that the infant is vulnerable to losses that 
might not register as ‘trauma’ objectively—for example, being left with wonderful 
caregivers during a mother’s hospitalization. Thus, for Dolto, regression to fusion is never 
understood as any kind of deadness, for unconscious life continues vibrantly, and the 
passively regressed remain alert (thus susceptible) to the transference. In addition, for Dolto, 
there is always somewhere to regress to because there is psychical progression from the first 
moment of intrauterine life. The infant is autistic in passage, we could say, emerging from a 
monad to which, suffering, he withdraws to—coming to reality ‘two steps forward and one 
step back.’ I believe this is captured by Freud’s remark on “sleep as a defense against the 
external world” (1907/1962, 223). By way of a summary, then, if we are to consider ‘autism 
as pathology,’ it is rather as Farley writes in the context of Winnicott, that “the baby’s 
madness only becomes true madness if it appears later in life” (2011, 10). I recognize that 
Dolto and Tustin do not agree on all points, nor do they need to, for they have both worked 
diligently, independently, to narrate the one who is, by definition, deprived of the capacity to 
narrate. However, I cannot but regret that Tustin does not cite Dolto, as Dolto is effectively 
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silenced in a field where she had been contributing for years prior to Tustin’s work, and 
once more rich grounds for engagement seem to have been lost across the English Channel.  
 
6. In a relatively new genre of literature, autists teach us something critical: securing 
communication hinges on ‘speaking (or writing) through,’ and ‘listening through’ a 
mediating object for the transference. Dolto’s opening onto the oral passive stage, and her 
«effet poupée-fleur» (JD; JP; also Note 8), enable us to describe a process whereby the 
subject engages reality indirectly (passively), through the mediation of an other with whom 
he is unconsciously continuous, who offers «non-réactivité émotionelle» (VC2,799;  also 
Ch. 1) by which he can privately be “living out slowly an out-of-date phase” (MA, 217) that 
would normatively have been transitted in infancy or early childhood—thus slowly venting 
affect and “waking.” Further, these works reveal the autist’s vibrant presence, even as many 
assume his functional “absence,” just as Dolto diagnosed:  
The autistic child, for example, that is the child who looks at nothing, hears 
everything. He only seems to be elsewhere, and it is that which is troubling and that 
results, finally, in our speaking about them without addressing ourselves to their 
person…We must never believe that the subject is not in full lucidity, even if the 
individual… seems besotted, sleepy or even comatose (SP1, 118). 
The autist as a writer also shares his critical awareness that his securing speech has, in fact, 
fundamentally depended on a very particular (type of) mediating object, a «semblable» 
“from which he can construct an interior unity that allows him to speak in his name, 
wherever he finds himself, even if it is in a manner that does not satisfy the neighbours” 
(SP1, 43). Interested readers are referred to Sean Barron, Blaze Ginsberg, Temple Grandin, 
Alison Hale, Naoki Higashidi, Thomas A. McKean, Dawn Prince-Hughes, Stephanie R. 
Marks, Kamran Nazeer, Tim Page, Birger Sellin, Daniel Tammet and Donna Williams, for 
example. Of these, the most recommended is by Pulitzer-prize winning author, Ron Suskind, 
about his autistic adult son, Owen, who communicates through Disney “sidekicks” (Life 
Animated, Kingswell, 2014). These works all make the compelling point that while autism 
typically entails an inability to engage language actively, there paradoxically resides in the 
autistic subject a potent capacity to engage language passively, for “in passivity we are 
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extremely receptive” (SP1, 114) Thus, autistic writers confirm Dolto’s steadfastly 
optimistic, progressive views on autism: the need for a mediating object for the transference, 
and the potential for passive learning. 
 
7. In personal correspondence (11 May 2015), Deborah Britzman—then in press on 
Klein—notes that, “the monstrous combined parent is for Klein a phantasy dedicated to 
epistemophilia or sadism at its height and in this sense is [also] one’s own conception.” Her 
valuable comment invites us to put Dolto in conversation with Klein a little longer regarding 
the internal object and the combined parent figure—that “part-object form”  (Spillius, 2011, 
452)—in the child’s “earliest conception of the primal scene” (Ibid). For Dolto, the primal 
scene may enigmatically be one’s own conception or the coitus of parents (MA, 178). In an 
interview in 1986, Roudinesco suggests that in France in the 1960s, Dolto had Klein’s place 
in London: «peut-être» [maybe], Dolto answers (1986/1988, 32). And in 1984, Dolto 
comments on her concept of the «moi idéale bicéphale,» in parentheses: “(This may be what 
the school of Melanie Klein calls the combined parent)” (IIC, 271). The “maybes” and 
parentheses signal Dolto’s reserve in constructing a dialogue with this ‘other’ pioneer who, 
in more ways than one, does not speak the same language. For Dolto evokes an 
undifferentiated, un-split, liquid, passive pre-subject: a «co-moi papa-maman» [co-me 
father-mother] (EM, 39) for whom there is necessarily no ‘object’ that is not a part of the 
self. Further, the archaic’s “subtle objects” (PS, 21-22 & 89; SP1, 61; SP3, 128)—sounds, 
including phonemes—are as fluid and reversible as the pre-subject, arriving as an enigmatic 
echo that becomes a path to be followed, reversibly, to the dream as much as to reality. 
Thus, the notion of an ‘internal object’ to be taken in or used, in coming to reality, in 
whatever primitive and phantastic ways, is best set aside for a conception far more 
«anobjectal» (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/2004, 262) before we can think with Dolto—not 
about developmentally limited or transitory “infantile transferences” (Rustin, 2008, 377), but 
rather, about the very origin in infancy of the lifelong (passive) human capacity for 
transference. 
Our difficulty in thinking about these matters will originate in the problem of time in 
the archaic, or the absence thereof. At issue is that the «pre-moi» begins archaic 
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identification while he is without vision, an active mode or a distinct subjectivity—with only 
liquidity, audition, passivity and an unconscious symbolization of presence and absence 
forming a primordial «rhythm binaire» (CE, 94, 257 & 350; DQ, 70; IIC, 90; PJE, 105) in 
the fetal environment. The weaving of enduring organic sounds with an incrementally 
‘present’ exterior (audition on an evolving soundscape) continues a symbolic relation in 
service of the wish—a dream of discourse with an enigmatic witness—in what is, 
effectively, the inaugural “total transference situation,” to borrow the wonderful coinage by 
Betty Joseph (1985)—oddly inside that same window of time, though evidently inspired by 
Klein’s “total situations transferred” (1952/1997, 55). The inherent inseparability and 
reversibility of the indistinct pre-subject in the non-space, non-time of the archaic mean that 
the inception of the subject is not isolatable in time, and we will never be able to see the 
horizon of the combined parent as a distinct figure. Rather, with Dolto, it is rather more as-if 
the father and child split from the mother, but only if one understands that we are speaking 
in, and of, a moment of pure metaphor, in a dream register with no reality (space or time) 
whatsoever. So it becomes paradoxically sensible to describe a 2
nd
 that is a 3
rd
 that is a 2
nd—
as Dolto puts it, “one and one makes three” (ES, 39); or as Bernard This formulates, 
following Dolto, “1+1=3” (2007, 157). In short, this «situation triangulaire» (SP1, 215- 217) 
is the source of «sécurité intérieur» (Ibid). This’s shorthand here should not be confused 
with Winnicott’s “sum I am,” referring to the unit self (1968/1986b, 57, 62 & 64), from 
which our discussion of the «pré-moi» is developmentally very far behind. We should note, 
though, the uncanny way we return here to the «je- nous» [I – we] Dolto speaks of re young 
Tony with his sore «genoux» [knees]—the “play of words” (IIC, 365; SP3, 76; see Ch. 2) —
and how Dolto talks of the «je-nous» (SP1, 217) in this context, commenting on «the mother 
coupled with the father and with their child» (SP1, 215). Here, she adds her frequent 
witnessing of psychical instability in children whose parents over-use «on» (SP1, 217; also 
CD, 99: DW, 129; LF, 291; PM, 38)—a nebulous pronoun in French that can mean I, we, 
everyone, and no one in particular—as nascent subjectivity in reality is impeded through 
“the problem of non-castration of the other” (SP1, 217). In fact, we are elaborating Dolto’s 
explanations of the otherwise inexplicable archaic with contra-dictions (what is said against 
what is said, i.e., reversals) and homonymic echoes, as the auditory environment itself 
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provides the only instruments of any use in trying to fathom the unthinkable. So doing, we 
begin to appreciate Dolto’s own archaic subject position, and the enigmatic pool from which 
she draws her formidable analytic wisdom on the oral passive stage. With Dolto, we not 
only witness the archaic scene, but we experience the archaic process by benefitting from 
the mediation of word-things. After all, Dolto says, “all games are mediators of desire” (EM, 
168). Further, once things begin to lose their dreaminess at the encounter with reality, the 
relation to the mother is (by definition) castrated, while that to the other endures, effecting 
the continued, securing presence of the «père pré-symbolique»: 
The human being…is animated without discontinuity since birth with/by the 
symbolic function. What he perceives of the interior…is articulated with what is, 
perceived as coming from the exterior world, apprehended by him as a call or 
response of others to his desire.These two sources of perception, coming from 
himself and from others, weave themselves like warp and weft (1982a, 146-147).  
Thus it is as-if the father indicates the secure direction to follow in the child’s capacity to 
exit the monad to engage object relations, from its «prolongement» to language and its 
unconscious register, the transference. As Dolto explains it, “the father is discontinuous 
(EM, 63), “separated out” from the mother (CE, 172), emerging from a dual relation from 
the “heart of the mother to the body of the child” (SP2, 126). Ergo, the “other of the mother” 
(TL, 43) offers the potential for separability in reality that inheres in his perpetual continuity 
with the subject, along which path we develop symbolic relations in reality. Here is where 
we begin to fathom the crucial work of the transference not only in our coming to reality, 
but our remaining in it—our ability to engage in incremental sacrifices, like little Josette. 
Refinding the symbolic father involves a letting go of even the profoundest identifications 
“taken in” from the side of reality, such as Klein’s internal object, “the mother as a loved 
object [that] needs to have been introjected or internalized” (Spillius, 2011, 363). This is 
why, for Dolto, the notion of a subject founded on a late arrival from the outside is madness: 
she assumes the permanence of safety is inscribed into the subject’s ontogeny long prior to 
his birth, one neither referred to, nor dependent on, reality at all.  Simplifying greatly, we 
suggest that the psychical history Klein narrates is after Dolto’s developmentally. Thus, in a 
performance of theory, Dolto’s subject does not easily progress onto the Kleinian scene, 
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meeting anxiety as a «tension regressivante»; while the Kleinian subject, holding his internal 
object, regresses with great difficulty onto Dolto’s scene. For while Klein discovers that the 
child has already repressed the infant (Roudinesco, 1999, 159), Dolto discovers that the 
infant has already repressed the fetus. 
Shifting frames of reference a bit, we note another contrast in that Klein’s internal 
object is threatened by anxiety at reality, risking the child; whereas Dolto’s subject is 
perpetually bound to a past he must never disjoin, thus he will throw reality ‘out with the 
bathwater’ and simply go back to the archaic, carried along what Andreas-Salomé once 
lovingly described as “a stream of subterranean water we hear murmuring once more” 
(1977, 208). Further, Klein’s “good object” is laden with maternal tropes—described with 
relation to a splitting between “good breast” and “bad breast” (Spillius, 2011, 348), and 
“conceived in the mind of the infant in terms of bodily parts”(Ibid). In contrast, Dolto’s 
“archaic identification” is a symbolic communication devoid of any sense of body parts, 
informed solely by the fluidity of sound in a purely unconscious life, and the indivisibility of 
the «pre-moi» with its archaic environment. Thus, I suggest Dolto would disagree with 
Klein’s idea that “the unrealistic nature of the extremely ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ object leaves it 
unstable and constantly under threat from reality” (Ibid, 349). For the unrealistic extreme 
goodness of the «père pré-symbolique» is precisely what can give the subject, given 
continuity with it, his security in reality. Further, the archaic landscape and its «père pré-
symbolique» are never at risk from reality or under threat as they constitute, by definition, a 
permanent phantasy of infallible security—a wish. Rather, the only thing reality threatens is 
reality itself, in that one will simply not come fully ‘into it,’ withdrawing instead to the 
“incomparable strength of the first affective ties of human creatures” (Freud, 1930, 209), the 
“perennial first inclinations” of dream-life (Ibid). The primitive response to anxiety, then, is 
simply to refuse it—to refuse “to be distressed by the provocations of reality, [or] to let itself 
be compelled to suffer” (Freud, 1927, 162). And here we touch, I believe, on the “necessary 
aggression” Dolto will speak of in the context of the «poupée-fleur,» that is required to 
counter the anxiety (without regressing to the archaic) that threatens the subject from the 
side of reality. For along economic lines, we will always choose safety above all else, 
grounding subjectivity in the bold and infallible primitive ‘logic’ of the instinct of 
208 
 
conservation, the pulses. In sum, Dolto’s project powerfully conveys the paradox that we are 
conscious only because of our enduring capacity to remain unconscious, in a negotiation of 
reality wherein the symbolic relation to the ‘other of the mother’ is a ‘pivot’ continued in 
language through the transference. I recall how instrumental one particular interview was for 
my understanding—Dolto’s moving talk with Bernard Pivot (Ribowski, 2004), which I 
watched repeatedly. And when thoughts connect like this through unexpected word-plays, 
we know we are approaching the archaic. Then again, did we ever leave? 
 
8. I confess that when I began reading Dolto, I believed the «poupée-fleur» (PF) to 
be a secondary construct in her theorization—a secondary revision, as it were, of the dream-
work I felt to be in circulation. I was profoundly mistaken. For the PF emerges as central to 
Dolto’s creativity, being a notion with traces to her own and her grandmother’s middle 
name, Marguerite (Ch. 2 & 3), in the most authentic signature imaginable; not to mention 
that by her choice of husbands, she became “Dolto” in 1942 (AI, 162). And once one 
experiences the transference in Dolto’s project, the PF seems to turn up everywhere, as a 
sudden arrival in countless thoughts—play inside the work. In fact, the PF is a spectacular 
mediating object for the transference, just as Dolto suggested. Thus its current non-use is, as 
Roudinesco says, a blatant overlooking of Dolto’s «génie clinique» (1986, 169 & 278). 
Dolto invented the PF to help Bernadette (Ch. 2), whom she met in November 1946. Dolto 
relates her clinical observations in a watershed paper whose first part was in the inaugural 
issue of the prestigious Revue Française de la Psychanalyse, No. 1, jan.-mars 1949, as 
«Cure psychanalytique à l’aide de la poupée-fleur» […with the help of the PF] (in Ribas, 
2006, 95-108); with the second part featured in RFP No. 1, jan.-mars 1950 (VC2, 176f; in 
JD, 133-193). The PF made a third entrance that year at the 16e Congrès international de 
psychanalyse, 10 May 1949, in Zurich (VC2, 176f). In a letter to Philipp Sarasin, its 
Secretary, 30 May 1949, Dolto elaborates her «hypothèse» in rather substantial detail: 
The plastic representation figured as a vegetal creature holding by its body a human 
form, and by its head a floral form, provokes in the child (and, in general, in all 
human beings) a projection onto this object of pre-genital libido relating to affects 
lived during the epoch of the oral stage. This projection and the secondary reactions 
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of the transference he experiences/feels vis-à-vis the «objet poupée-fleur» brings the 
neurotic subject to a beneficial abreaction of oral libido that had remained 
pathogenic.Subjects for whom repressions lived in anterior stages have led to states 
of libidinal regression to pre-genital stages react the same way…experience 
demonstrates that the disappearance of the anxiety pertaining to the repressed oral-
stage pulses immediately permits the subject to address and abreact libido in 
pathological translations pertaining to the anal stage.This libido is very rapidly 
integrated into the «moi».It seems that the narcissistic neuroses are those which 
benefit the most from the utilization of this process of transference, as well as all the 
conversions of anxiety from functional symptoms of the digestive tube.The 
advantage is, for the psychoanalysis of children, the possibility of treatment in depth 
requiring only sessions that are far apart, and for the psychoanalysis of certain adults, 
the possibility of unblocking those who are «grands anxieux traumatisés au stade 
oral» or who are incapable of directly expressing in the transference the emotional or 
‘love-interest’ states of the affects of their pre-genital stages due to their absence of 
logic (VC2,177; also JD, 154 & 192). 
The PF made its fourth appearance the same year at the SPP’s 12e Conférence des 
psychanalystes de langue française, on narcissism, on 4-5 June 1949 (JP, 8; VC2, 176f). Its 
fifth appearance that year was in the article, «La poupée-fleur. À propos des états 
narcissisques de l’enfant» [The PF. On narcissistic states in children], in RFP No. 4, oct.-
déc. 1949 (JP, 86f; VC2, 176f; in JP, 19-33). Soon after, the PF made its sixth appearance of 
the year, on 18 October 1949, when it was a central topic for discussion at a meeting of the 
SPP. The proceedings included Maurice Benassy, Simone Blajan-Marcus, Françoise Dolto, 
René Held, Jacques Lacan, Serge Lebovici and Sacha Nacht (in JP, 34-42). It seems Lacan 
took to the PF quickly, as he elaborated theoretically that very day on the critical relevance 
of its having no mouth (in JP, 34); Lacan also spoke to attendees about the value of the PF 
having «pas de visage, pas de mains ni de pieds, pas de face ni de dos, pas d’articulation, pas 
de cou» [no face, neither hands nor feet, neither face nor back, no articulation, no neck] 
(Ibid, 37). To this we add our own dreams of audition on Lacan’s «cou» [neck], a perfect 
homonym of «coup» [a hit]. This is a play of some significance given that Lacan would earn 
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much credit in the years to come for providing emphasis to Freud’s concept of 
nachträghlichkeit, the «après-coup»—interestingly, from the 1950s onward (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1967, 33). In 1949, the PF is also found in the treatment of Nicole (JD, 149-174; 
see Ch 2), as well as in observations of 10 others (JD, 174-193). With seven-year old 
Monique, for example, use of the PF immediately restores continence (JD, 176). From there, 
the PF is used successfully in Dolto’s psychoanalytic work with schizophrenics in asylums 
for 10 to 15 years, “liberating affects tethered to oral-stage libidinal investments” to achieve 
an “unblocking” as, “thanks to the mediation of this object, they could re-find, going from 
themselves to this other, the alternating affects of emotional participation and projection that 
characterize personal rapports beginning at the oral stage” (SS, 21). There is a normal need 
for aggression to be invested at the oral stage, Dolto says—one that is impossible to satisfy 
when met in reality with “responses of painful aggression” (SS, 21f). Dolto provides clinical 
examples where the PF revives libidinal history (JD, 191); returns dreams and useful 
aggression (JD, 193); and enables patients to work on their integration (JD, 189). Even the 
doll-maker reports uncharacteristic laughter while fabricating exemplars (JD, 184; JP, 50). 
Dolto readily issues prescriptions for it (with a sketch) to every mother presenting with a 
child refusing food (e.g., VC2, 258-259; also 258f). And turning to a local «atelier,» she has 
them produced for wide use in her consultations, even giving some to friends with children 
(VC2, 261 & 261f). Yet, typically self-effacing, Dolto states humbly in 1949: «cette 
hypothèse ne vaut peut-être pas grand-chose» [this hypothesis is perhaps not worth much, 
not a ‘big thing’] (JD, 189). 
Some fifteen years later, arguably the most brilliant theoretical articulation of the PF 
is published ironically, marginally, by the pharmaceutical giant, Anphar: «L’enfant et la 
poupée-fleur, de bouche à corolle, et de corolle à oreille» [The child and the PF, from mouth 
to corolla, and from corolla to ear], Phot, No. 3, déc. 1964 (JP, 87, 15f; in JP, 43-50). And in 
November 1985, nearly 40 years from the PF’s arrival, but near the end of her own life, 
Dolto offers the powerful note, in a personal letter, that the «non-réactivité émotionelle» of 
the psychoanalyst is what achieves the «réactualization des événements inconnus ou oubliés 
de son histoire» [events unknown or forgotten in his (hi)story] (VC2, 799; also Ch. 1). Here, 
we enjoin Lacan’s valuation of the absence of a mouth (in JP, 34), and comments by Muriel 
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Djéribi-Valentin (among the project’s trusted editors) that the PF is an «objet végétal sans 
défense» [without defenses] (in JP, 11), thus offering an opportunity for an enigmatic 
«révolte de la passivité» (in JP, 15). At the proceedings of the SPP, Dolto identifies and 
names the therapeutic gain, «l’effet poupée-fleur» (JP, 42). And in closing her talk to her 
distinguished audience that October night, she says of her concept, simply, «il est utilisable» 
[it is usable] (Ibid). The PF allows the projection of “illogical affects” (JP, 39), and as 
Djéribi-Valentin explains, Dolto witnessed countless clinical observations of free drawing, 
wherein children “indicated a projection of their narcissism in representations of flowers or 
vegetal forms” (in VC2, 176f). The PF had, in effect, arrived in over-determination. Among 
the innumerable treasures of the Dolto’s corpus, then, the PF is “one of her most stunning 
clinical inventions” (Djéribi-Valentin, in VC2, 176f). And though the PF works in the 
intermediate zone between reality and phantasy, it is not a transitional object. First, whereas 
the transitional object (TO) is varied, such as a teddy, doll or toy (Winnicott, 1953/1971, 1), 
the PF is highly specific in shape: it has “no face, no hands, no feet, no back, no front” 
(VC2, 259), being vegetal green with the corolla at eye-level, and at least seven petals (JP, 
46). Second, while the TO is the “first ’not me’ possession” (Winnicott, 1953/1971, 1), the 
PF is functionally the opposite—a kind of ‘always me,’ that mediates the transference in a 
regression to a perpetually findable and indestructible archaic history. What is most 
operational with the PF, then, is that ‘the object is never being destroyed,’ as a “stimulus for 
the transference” (1919[1918]a, 162). Third, while the TO marks a routine passage through 
childhood, the PF is a clinical tool addressing narcissistic injuries at the oral stage (JD, 148 
& 159)—for those who are, as Dolto puts it, «figés [stuck/frozen] dans des symptômes 
régressifs profonds» (JP, 11). And while the PF is not a TO, it is interesting to speculate 
whether the former might, perhaps, have inspired the latter. Melanie Klein is recorded 
among several attendees who came from London for the SPP’s conference that summer of 
1949 in Paris (JP, 8), but there is no mention of Donald Winnicott.  
 
9. This construction of the subject ‘for, with, by (through)’ the other expresses 
nothing other than the dominance of oral passivity during the development of primary 
narcissism—and yet, it hugely complicates what we understand by an ‘object.’ I begin with 
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Dolto’s provocatively simple definition, rooted unhesitatingly in the oral stage: “Object: 
food, for example” (MA, 24). On the other hand—yet keeping with the idea of 
alimentation—is the complexity of the ‘object’ as metaphor: “the thing (breast), its invested 
meanings, and the interpretive psychosocial processes we bring to it” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, 
135). At issue is that the object never exists strictly in the concrete or metaphorical realm—
but always in both, and between. Thus, a ‘lost object’ may be a real thing, or a phantasy 
once serving a wish. Similarly, milk is a ‘reparative object’—but so is an unconscious 
«repère.» And when we invoke ‘archaic objects,’ we cannot functionally distinguish 
between a lost grandfather, his lost name, or the enigmatic love of the «père-
présymbolique.» In short, any object, however physical it may be, has inseparable, 
unconscious symbolic significance (associated through dream-work) that is necessarily 
idiosyncratic for individual prehistory. Besides, any distinction between the reality and 
phantasy of an object is moot, in a way, for in our ‘use’ of it psychically, as Freud tells us, 
“it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out 
upon real or imaginary objects” (1914b, 86). Furthermore, every object acquires, or rather 
inherits, its significance in symbolic filiation, such that by reduction (but not to absurdity), 
every object is ultimately returned unconsciously to “the earliest period of life…[when] the 
child’s primitive attitude towards object is a simple matter of pleasure or pain” (Abraham, 
1923/1955, 87). Thus we will be lured towards the use of an object by an unconscious 
process of identifying with it (or part thereof), in association with its predecessor. As Freud 
puts it, “to find the object, however, is, in truth, to rediscover it” (1907/1962, 87; also Ibid, 
108). So, enigmatically, all objects derive their symbolic filiation in a non-time, non-space 
of no-object, where the pre-subject is self-contained: a monad. And following Freud’s line 
of thought backwards, we arrive at a construction of primary narcissism as an 
“autoeroticism…when there is no object” (Ibid, 118). With Freud, we confirm that 
“identification is the earliest and original form of emotional tie…where the mechanisms of 
the unconscious are dominant, [and] object-choice is turned back into identification” 
(1921,107); in other words, “during the state of narcissism, they [object-libido and ego-
libido] exist together” (1914b,76; also 1914c,82). Thus, primary narcissism is a state of 
nascent environmental impingements spun into dream-work, and what is affectively 
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securing in reality (by offering symbolic filiation, continuity, with one’s prehistoric, archaic 
psychical landscape) acquires value in ‘luring.’ Furthermore, as Dolto makes clear, the most 
fluid, accessible, early-encountered, ubiquitous, repetitive—therefore, most likely—such 
mediating objects (lures) for our coming to reality are phonemes. Critically, object use is 
not comfortable at first, at least until sensory modalities are sufficiently developed to enable 
the experience of gratification (pleasure) from the side of reality (assuming such is offered). 
And with Freud, we recall—not for the last time—the importance of inertia in primary 
narcissism: “by being born we have made the step from an absolutely self-sufficient 
narcissism to the perception of a changing external world and the beginnings of the 
discovery of objects…we cannot endure the new state of things for long, [so] that we 
periodically revert from it, in our sleep, to our former condition of absence of stimulation 
and avoidance of objects” (1921,130), as “the condition of sleep… impl[ies] a narcissistic 
withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the subject’s own self…on to the single wish 
to sleep” (1914b, 83). Paradoxically, then, in the primary narcissistic state, the infant 
(economically speaking) would rather not use real objects—impingements; and when he 
does, it will always be in compliance with libidinal economics, insofar as the object is vested 
archaically (transference), serving an unconscious phantasy of the non-use of the object 
(continuation of what exists), in accordance with “the principle of inertia” (Freud, 1895, 
296-297). Thus, it follows that the use of an object in reality is facilitated by its closest 
possible relation to phantasy in one’s unique (idiosyncratic) prehistory. Only with 
maturation is there migration to objects with a lesser share of phantasy: “infants derive their 
first objects from the experience of satisfaction… in connection with vital functions which 
serve the purpose of self-preservation” (Ibid, 87). So for a young child, a pen is a sword, a 
tissue is a mouse’s carpet (etc.), as the development of speech simply makes it possible to 
observe the infant’s archaic heritage in his use of real objects—and the return of any object 
(along a trail of crumbs eventually made elusive by associative distance) to the monad of 
self-love, paradoxically to ‘no’ objects: “the child takes himself as object of love prior to 
choosing external objects…of which intra-uterine life is the archetype” (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1967/2004, 264). On the one hand, then, primary narcissism is “inadequately 
designated as anobjectal” (Ibid, 265), for as Klein put it, “narcissistic states are defined by a 
214 
 
return of libido on interior objects” (Ibid). On the other hand, there is no ‘internal object’ 
that is not, originally, a phantasy of something indissociable from the self, lacking 
boundaries, and right off the horizon of space-time. Thus, I find it helpful in thinking with 
Dolto to conceive of an anachronistic archaic landscape operating with, in and as dream-
work; and I believe the idea of an object from the side of reality is best conceived as an offer 
to perception (including proprioception), hence constituting “disturbances to which a child’s 
original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from 
them, and the paths into which he is forced in doing so” (Freud, 1914c, 92). 
In turn, these considerations take us to the question of anxiety. Is anxiety only there 
because of reality? Yes, and no. True, anxiety is a response to what arrives insofar as it 
exceeds what can be managed economically in maintaining a phantasy of inertia. In short, 
“anxiety must enter the psyche from elsewhere” (Freud, 1911/1974, 318). And Winnicott 
observes: “there is certainly before birth the beginning of an emotional development” (1949, 
182), whereby “the ordinary birth process can be accepted by the infant as a further example 
of what has already happened, but a difficult birth goes far beyond any prenatal experience 
of impingement” (Ibid,184). However, anxiety does not arrive with ‘reality’ as normally 
understood (time-space), but with ‘reality’ as anything which phantasy cannot dispose of 
easily enough; for under the sway of the pulses of conservation, such impingements are felt 
as “the threat of annihilation” (Winnicott, 1960, 591), or a “dread of being devoured and 
destroyed” (Klein, 1928/1998, 187). As Dolto explains it, when “pulsions, upon their 
appearance, find an interdiction exterior to the subject, the idea is repressed but the affect 
remains, provoking anxiety …which we call ‘primary’” (MA, 16; italics mine, to recall this 
tension wherein dream-work struggles for sublimation as thought). ‘Secondary anxiety,’ in 
turn, occurs when pulsions «entrent en résonance» by “unconscious association between 
actual ideas and ideas that had, in the first experiences of childhood… provoked primary 
anxiety” (MA, 17; italics mine, to stress the auditory realm and its echoes). In this context, 
the potent archaic legacy of phonemes to linguistics, education and literacy seems especially 
palpable.  
 
Chapter Three: Infancy & Audition 
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10. In a 2001 press release honouring the 100th anniversary of «l’Hôpital Trousseau» 
(Wikipédia, 2014k), Catherine Dolto says her mother invented a tunnel toy for her clinic, 
and that Salvador Dali tried to crawl through it but could not (C. Dolto, 2001). It is 
impossible to know why Dali sought a symbolic birth with Dolto, but it is entirely possible 
she invented such an object. For she was, as Freud said of Charcot, one whose “common 
sense was touched by genius” (1893c, 9; 1961, 196)—besides, she believed children love 
passing through tunnels and tubes (EF, 12). Tunnels also transect her history, beginning with 
her immense question about death, at age four, as trains moved beneath the «passerelle» 
where she walked (EN, 10), and she discovered the ignorance of adults (AI, 94f). It is also 
plausible it would not occur to Dolto to file a patent, for she would have considered the 
concept ridiculously obvious, and she believed in the free exchange of ideas. Case in point, 
there is no patent for the spectacular «poupée-fleur» (Dolto, 1949/1999a; 1949/1999b). A 
search reveals that Barbara Clark filed a US application for a “Tunnel Toy” in 1931, to 
securitize a child, as “crawling into a hole is instinctive” (IFI Claims Patent Service, 2012). 
But Dolto had absolutely the contrary objective, as articulated elsewhere: to help a child find 
his «cheminement hors de son tunnel» [his path out of his tunnel] (Dolto, 1989c, 17; also, C. 
Dolto & Faure-Poirée, 2008, 37). Perhaps the same obsession possessed Dali when he 
insisted Millet’s “Angelus,” haunting him since childhood, was actually a baby’s burial, so 
that he fought for years to have it x-rayed and even wrote a book about it (AI, 248; 
Wikipedia, 2014a). Curiously, the original hung for years in the home of Dolto’s maternal 
grandfather, the copper industrialist and art collector, Pierre-Eugène Secrétan (AI, 248; 
Wikipédia, 2014h; see Ch. 6). The prized work was sold at an auction in 1889 to fund 
corporate restructuring (AI, 248), sending it across the Atlantic. It returned to France in 
1909, soon after the birth of Françoise, when its new collector donated it to the Louvre 
(Ibid). There, in 1932, oddly enough, it was lacerated by a patient of Lacan’s (Ibid). The 
painting is now in the «Musée d’Orsay,» while its memory dominates nearby Barbizon, 
Millet’s home town, in the forest of Fontainebleau (Wikipedia, 2014g), where Dolto’s silent 
father spent his childhood. Françoise longed to visit him there in 1930, but didn’t (PF, 29 & 
31), only finding her way to Fontainebleau in 1939 to see Pichon (VC2, 26). In Montmartre, 
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a lovely museum, «Espace Dali,» lets the modern visitor witness the tremendous impact on 
Dali of both psychoanalysis and Freud, whom he met in London in July 1938 while 
sketching his portrait (Douville, 2009, 178)—though Freud apparently did not reciprocate 
the admiration (Wikipedia, 2014j). Among the critical objects for the Dolto reader is a giant 
sculpture, “The Snail and the Angel,” that oddly recalls «escargotage» [snailing] (e.g., SS, 
220; 1985f), her idiom for self-enclosing psychical development, akin to Freud’s 
“strangulated affect” (1893d, 39; 1909b, 18; 1914c, 156). Also significant is Dali’s “Profile 
of Time”—a melting clock, a theme he repeats, as in “The Persistence of Memory”—and 
how it is reminiscent of Dolto’s childhood stress on the difficulty of knowing the exact time. 
We find her famous analysand, “Dominique,” telling Dolto during a session (date unknown, 
but discernible as 1963 by the death of a Pope upon which Dominique comments) how 
much he enjoyed a recent Dali exhibit (CD, 155). He critiques it as being full of «des trous 
et puis des tiroirs dans les gens» [holes and drawers in people]. Dolto does not say if she has 
seen it, though he asks. Yet her correspondence has many references to her making, 
viewing, and even exposing artwork (e.g., AI, 120-121; PF, 26; VC1, 165, 192, 238 & 246); 
she also valued art in her seminars and clinics (e.g., APP; see Ch. 6). So it is not far-fetched 
to imagine her encounter with these iconic works and their transference—just as Dali was 
unconsciously moved by works from Dolto’s landscape. Further, knowing Dolto may have 
kept her patient’s name, one notes it is twice Dali’s name, for he was Salvador Domingo 
Felipe Jacinto Dalí i Domènech (Wikipedia, 2014j). One hardly knows what to say about the 
complex weave that threads Dolto with Dali. It is a coincidence only if one believes in such, 
but Dolto does not (DW, 25; SS, 99 & 113; VC2, 495). Further, Dolto believes about art that 
“like a dream, it is a witness of the unconscious” (SS, 116), a vehicle for the transference of 
latent content (VC2, 447). So the effect of «Espace Dali» on the Dolto reader is uncanny 
indeed. Yet soon, one realizes it is situated precisely on the first site of the «Maison 
Blanche,» an asylum that relocated next to Dolto’s family at the turn of the century, from 
where it profoundly influenced her childhood and career (Murat, 2001/2013). Dolto is 
correct, then: knowing the exact time is extremely difficult in the dreamscape of Paris.  
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11. Dolto shares her plan for the doll (AI, 57; JP, 46; VC2, 259; photo: VC2, 275 & 
AI, 54), so it seemed like good research to make one. My own ‘flower doll’ is 36 cm high, 
and I admit to experiencing a significant return of old psychical material (in French) tethered 
to choosing its name (which I am reluctant to disclose), its fabric (too slick, scratchy…), and 
the shade of green (too dark, bright…). After constructing it in July 2013, I left it next to 
some large chronicles about Freud and my small rock collection from Paris. Yet oddly 
enough, I only managed to overcome a very difficult emotional impasse in starting to write 
the current work by placing it on my desk, where it remains as a presence: a witness despite 
(because of?) its blindness. 
 
12. The notion of a well mother to the wellness of a child is universally held, and 
Dolto is certainly among her peers (educators and analysts) in this essential concern of her 
practice. But Dolto’s infans in the archaic stage is prior to speaking and, before birth, even 
prior to being present in the usual sense. Dolto’s construction of the infant in the archaic 
stage is that of a full subject in continuity with an enigmatic other in a non-time, non-space 
where dreams are spun upon what arrives. And her foremost concern for instinctual life 
founds a radically liberating view: «c’est le foetus qui demande à naître» [it’s the fetus that 
asks to be born] (SP1, 225). Dolto has no need of an apologist, and she is the first to admit, 
“I don’t write in a literary sense” (AI, 217; VC2, 796-797). But if we can get beyond her 
words, or rather in front of them, we begin to fathom the precocity of the subject position at 
stake in Dolto’s conception of the archaic: there is a “life anterior to primary narcissism” 
(SP1, 76). On this view, the mother and other adults may grant or withhold their agreement 
to life, and it is “their duty to subsequent generations to sustain fetuses in their desire to be 
born” (SP1, 225). As uncomfortable as Dolto’s words feel, they compel a more careful 
listening, a second hearing, and a playing with reversals. For the “fetus desiring to live” is 
none other than a wishful being—alive unconsciously, subsisting blissfully in his dreams in 
the jurisdiction of the instinct of conservation. According to Dolto, to stress, the fetus is 
already a subject. As Freud explains, there is an auto-erotic state prior to primary narcissism 
since, “something must be added to auto-eroticism to bring about narcissism” (1914/b, 77). 
And in this state, “auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital 
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functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation” (Ibid, 87). Helped by Freud, we 
follow Dolto easily now when she muses on how the mother’s obligation to help confounds 
pregnancy with the «interdit» [prohibition; homonymically, «inter-dit», ‘spoken between 
us’; and even «in-terre-dit», ‘spoken in the ground’] of illness and death (SP1, 225)—for her 
view of infancy is rooted in the primacy of the instincts. Of course, this auto-erotic state in 
utero, prior to primary narcissism, is not ‘auto’ at all: “there must be, actually, neither life 
pulsions nor death pulsions, everything is absolutely linked to the mother” (VO, 114). Then 
again, as Freud noted, the infant is content with his dream of self-reliance:“The charm of a 
child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility….an 
unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned” (1914b, 91). 
Freud’s humour is an apt reminder that primary narcissism forms in a field of dreams 
dominated by the pleasure principal, where it is difficult “to find our bearings” (Ibid, 78)—
and, as Dolto easily conceded, we “face the possibility of error” (Ibid, 79). Dolto’s valuing 
of examples serves the Freudian oeuvre well, as “legitimate extensions of the theory of 
libido come from observations of children” (Ibid, 75). And commenting on her own clinical 
attitude, in an interview with J.-P. Winter in 1986, appearing in print and film (DW, 109; 
Nobécourt, 2008b), Dolto states: “It’s never their fault, but it happens to be their fact.” Of 
course, the notion of primary narcissism as auto-erotic is paradoxical since the subject does 
not subsist autonomously; and in the absence of boundaries for the «pré-moi», the idea of a 
co-narcissistic state remains perplexing. And yet, these are the provocations of Dolto’s 
unprecedented opening onto the archaic stage. Freud himself admits the difficulty of 
hypothesizing on primary narcissism, given “the importance and extensiveness of the topic” 
(1914b, 100), and calls his own crucial work merely “remarks…somewhat loosely strung 
together” (Ibid). 
 
13. It is impossible to deny that Dolto’s view of melancholy seems beholden to Karl 
Abraham (1924/1949), who describes patients in a “passive mode” (Ibid, 450), experiencing 
an “archaic form of mourning” (Ibid, 437). Abraham notes that, “the melancholic is trying to 
escape from his oral-sadistic impulses” (Ibid, 450); and melancholia is characterized by the 
“extensive detachment of the libido from the external world” (Ibid, 453) brought on by a 
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“disappointment in love” (Ibid, 456 & 459). Here, as elsewhere, Abraham seems to capture 
the infant’s world perfectly. And in his adding that later repetitions of this primary 
disappointment can bring on melancholia (Ibid, 459), we can understand, on Dolto’s terms, 
regression to the archaic due to the loss of continuity. Citing Stärcke, Abraham reminds us 
that coming to reality requires the successful withdrawal of the breast as a “primal 
castration” (Ibid,463). That we will hear Stärcke in Dolto, then, is equally undeniable. I 
believe that consistent with this is Freud’s comment on “the desire to go to sleep where one 
has slept in childhood” (1907/1962, 156). For in the infant’s melancholia, it is an archaic 
‘location,’ a dreamscape and its securing affects, that is lost—left behind in coming forward. 
I submit that what is crucial about this view of melancholia is that what is deemed 
pathological in clinic is, in fact, just a way of life for the infant. Thus, while popular 
constructs prefer the infant as a ‘digestive tube’ or ‘bundle of joy,’ psychoanalysis reveals 
the radical truth—one that resounds throughout Dolto’s project: the infant is intensely 
susceptible to suffering. I turn to consider, philosophically, just how the human subject is 
born in such a melancholic tension:  
I must carry the other and his world… Melancholy welcomes the failure and the 
pathology of this mourning…Melancholy must ever resign itself to idealizing 
introjection…The norm is nothing other than the good conscience of amnesia. It 
allows us to forget that to keep the other within the self, as oneself, is already to 
forget the other…Melancholy is therefore necessary (Derrida, 2003/2005, 160).  
I believe Dolto’s intrinsic theorizing on the human narrates a developmentally necessary 
melancholy contingent on our origins in dream-work. In this sense, it is not melancholy as 
pathology but as the formidable legacy of our unconscious heritage—i.e., an intimate 
“secrecy which holds to the responsibility for the Other… from which one does not escape, 
and which, thus, is the principle of an absolute individuation” (Levinas, 1982, 81). So I 
submit that Dolto comes to her notion of ‘constitutional melancholy’ largely on her own, 
and that she contributes something original—notwithstanding that she surely read Abraham 
and found him to be a like-minded human who was speaking a critical truth. And in view of 
Abraham’s belief that melancholia is “not as yet sufficiently understood” (1924/1949, 434), 
I suggest that Dolto can add much to our comprehension.  
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14. I went to France in the summer of 2014, between reading and writing Dolto, 
seeking a certain «je-ne-sais-quoi»—an enigma. I found it on my first full day there. I 
confess I was already in a melancholy mood, after spending hours at the «Cimétière Père 
Lachaise,» searching for a possible relative. His site was unkempt, so I slipped upon his 
mossy resting spot, falling on his grave, his «tombeau»—a homonymic play of ‘fall-water’ 
and ‘fall-from-high.’ Onlookers asked after me as I hobbled on, constructively humbled. But 
if this is how easy it was to be symptomatic in Paris, it was going to be a long trip. From 
then, I began noticing the sea of my first language, something I seldom encounter outside 
Quebec, my place of origin. Yet though I was in a cemetery, in the rain, alone, and injured, I 
was entirely unafraid—whereas ‘back home,’ my anxiety has such high walls to guard. That 
is how I overheard a graveyard guide reading an inscription to her group: «Que devient le 
rêve quand le rêve est fini?» [What becomes of the dream when the dream is done?]. It was 
an absolutely uncanny question. For it is arguably my whole question—not just of the day, 
or of Dolto and the present project, but of my life. So as I walked from the cemetery to 
Trousseau, I began to lose my sense of the misty rain that had helped my foot comply with 
my tongue, yet I became potently aware of having arrived at a most unusual destination. For 
my route, as the map suggested, was a simple trek of a few blocks—but it became, instead, a 
place of unmappable resonances. Taking Avenue de «Saint-Mandé» [saint-requested; 
homonymically, breast-requested], I entered a nearby church, «L’Église de l’Immaculée 
Conception,» drawn by architectural curiosity and the desire to explore landmarks upon the 
geography Dolto desired to return to, for free, for 40 years. I came face-to-face with an 
immense tree-like tapestry behind the altar remarkably like the one in Dolto’s home office 
on St-Jacques (AI, 231 & 233; VC2, 650 & 829). Once more outside, I found a street post 
near a «passerelle» like the one where Dolto questioned death as a child (EN, 10). Its signs 
stated that, as well as being on Saint-Mandé, I was nearing «Bois de Vincennes,» one of two 
forests in Paris—homonymically, ‘the drink of twenty cents.’ I drifted absently to 1921, 
when a graphologist suggested young Françoise drank—«boit»—obstacles (AI, 94; PF, 20; 
VC1, 114), and I couldn’t help thinking of her symbolic payment (e.g., ATP, 196; CE, 371; 
DW, 139; SS, 124 & 125f; TL, 112; VC2, 890). I might have worried about my grip on 
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reality through this bounce of sounds, except for one thing: it was amusing. So as I took in 
my soundscape, and words reverberated between past and present, here and elsewhere, life 
and texts, I began to realize that this is the life of a child—a confabulation of homonymic 
possibility as yet unlimited by reality.   
Back in Canada, I would read Freud’s discussion of refinding the familiar, and how 
similarity of sound serves the libidinal economy through dream-work as “joke work” 
(1905d, 120-122). I was, that day, simply “in possession of a childish source of pleasure” 
(Ibid, 170). Yet as I turned from Saint-Mandé to locate Trousseau, I was stunned again at the 
sight of three giant palm trees—surely here when Dolto was. And I was returned to the 
landscape of the book that made her want to learn, then unlearn, reading: Les Babouches de 
Baba-Hassein (Balesta, 1894/1902; see ATP, 82 & Ch. 4), a set of orientalist short stories 
for children. After all, here were some of the only such trees in all of Paris. And just above 
them was a high clock, «l’heure juste» [exact time], affixed to «l’Édifice de l’horloge»  
[clock building] (L’oeuil du Cartier Bel-Air Sud, 2011). «L’heure juste» is mentioned often 
enough in Dolto’s early life to be the title of a lovely children’s biography of her (Farkas & 
Ratier, 2011). Thus reading Dolto while standing, I heard echoes of her autobiography in 
this place, until the line between theory and history blurred to a vanishing point. So while 
Dolto said that she kept an excellent souvenir of Trousseau (ATP, 195), I offer that 
Trousseau kept an excellent souvenir of Dolto. For a close reader is left with little doubt that 
Trousseau’s peculiar «géographie» (homonymically: ‘I have water-written/above-written’) 
returned, in transference, the landscape of Dolto’s childhood phantasies—securitization 
unconsciously sought and found—that echoed in her work, subtly advancing. In effect, the 
thin mesh between reality and phantasy in this neighbourhood (for her and for me) evokes 
the archaic rhythm infusing her entire project. This archaic echo is the ordinary business of 
childhood, a psychical working-through to which we give a deceptively simple name: 
listening. For safely hidden beneath our adult movements in reality, a continuous call rises 
from the soft bottom of our infantile origins that we seek to refind on solid land. Dolto’s 
spectacular success in assuaging human suffering invites the conclusion that this archaic 
securitization is the source of our creative potential. I could only listen in wonder, then, on 
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refinding my archaic security in French after half a century, following my own infantile 
rupturing. For here at Trousseau, with Dolto, I learned to play again. 
 
Chapter Four: Reading & Presentification 
 
15. On her fine construction of psychical liberty, I believe Dolto incidentally but 
decisively dismisses the most significant claims of Jung and Rank. Dolto narrates archaic 
prehistory as a highly idiosyncratic, unconscious experience of audition and transmission, 
blurring the pre-subject and mother-father, wherein the fetal environment is necessarily 
impacted by parental prehistory (audition, love and suffering among others), and woven 
with variable physiological factors, such as anxiety toleration, auditory acuity, etc. It is a 
tautology that geographic, linguistic and familial proximity will enable common words to 
serve as mediating objects for the transference—but what happens from here, in terms of 
symbolization, is anyone’s guess. For Dolto’s theoretical work makes the eminent point that 
symbol formation is a dynamic process that does not happen in isolation from human 
relations. Put another way, symbols are not formed except in movement and displacement. 
In contrast, Jung seems to favour a rather more undifferentiated, static or fixed (fixated?) 
infant, we might say: “Complexities of the infantile mind stem from its original identity with 
the prehistoric psyche. That ‘original mind’ is just as much present and still functioning in 
the child as the evolutionary stages are in the embryo” (Jung, 1957/1990, 139). Yet by the 
ombilical castration, Dolto argues convincingly, every subject is already psychically unique, 
and thus set to bring something new to the world in which he arrives. Arguably, then, is as if 
while purporting to value dreams themselves, the Jungian project actually disavows dream-
work. Further, the visual symbolism inherent in Jungian archetypes ignores the primacy of 
audition in the archaic, as amply articulated by Dolto. On the key stake of audition, Dolto’s 
comment is un-selfconsciously witty indeed: «Je ne connaissais pas un mot de Jung» [I did 
not know a single word of Jung’s] (Nadal, 2006, 125). What we discover with Dolto then, 
beginning with her notion of the «phonème,» is that no dictionary of unconscious symbols is 
ever possible; rather, the unconscious uses the dictionary, so to speak. Dolto herself warns: 
“let us beware of symbolic dictionaries” (SP1, 208). And in a letter in 1962, she strongly 
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disagrees with guessing the sense of drawings from supposedly common unconscious 
experiences (VC2, 370). Further, in a letter in 1980 to Lacan, that other revenant of our 
iconic street, “My dear Jacques,” Dolto recalls how Laforgue believed Jung (and Adler) 
departed from Freud’s thought and could not be considered psychoanalysts (VC2, 668). 
Dolto actually met the aging Jung in Switzerland in 1957 (photo: VC2, 278). She recalls 
their conversation thus: 
Jung told me, ‘He [Freud] believed I wanted to take myself for a father, but it was 
him who took himself for a father and wanted me to be his son.’ See these brave 
people! It was the beginning of psychoanalysis! Only, it’s quite fine, this fascination 
of Freud’s eyes that fainted fixing Jung’s profoundly…Will we ever know what 
Freud experienced at that moment and what there was in Jung of a «désir» for the 
death of Freud, who served as an Oedipal substitute for him? I think Freud saw very 
clearly. Jung didn’t want to continue along Freud’s line…He wanted to leave the old 
father and create a school on the side…That it was an Oedipal story between them is 
very possible. But whose? Neither was father nor son...Jung didn’t want to admit the 
primacy of the Oedipal Complex (VO,110). 
The ombilical castration is also precisely where Dolto’s engagement with Rank is found, 
though it must be inferred, as there is no record of a physical or literary encounter. Rank 
spoke of what is before the Oedipus Complex in 1924 (1924/1993, 216); and he is credited 
as the first to use the term “pre-Oedipal” publicly, in 1925 (1996, 43). But from this word, 
they depart. In a nutshell, Rank believes “every infantile…anxiety or fear is a partial 
disposal of the birth anxiety” (Rank, 1924/1993, 17; also Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1967/2004, 77). Dolto, however, considers that while birth introduces new sources of 
anxiety, the pre-subject (indissociably ‘co-me mother-father’) has long been managing 
impingements. Further, Dolto believes unhesitatingly that birth brings possibilities for 
pleasure: «La naissance est une libération: on naît à la liberté» [Birth is a liberation: we are 
born into liberty] (SP1, 133).Besides, “anxiety is a result not a cause of the failure of «allant-
devenant»” (JD, 199). It is actually remarkable to witness how Dolto is so Freudian that her 
work cannot help but discount those who divert or dilute Freud’s drive theory by 
overlooking his vital discovery that “what is essential in dreams is the process of the dream-
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work” (1933a, 8). Meanwhile, Dolto’s elaboration of the ontogeny of the transference in our 
archaic prehistory, and of the work of the transference in our idiosyncratic psychical 
structuration, makes imaginary any ‘collective unconscious,’ and secondary any ‘trauma of 
birth.’ 
 
Chapter Five: Society & Interdiction 
 
16. Olivier Douville offers a perfect example of what may, or not, be the après-coup 
of Dolto’s radio programs. Born in 1953, he was 16 in 1969, when Dolto first aired S.O.S. 
Psychanalyst! Did he listen to it? We cannot know. Nor can we know what he or any French 
analyst has read of Dolto’s abundantly available works. Yet Douville ends up interested in 
reports in the Senegalese literature of the 1960s of children with precocious phobia and 
mutism, thought to “be responded to by ancestors” (2004, 189, 198, 201 & 210), and viewed 
as “the parent of the parent” (2004, 199). He sees in his Paris clinic 8-year old Cumba (Ibid, 
210-215)—fragile, nearly mute, dependent and violent—her name, he notes, meaning ‘old 
woman.’ He reports her mother disbelieving she was pregnant and worrying about losing the 
baby, and he deems the child further marked by a ‘game of translations’ between her origins 
and France, and between her parents (Ibid, 205 & 212-213). During a pivotal session, he 
says Cumba leaves “the angle of the wall” and puts a paper in his pocket, as he concludes 
she was «une présentification d’une nostalgie mélancolique» (Ibid, 215; italics mine). 
Despite his odd usage of that term, is it even possible not to hear Dolto? Yet she is 
unreferenced. Douville shows, then, how French psychoanalysis has been operating for 80 
years in the ‘climate’ of Dolto, whose legacy to generations is ever-present, if unspoken. 
Ironically, too, it is as if the problem of (the lack of) references in Dolto self-perpetuates. 
 
17. While in Paris in July of 2014, I had the opportunity to spend about six hours at 
the «Archives Françoise Dolto,» 21 rue Cujas. It was an odd feeling to have read so much 
about Dolto, and so to find myself at home where I had never been before. The room is 
situated in the area normally occupied by a courtyard in a bourgeois Paris home. It is wood-
paneled and lined with shelving that features, floor to ceiling, a selection of Dolto’s 
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favourite books and various items that include three «poupée-fleurs», several exquisite 
watercolours and sculptures by Dolto, and over three dozen small owls (see AI, 5, 220-221 
& AI, cover; for owls in her own art, e.g.,ATP, 215 & 1979c). The publications that fill the 
shelves include posters for post-humous conferences; published and original transcripts of 
books; hundreds of unpublished articles and notes; and the oldest document, her medical 
dissertation from 1939, including Pichon’s hand-written comments on her first draft. In 
countless folders, meticulously organized by her daughter and a volunteer team, one 
witnesses how each paper was hammered out on a manual typewriter and repeatedly revised, 
as Dolto tirelessly reworked her material for decades. And overlooking everything along the 
only wall without shelves is a huge photograph of Dolto almost two metres high whose eyes 
follow the observer with a penetrating look of wonder, pain and a silent plea—as if it were 
the gaze of an ageless power to be reckoned with, who suffered much. The archive was 
unofficially hosted for me that day by the archivist’s infant daughter, nearly one and just 
learning to walk. Crawling from one shelf to another, she pulled herself up, looked towards 
me, and gestured to the materials with one hand and some verbalizations. It seemed so apt 
that a baby would be my guide, as Dolto insisted all her life that she had learned everything 
from babies, her peers, and that one should always regard infants as «un hôte d’honneur» 
[honourable host] (De Mezamat, 2008a; LO1, 119). I believe Dolto would have wanted it 
just like this. For the archive, that archaic repository, is first and foremost a place of 
transferences—a condensation of the past in the present whose area of influence in après-
coup is immeasurable. Thus its significance can only ever make an effort at words. As it 
turns out, about a year to the day later, Dolto was deservedly honoured by a relocation of 
these materials to the prestigious «Archives Nationales» in the heart of Paris, rue des Francs 
Bourgeois.  
 
18. In her dissertation of 1939, Dolto cites 21 texts by Freud; 17 by Pichon; 5 each 
by Morgenstern and Laforgue; 3 each by Bonaparte and R. De Saussure; 2 each by A. Freud 
& Leuba; 1 by Jones; and 5 by others (MA, 269-271). Of interest, these references appear in 
the first edition but are absent from all further editions: 11 in French alone 
(1940,1961,1965,1971,1976,1979,1986,1988,1994,1998,2008; see worldcat.org, 2015a).The 
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number of references required (about 450) to write a research text on Dolto now, on the 
other hand, is a powerful witness to the breadth of her work and the productivity of her 
thought—fertile grounds indeed. 
 
19. I am grateful to Lou Andreas-Salomé for offering a possible interpretation for the 
name of Laforgue’s analysands, «Le Club des Piqués» [The Stung], in her incidental sharing 
of a French proverb I either never knew or forgot: «Ce n’est pas le plus mauvais fruit que la 
guêpe choisit de piquer» [It is not the worse fruit that the wasp chooses to sting] (Pfeiffer, 
1983, 168). And I am grateful to Dolto, without whom I might have continued to overlook 
Lou, whom Karl Abraham believed had a “deep and subtle intelligence for psychoanalysis” 
(Livingstone, 1984, 173). Space precludes an extended discussion, but some uncanny 
material emerges. First, Lou was with Rilke in Paris in 1902-1910 (Steig & Michaud, 2001), 
coincidentally during both the birth and near-death of little Françoise. Lou’s reference to 
Freud (rather than her father) being the “father-face that presided over her life” (Pfeiffer, 
1972, 241) also opens speculation about an early history of loss. Our suspicions are 
strengthened when Lou reports that “On Narcissism” is her favourite Freud paper (Pfeiffer, 
1972, 217), and she writes a fair bit on primary narcissism (1977). In an odd coincidence, 
the preface for Lou’s autobiography, «Ma vie» [my life] (Pfeiffer, 1979), is written by 
Jacques Nobécourt, whose daughter, Emmanuelle (Who’s Who in France, n.d.) produced a 
film series (Nobécourt, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d) and a movie (Nobécourt & Simonetta, 
1978) about Dolto—and who himself carries the name of our revenant. But while Dolto felt 
she could not write well, Lou is lyrical: «Nous avons une mémoire, mais nous sommes le 
souvenir» [we have memory, but we are remembrance] (Andreas-Salomé, 1977, 164). And 
though Lou dismissed Jung for his “proclivity to premature synthesis” (Leavy, 1964, 150), 
she herself had a strong tendency toward synthesis, as noted by Freud (Livingstone, 1984, 
209) and her own biographers (Ibid, 188)—while in sharp contrast, Dolto plays productively 
with questions and enigmas. So what prompted Dolto’s identification? After reading 
virtually all of Lou’s corpus in English and French, I believe Dolto’s comment was of a 
personal nature, as a resonance with a similar-enough other, not only on the word. We are 
first alerted to a person with infantile suffering, perhaps, in a story about her lost childhood 
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name, Liola ou Lolia (Pfeiffer, 1979, 29), or Lyolya (Livingstone, 2984, 12), of which 
nothing more is said; Lou also admits a “strong infantile regression, or a desire to linger in 
childhood” (Pfeiffer, 1979, 19). Furthermore, Lou (a prolific writer) maintains that creativity 
thrives best in «récepteurs passifs» (Pfeiffer, 1983, 158), and that psychoanalysis was the 
gift of a lifetime (Leavy, 1964, 90). But more than these overt references, an affect of 
wounding and loss comes through Lou’s fiction, letters and theory. I wonder myself, too, 
why it feels impossible to name her Andreas-Salomé—she is just ‘Lou’—and why her 
corpus evokes a closed door and a call. In Lou Andreas-Salomé, I believe we have an ideal 
subject (for someone fluent in Russian) to follow the trace of infantile remnants and 
daydreams. For the faint echo of a little girl with a hard history informs a haunting 
loneliness that transits Lou’s texts and cannot help but lure the wounded reader. Perhaps it 
drew Dolto too. 
 
20. We find a fine example of a “condensation”—a richly tethered mediating 
object—in the project inspiring our own, Freud’s “DaVinci.” Naming the bird that visits the 
cradle, Freud uses geier (rather than the better German word, milan) for DaVinci’s nibio 
(modern, nibbio; in Italian, bird and kite). Freud’s editors concede that “in the face of this 
mistake, some readers may feel an impulse to dismiss the whole study as worthless” (1910b, 
61; also, 82f). Quite the contrary, I believe the ‘error’ makes Freud’s study even more 
valuable. For DaVinci was forced to leave the city of Milan, the secure home wherein “his 
position was assured” (Ibid, 65). And with Freud’s use of geier, milan is ironically made 
more palpable by its absence, as the act of translation hides in the very same movement 
whereby it reveals the word-thing, milan, that bridges the subject and his biographer. For by 
it, we hear an echo of Freud’s own departure from home: “Deeply buried within me there 
still lives the happy child of Freiberg, the first-born child of a youthful mother, who received 
his first indelible impressions from this air, from this soil” (1931, 259).  Melancholy 
permeates Freud’s loss of “the transference on place”—proliferations of unconscious 
associations to a private history—as silence itself becomes a memorial to that wound. 
Enigma signs even the publication, as what Freud considered “the only beautiful thing I 
have ever written” (Gay, 1988, 268) continues to be derided or ignored. In fact, this unique 
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work is of vital interest as a witness to the unconscious—not just DaVinci’s, but Freud’s. 
For it offers another example of the transference in texts as testimony to a kind of ‘co-
dreaming’ that happens as Freud reads, then writes, DaVinci during his own biographic 
project. Thus Freud demonstrates, beautifully indeed, the dream-work that is at stake as 
words paradoxically ventilate and repress affect, inscribing narrative revolt—and how a 
problem of translation is exactly what we would expect from such a potent investment of 
what is latent. 
For another instance, we turn to the re-analysis of Freud’s “Wolf-Man” (1918[1914]) 
by Torok and Abraham (1986). In a letter in 1986, Dolto comments briefly that they worked 
“around the signifiers of the Russian language” (VC2, 812). Ironically, Torok and Abraham 
admit, “We do not know Russian…it permits us to…follow better the avenues of our own 
listening” (1986, 34). A detailed discussion would indeed take us down strange avenues. But 
Derrida’s preface suffices, in which he observes a “cryptic motivation,” a “proper-name 
effect,” by which Torok “induces the word-thing tieret,” to advance the “importance for the 
Wolf-Man of the root tr, tor (tor: the past tense of tieret)” (1986a, xlvii). Derrida aptly 
concludes that Torok “work[ed] doubly, in his own name, on his own name” (Ibid). For in 
what he deems to be the Wolf-Man’s word-things, Torok’s own are unconsciously inscribed. 
And his lack of Russian (as-if being an absence of a problem of translation) cannot prevent 
the investment of what is latent in Torok. To this, I add only the playful discovery that Taroc 
was “Freud’s favourite card game” (E. Freud, 1961, 99f; see also Boehlich, 1990, 180). 
Thus on two phonemes echoing enigmatically, the transference in texts is a witness to the 
enduring force of archaic objects, and of the rogue unconscious associations that trade affect 
between us in human engagements. 
For one further, powerful example of words as mediating object for the 
transference—in particular, of richly associated words, or condensations—I return to 
Dolto’s corpus, to «huit jours» [eight days]. So frequent is its repetition that it has predictive 
value: whether Dolto retells or prescribes, the time is invariably ‘eight days.’ 
Homonymically, the phrase is nearly «oui joue» [yes play]. We detour from Dolto’s home to 
nearby rue Pajou [no play], to the maternal great-grandmother’s house where her parents 
went alone every Friday, as Dolto reminisces about learning time based on routines: “The 
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days were marked by, ‘This is the day when…’” (EN, 43). Yet others in her circle use the 
unit too: her mother (PF, 40); father (PF, 97); brother (PF, 59); sister-in-law (PF, 369); 
maternal grandmother (PF, 109); daughter (VC2, 403); and husband (VC2, 422). The family 
record also gives this as the time it took the maternal great-grandmother to die in 1925 (AI, 
102); and how long it took Dolto’s husband, Boris, to die in 1982 (AI, 212). The weekly, La 
Semaine de Suzette, is described as arriving every «huit jours» (EN, 68)—and in a letter to 
her father in 1921, her handwriting analysis (in its latest issue), her mother’s illness, and her 
wish to see him are all in «huit jours» (PF, 20; VC1, 114). In four texts alone, I count 34 
instances and make no claim to exhaustivity (e.g., PF, 66,89,114,150,164,320,331,454; 
VC2,50,324,480; EN,68,73,86; ATP,89,92,130,137,157,226,233). Even Lacan uses it (VC2, 
337), as does a friend, Agnes (VC1, 254); while both Dolto and Mme Chapdelot (Ch.6) use 
«une huitaine» [group of eight] (VC1, 454 & 484), an old colloquialism for “one week” 
(Wiktionnaire, 2014). Also, her patient Leon (age 8) is said to answer eight days later the 
questions asked eight days prior (IIC, 297). In fact, the Romans used an eight-day week for 
about eight centuries from 800 BC, the «nundinae» [no dinner; and its uncanny homonym, 
which I will not ‘hear’ until the near-end of my project: «non/nom dit est [is]» (Wikipedia, 
2014i). On the one hand, then, a speech habit circulates among proximal individuals. On the 
other hand, something excess and unquantifiable seems to be conveyed, as if not only 
phonemes but a cycle were engrained—as if, Dolto suggests, the dates of repetitions begin 
in archaic rhythmic exchanges (CE, 257; JD, 251; SP3,144). We further muse that two 
phonemes are a ‘rhythm in double time.’ Dolto believes a «rhythm binaire» heralds uterine 
life (CE, 94-95, 257 & 350; DQ, 70; IIC, 90, PJE, 105), leading to «rhythms de 
déplacement» (EM, 274; LF, 61), as we unconsciously seek a lost rhythm (SP1,148; 
also,CE, 350; DV,213;EV,62; JD,24). She also observes that some patients return about pain 
on key dates (Dolto & Roudinesco, 1986, 17). Here, we recall Freud on Dora: “We had only 
two hours more work before us. This was the same length of time which she had spent in 
front of the Sistine Madonna, and…the length of the walk which she had not made round the 
lake” (1905a, 119). Thus things settled for a year in my mind until, as I walked alone one 
morning, contemplating the teaching day that lay ahead, a thought suddenly ‘arrived’: 
Jacqueline died at 18, its digits readable (as Mititi spoke) as «dix-huit» [homonym: ‘say 
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eight’]—as-if a suggestion of play with ‘eight days.’ Once heard, the elusive seemed so 
obvious. Yet I scribbled it down quickly, afraid to forget it. Such is learning in après-coup: 
not just the impossibility of boundaries of knowledge, subject, time or space, but the risk of 
losing what is fleeting, as the transference trickles in quietly, unexpectedly, amid the thunder 
of reality. Yet «huit mois» [months; homonym: ‘me’] later (honestly), I discovered while 
sifting through my old research on local architecture that the correct word for a male 
automat (evoking «automaterner»?) on a clocktower is a «jaquemart» [homonym: ‘jacques 
dead’ or ‘jacques bites’]—the female being a «jacqueline» (Wikipédia, 2014l). And pre-
modernity, uncannily, a «jacquemart» was the peasant who rang the angelus (Ibid; see also 
Note 10 & Ch. 6). Further, the lost nanny was said to be 18, the address at Gustave-Zédé 
(the first home without her) of our infant born in 1908 (who died in 1988), marked so deeply 
by the War of «14-18.» Left to dream, I hear «le glas» of that bell’s rhythm from an archaic 
soundscape, effacing absence. For as words flow between us, and the transference circulates 
wildly, we each tell a finely tethered story that began long before us, that will go on when 
we are gone. 
 
21. The question of aggression brings us to complex theoretical intersects. In oral 
passivity, the infant lives in unconscious fusion ‘with, as-if, through’ another. The 
importance of inertia to understanding oral passivity cannot be overstated, being essential to 
grasping how projection could ever enter that scene as primary aggression. I begin with 
Freud’s description of the infant: “sleep is his natural condition, from which he is roused 
only by his bodily needs. As soon as these are satisfied he falls asleep again…[and] 
continues his fetal state” (1907/1962, 222). As Winnicott puts it perfectly, in the oral passive 
stage, “the environment that impinges cannot yet be felt by the infant to be a projection of 
personal aggression, since the stage has not yet been reached at which this means anything” 
(1949, 185); it is “a state of not having to react, which is the only state in which the self can 
begin to be” (Ibid, 183). We are, in sum, at a time prior to projection when regression to the 
monad is the only defense possible. We should further recall that at this juncture in 
development, the pulses of conservation are indissociable from the sexual pulses (Laplanche 
& Pontalis, 1967, 148). Of course, coming to reality introduces impingements, while the 
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prime consideration for the psychical system throughout this process will remain, as always, 
economic efficiency—thus, the necessity of maintaining henceforth what is closest to 
inertia, i.e., the least energy expenditure possible. In turn, this primary condition of inertia 
will favour the forward transport (disposal) of unconscious affects as opposed to their 
accumulation (as anxiety), along with the least possible expenditure on defense (leading to 
the production of the ego, we could say, as an environmentally-contingent, routinized, 
economically efficient individual adaptation). For, as Freud explains it, “the mental 
apparatus is first and foremost a device for mastering the excitations which would otherwise 
be felt as distressing or have a pathogenic effect” (1914b, 85); and “a sexual aim…consists 
in replacing the projected sensation of stimulation in the erotogenic zone by an external 
stimulus which removes that sensation by producing a feeling of satisfaction” (Freud, 1905c, 
184; italics mine). We can restate this in terms of fusion as economical efficiency, since the 
other is indistinguishable from the «pré-moi,» thus defense is moot. Fusion will be favoured 
economically whenever projection is impossible (due to not having been achieved 
developmentally) or unfeasible (due to the demands of defense being too great), such as 
during too-rapid changes in the infant’s life, when «repères» may be lost, triggering 
“regression to dependence, in order to get behind the period at which impingements became 
multiple and unmanageable” (Winnicott, 1949, 193).  And in that a mother essentially 
“provides a setting” (Winnicott, 1956/1992b, 303) for the onset of projection on a high 
frequency of lures, there is a potent discussion to be had of the sequelae of moving or 
immigration, as the loss of language mediation, being a threat for the (fragile) infant as 
serious as the mother’s prolongued absence—though it would take us far afield. Still, 
Dolto’s notion that the phoneme is a transitional object and audition is primary in coming to 
reality, long before vision, should seed fields of thought for a future uptake. 
For emergence in reality is, as Freud describes it, contingent on continuity under the 
control of the pleasure principle: “Satisfaction must have been previously experienced in 
order to have left behind a need for its repetition” (1905c,184); in a footnote, Strachey adds, 
“an ‘experience of satisfaction’ is only a special application of Freud’s general theory of the 
mechanism of wishes, as explained in …The Interpretation of Dreams…The whole topic 
links up with Freud’s views on reality-testing” (1905c,184f). So here we have, as clearly as 
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we ever will, the indispensible idea of continuity from the archaic as symbolic filiation with 
a precocious experience of pleasure that predestines the receptivity of the passive infant to 
the detection of «repères» as potential sites of investment, i.e., projection. Thus, projection 
enables “sublimation” as an economic efficiency, as Freud says: “powerful components are 
acquired for every kind of cultural achievement by this diversion of sexual instinctual forces 
from sexual aims and their direction to new ones”(1905c,178; also 1921,139). Freud stresses 
projection is a reaction to fear: “[the paranoid] projects his unconscious impulses outward” 
(1908/1962, 291), as “the self-reproach is repressed in a manner which may be described as 
projection” (1896c, 184)—“projecting…into the external world” (Ibid, 209). Further, 
projection is a normative process: “The mechanism is frequently employed in normal life 
and it is from such normal examples that one must proceed” (Freud, 1906/1962, 33). 
Reciprocally, interprojections in the monad—de facto, ‘fusion’—is an economic response to 
phobia as a perception of the sudden loss of continuity (absence of any securitizing 
«repère»). Aided by Dolto’s thinking, we thus understand projection to the exterior as an 
attempt to repeat on the side of reality the economics of interprojection, to reduce the need 
for defense and return what is closest to inertia (given perceptual impingements cannot be 
prevented from encroaching, especially prior to displace-ment, i.e., walking). Put another 
way, identification is an experiment in projection that enables differentiation. And thinking 
with Dolto, I offer that projection is an unconscious means of complimentary regulation by 
which the subject is making a «semblable» (in phantasy), as a process requiring greater 
libidinal investment (thus constructed progressively) following the developmentally prior 
process of simply finding another «semblable.» In other words, sometime during the oral 
‘aggressive’ stage, projection begins as the aggression of primary narcissism. Klein defines 
“projective identification” in 1946, precisely as an unconscious effort to incite 
complimentary behaviour (Spillius, 2011, 126). In turn, “projective identification” is almost 
named by Dolto in 1939, when she writes, “thought at the anal stage is characterized by 
mechanisms of identification, of projection…inherent to the sado-masochistic ambivalence 
of object relations” (MA, 36; italics mine).  
Pausing, we observe that the capacity for projection is a sign that the oral passive 
stage is being surpassed (later regressions notwithstanding). And here we encounter the 
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notion of “sublimation,” which Freud first elaborated in the context of DaVinci (Laplanche 
& Pontalis, 1967, 148)—a concept of staggering significance to psychobiography as the 
exploration of the vicissitudes of the pulses. As Ledoux puts it, sublimation and 
symbolization are “close terms in the thinking of F. Dolto,” for whom sublimation has a 
“technical sense” linked to symbolic castration and the displacement of aims favoured by the 
super-ego, as the capacity for “archaic pleasure to be surpassed” (2006, 326-327). From 
1939, in fact, Dolto theorizes on sublimation as “the utilization of libido in social activities 
tolerated or stimulated by the exterior world,” such that “repression is silent, without 
anxiety” (MA, 19); while “if sublimations are insufficient…there will be a tension that 
‘translates anxiety’” (MA, 20). Freud himself explains sublimation in terms of primary 
narcissism, as a retreat of libido into the «moi» critical to its formation, as sublimation 
functions to “unite and link” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967, 466). As Freud states, “If this 
displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it may also be described as sublimated 
energy…If thought processes in the wider sense are to be included among these 
displacements, then the activity of thinking is also supplied from the sublimation of erotic 
motive forces” (1923, 45). We stop to ponder the phenomenal watershed: thought, as the 
inheritor of dream-work, is itself sublimation. In sum, we are witnessing the developmental 
progression from a passive-state human being to the increasing need (and, hopefully, 
capacity) to project in response to environmental impingements by cathecting identifications 
on the exterior, rather than by the primary defense of regression. This transition from oral 
passivity to the ‘anal-sadistic’ stage is effectively an ‘oral aggressive’ phase—alternately 
conceptualized as an ‘oral stage’ divided into a passive and a later active/aggressive phase. 
Successful sublimations mark the subject with the capacity for fluidly displacing libido onto 
appropriate socio-cultural objects (including words) as environmentally-contingent affective 
investments, optimizing routinized defenses as economic efficiencies.  
Chapter Six: Conclusion ~ Trace & Publication   
 
22. Françoise Dolto met Alain Cuny (1908 – 1994) while she was on her way to 
René Laforgue’s, most likely in 1934 when he first became her analyst. Cuny apparently 
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blocked the road, furious and baring a revolver, saying it was for Laforgue, «le salaud» 
[scum]; deadpan, Dolto said she wanted to talk to Laforgue first, then joked Cuny would be 
better off eating supper with her, as he could always kill Laforgue the next day (ATP, 123-
125). Delighted by her offer of play, Cuny dined with her at «L’Hotel de la Loube,» in 
Roquebroussane (PF, 119), a splendid evening in which he recited Baudelaire. So began a 
profound friendship that endured until her death. By 1936, they were both active members 
of Laforgue’s «Club des Piqués» (AI, 124 & 131), chanting its parodic theme song (VC1, 
526-527)—and their lives, begun the same year, would soon overlap again at the «Maison 
Blanche» where they worked (VC1, 490-491; photo:VC1, 507). This adult asylum was 
oddly at the juncture of rue Secrétan (named after Dolto’s paternal grandfather), and bore 
the same name as the «Maison Blanche» near her home, though it was unrelated to it. Here, 
Dolto and Cuny remained during the mid-1930s (VC1, 507), unhappy with the demoralizing 
overcrowding, after which they each turned to the work that would result in their becoming 
two of their country’s most well-known citizens: Dolto, as a household word whose work 
forever shaped psychoanalysis, education and family life in France; and Cuny, as one of his 
country’s most popular actors (Wikipédia, 2014a). The letters between them for more than 
five decades are potent with genuine affect, conveying a bond beyond temporalities. He will 
tell her that he is braided with her because she supports his mutism (VC2, 4), that she helps 
him overcome the interdiction against breathing (VC2, 14), and that she is the moon that 
makes his day (VC2, 549). She will confess to him that she is afraid of death, and she 
always holds something in reserve (VC2, 14); and she pleads to hear from him so she won’t 
be forgotten in a «trou» [a hole] (VC1, 491). The reader stops to muse that she was content 
for decades at «trousseau»—a homonymic cluster of hole-hop, hole-water, hole-bucket, and 
hole-high, as well as “dowry”—in sum, holes with means of escape. The game of sounds is 
reciprocal, for he says she is his symbolic and real «manger,»  a play on the English 
“manger” and French «manger» [to eat] (VC2, 309). Then, in a letter he writes her on a 
«samedi 20» [Saturday the 20th], he toys with the date’s homonyms: «ça me dit: vain?» [It 
tells me something, vainly?]; and «ça me divin» [it makes me divine, it divines me] (VC2, 
494). He also names his new home «Savon noir» [black soap], as a phonemic inversion of 
«non-savoir» [non-knowing] (VC2, 494f)]. Even simple exchanges over family events 
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convey a feeling that reality is merely something to manage atop their deep, unconscious 
tethers. And when Dolto worries about not being able to write her dissertation, saying she 
needs “eyes looking at me, obliging me to talk…waiting for me to talk” (AI, 124), Cuny 
sends her two porcelain panther eyes (Ibid). Thus the woman marked as a child for her 
«yeux ronds» [round eyes; an idiom for great curiosity] (EN, 9; DW, 67) begins her 
watershed work (AI, 124). His letter of 1988 is the last public correspondence (VC2, 901), 
and a late photo honours their 50-year trust (VC2, 761). 
 
23. The statue of Jean de la Fontaine is the most famous object at the Jardins de 
Ranelagh (Wikipédia, 2014n). Erected in 1985, it features a full-bodied Lafontaine looking 
down on a crow giving a fox a big coin (photo: AI, 94). Yet prior to it stood an earlier 
version (1891), which is the one young Françoise actually saw daily. So a visitor familiar 
with Dolto has the odd feeling of a reversal in time, as if its revision had been influenced by 
her “symbolic payment” (CE, 371; VC2, 890; SS, 124 & 125f; TL, 112; ATP, 196; DW, 
139). That first statue featured Lafontaine’s bust, a woman with wings and clouds, a child 
with wings, various animals, stalks of wheat, and a crow holding cheese (Ass. du Musée 
Jean de la Fontaine, n.d.). Arguably, though, another statue here is far more prominent: a 
white marble structure of a young fisherman dragging a net holding a human head. Erected 
in 1883, it is Longepied’s, «Pêcheur ramenant la tête d’Orphée dans ses filets» [Fisherman 
bringing back the head of Orpheus in his nets] (Wikimedia, 2012). I daydream about the 
effect, over years, of her passing by this adult head, and its being the burdensome catch 
(debris, even?) of a powerful child. Further, it returns beloved «Oncle Pierre,» who died at 
the «Sphinx de la Tête des Faux» [‘of the head of false ones’], which became a site of 
pilgrimage for the family (AI, 79; VC1, 60f, 207, 209 & 391). 
 
24. I believe Segal’s symbolic equation is a translation on Kleinian grounds of that 
which on Doltoian grounds we will describe as continuity with the archaic via «repères.» 
Segal explains: “It is the time of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, described by Freud, when 
the mind creates objects which are then felt to be available. A leading defense mechanism in 
this phase is projective identification…[wherein] the subject in phantasy projects large parts 
236 
 
of himself into the object, and the object becomes identified with the parts of the self that it 
is felt to contain…[This is] the beginning of the process of symbol formation” (1957/1981, 
53). Meanwhile, congruent with what we understand, with Dolto, as the normal reality of the 
infant, Segal describes how “excessive projective identification equates the object with the 
projected part of the subject…treating the symbol…as part of oneself” (1994, 396; also 
1981, 12 & 134). This thinking about the infant dovetails perfectly Winnicott’s note that we 
find the “root of symbolism in time” (1953/1971, 6)—for we are precisely, or rather 
nebulously, at the infant’s entry into time-space. I also consider Winnicott’s discussion of 
how transitional phenomena become spread over the “intermediate territory” between inner 
and outer reality (1971a, 5) to be enriched by Dolto’s narration of symbolic filiation, in that 
coming to reality is mediated by the primary processes, thus we can predict just such a slow 
formation of associations, a “spreading,” as ordinary dream-work—elsewhere also explained 
by Dolto in terms of ‘transferential colouring,’ ‘diffusion’ and ‘diffraction.’ Further, I 
believe Winnicott is describing the symbolic equation when he narrates “the infant’s 
hallucinating and the world’s presenting, with moments of illusion for the infant in which 
the two are taken by him to be identical” (1945, 142); only with Dolto, we are always 
prompted to consider the critical value of the audition of priorly-invested phonemes in those 
presentations.We also invoke Abraham’s pertinent reference that, “communication by means 
of symbols is chosen by those who must not give free expression to their thoughts and yet 
are unwilling to suppress them completely. Symbolism is both revealing and concealing” 
(1911/1955, 243). Is this not, in effect, the infant’s life in a nutshell? Abraham further 
clarifies that, “the symbolism which occurs in the dream occurs in all unconscious 
activities” (Ibid, 242), and this is what Dolto finds, as dream-work on phonemes enables our 
engagement with reality as a ‘refinding.’ Dolto’s theorization on these matters is clear from 
1939, where she describes how the “liquidation of the castration complex is translated by the 
dream” (MA, 206), and how a child’s symbols reveal the «âge affectif» of the subject (MA, 
53). In each bringing to their theoretical work the après-coup of their precocious infantile 
trauma, I believe Dolto and Segal reveal how early inscription begins, and the permanence 
of this record as a legacy to thought. 
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25. Dolto says, “all I write seems too elliptical” (VC2, 453), yet her words harbour a 
curious beauty: 
In 1957: Desire for interpsychic communication is the fundamental desire that above and 
beyond the whole world of sensory objects of pleasure for the body is essential to the 
human being…They recognize, in something, one and the other as «semblable» in 
desire, and one by the other complementary together as granted in this interpsychic 
encounter...The «lien» that unites them beyond their separation is an «ensemble» of 
signs that, little by little, are elaborated in language.The imaginary sensori-motor 
representation of this language recalls the joyful encounter of the sensory presence, 
and the signifier of the psychical ‘more of life’ that accompanied the encounter 
permits the temporalisation of desire while waiting for the re-finding of this 
other…These memorized traces are as much in the body of the desiring one as in the 
souvenir of the sensorial exchanges that represent the living with the pleasure that 
accompanied their encounter.The other thus becomes woven with the body proper of 
the one who desires his return.The other is thereby guarantor of my existence in 
space and time, the same way that for him, being his elective other, the souvenir that 
he has of me is guarantor of his existence…Elective affinities between human beings 
derive from these perceptions, holders of subtle accords between them, that make 
them recognize each other as «semblables» and at the same time constantly new and 
never totally knowable, provoking each other to a creative renewal of mutual 
adaptation… Freudian decoding by psychoanalysis opens onto the origin of language 
necessary to co-living, but reveals the punctual contingency of interpsychic 
communication through time and space between individuals of the human race (SS, 
244-246). 
In 1975: Desire continues its route that develops in spiral with an expansive dynamic 
movement  through that which, in the body of man, is growth and multiplication, by 
the adjunction-disjunction-elimination, that relational life symbolises in expressive 
language in its continual «mutance» [shedding, mutation], fruits of its partitions. 
This desire, when its dynamic is immured in its isolation instead of continuing in its 
expansive destiny, sees the spiral inflect its movement, enroll upon itself and, after 
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phantasmatic consumptions of structures of the anterior «moi» that have become 
ersatz exterior elements, encyst language and the symbolic function inherent in 
human desire, making him scission his own potentialities taken for an elsewhere and 
invert, without ever ceasing, if no one comes from the exterior of this individual to 
break the vicious cycle (PS, 88-89). 
 
26. Freud first met Yvette Guilbert in Paris in August 1889, encouraged to her show 
by Mme Charcot (Steel, 1982, 84). They met again on her tours to Vienna, eight between 
1892-1929 (Freud Museum London, 1992, 209-232). Guilbert, whose portrait hangs in 
London next to the Princess and Lou Andreas-Salome (Ibid, 86), was Eva Rosenfeld’s aunt 
(Ibid, 85). On an evening with Guilbert and her husband, Max Schiller, Freud shared 
poignantly,«Meine prothese spricht nicht mehr französisch» [My prosthesis no longer 
speaks French] (Scheidhauer, 2010, 70 & 70f; Steel, 1982, 87). And when Freud passed 
through Paris on his way to England, Guilbert was among the few guests (Steel, 1982, 89). 
Oddly enough, there is no mention of Freud in her memoirs, literally a ‘who’s who’ of her 
time (Guilbert, 1927 & 1929)—as if she holds Freud closely, privately. But in January, 
1938, she writes about him in her column in «Ce soir»: “We are stupified to realize that we 
had never been interested in our mechanism” (Scheidhauer, 2010, 75; my translation). 
Guilbert never read Freud (Steel, 1982, 90), but her interest in the wellsprings of creativity 
prompts his letters to her and Schiller in 1931: “It is really interesting for me to have to 
defend my theories against Mme Yvette and Uncle Max” (E.Freud, 1960, 442). Freud 
explains to her how Saint-Anne can only be grasped, “if we understand the particularities of 
the infancy of Leonardo” (Ibid, 443). Given that he did not much enjoy music, Freud’s 
relation to Guilbert seems ironic to some (e.g., Charuty, 2015, 83). Yet in fact, Guilbert was 
not a singer but a «diseuse» [sayer]: a highly compelling story-teller—and a lay scholar of 
ancient French songs. Further, we learn from his colleague that Freud’s disinterest in music 
was rooted in his regarding it as an “unintelligible language” (Hitschmann, 1957, 27). In his 
letter to Guilbert in 1938 (E.Freud, 1960, 494), Freud bemoans missing, due to illness, “the 
chance to become young again for even an hour thanks to the «charme magique d’Yvette»” 
(Ibid). Guilbert’s corpus is ripe for psychobiographers—while a curious love of French 
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persists as a subtext in Freud’s life, and one feels he might well have chosen Paris instead of 
London were it not, paradoxically, for “France being impossible for us due to the language” 
(E.Freud, 1960, 493-494). Ambivalence entirely resists a settling here. 
 
27. Of the biographer’s dream, Leon Edel says, “In the last stages of the writing of 
his life, he [Henry James] came to me in my dream world, early one summer morning” 
(1987, 3). And Winnicott notes, “When I write a paper for this [British Psycho-Analytical] 
Society on any subject, I nearly always find myself dreaming dreams which belong to that 
subject” (1949,177f). Even scientists at the Salpêtrière note one gets more dreams asking for 
a journal of them (Arnulf, 2014, 17). In fact, Freud said the same thing a century prior, after 
walking the same grounds and translating Charcot: “Anyone who takes an interest in dreams 
remembers a considerably greater number of them after waking” (1900b, 572). So I wonder, 
is writing biography an ‘asking for dreams’? 
 
28. The «Archives Françoise Dolto» issued its most recent book in 2008, for the 
100
th
 anniversary of her birth. «Archives de l’intime» (Potin, 2008), a project steered by 
Dolto’s daughter, Catherine, is unarguably the most beautiful of the corpus. A rare 
collection is here, including extracts from «Traversée du siècle»—Dolto’s unpublished co-
autobiography with Boris, as well as memorabilia and images of her art reproduced nowhere 
else, even in the huge volumes of correspondence (VC1 & VC2). I believe its most precious 
content is a little poem from the journal of 16-year old Françoise dated April 1924. The time 
of writing should not be overlooked, being a work produced in «l’entre-deux-guerres.» In 
1924, Dolto is herself between her birth (1908) and her rebirth in name, via marriage (1942). 
Her beloved Irish nanny is gone (1909); as is Jacqueline (d.1920); her uncle-fiancé-
godfather, Pierre (d.1916); her maternal grandfather, Arthur Demmler (d.1912); her paternal 
grandmother, Marie-Charlotte Landry (d. 1921); and a paternal grandfather she never met, 
Henri Marette (d.1880). On the other hand, her youngest sibling, Jacques, has just arrived 
(b.1922); and still alive are the elder of greatest influence, her maternal great-grandmother, 
Cécile Overnay («Dan-mé Étan») (d.1925); her maternal grandmother, Henriette Marguerite 
Secrétan («Dan-mé») (d.1938); her parents and other brothers; and Mlle (Élisabeth 
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Weilandt), governess since 1919 (AI, 97; VC1, 23) (d.1957). So, from the last pages of the 
last text, I offer “The Dead” (AI, 240), as I wish to give Dolto the last word in this work, 
more hers than mine:  
I live with the dead more than with the living. 
Around me, I feel, I see, I hear their soul, 
and their plaintive call claims me unceasingly, 
remainder of the love I had for them…before! 
I love this place, calm and silent, 
where some rose bush, some leafless flower,  
marks their home until…Eternity… 
It is a cemetery, yes, but it is joyful. 
And yet, it is not only to cemeteries  
That I go when I want to speak with them, 
to come closer to them and then tenderly hear 
the worried whisper of familiar shadows. 
And I don’t need to be kneeling either. 
Often, in the screeching crowd that brushes by me, 
I have felt a hand tapping my shoulder, 
An invisible being telling me, “Think of us!” 
. 
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